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Preface
The idea for this book emerged at a workshop in the Network for Civil
Defense History held at Lund University in the autumn of 2018. In
the delightful surroundings of the Old Bishop’s House, our conversa-
tions brimmed with observations about the similarities and differences in
national civil defence efforts during the Cold War and theoretical discus-
sions about how to approach and study such histories. Notwithstanding
the interdisciplinary composition of the group, there was agreement
that the field of civil defence history would benefit from a common
theoretical vocabulary and a sustained effort in the direction of transna-
tional and comparative history. It was against this background that we
decided to collectively explore the merits and potential of the concept of
sociotechnical imaginaries in a branch of history so deeply affected by the
development of science and technology. When we met again, this time in
wonderful Copenhagen at the height of summer in August 2019, most
of the chapters began to take shape. We thank Riksbankens Jubileums-
fond and the Danish Research Council (grant no. 8018-00047B, Danish
Civil Defence during the Cold War) for their support in making these
workshops possible.
Shortly after lockdowns were introduced in many countries during
the spring of 2020, we moved our collaboration online, submitting and
commenting on drafts through a web-based collaborative platform. The
pandemic and its waves have had deep effects on societies, communities,
families and individuals across the world. For teachers and scholars of
v
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history, neat plans and schedules were disrupted due to irregular access
to archives and new forms of teaching that encroached on research time.
What stands out, however, from our perspective as editors, is just how
rewarding and gratifying scholarly collaboration has proved to be during
this time. We cannot thank the contributors to this volume enough for
the spirit and energy with which they have taken on this task under novel
circumstances.
It has been our priority from the outset to make this volume as
widely accessible as possible, and we are deeply grateful to the Book
Fund at the Lund University Library for covering the Open Access fee,
and thereby making the entire volume available to access and download
via the Palgrave Macmillan website. We would also like to thank Den
Hielmstierne-Rosencroneske Stiftelse for its financial support, which has
proved extremely valuable in preparing the manuscript for publication.
In that context, we would also like to express our gratitude to Catherine
Schwerin, who has improved the manuscript with great care and a sharp
eye for every detail. Finally, we thank Molly Beck, Lucy Kidwell and Joe
Johnson at Palgrave Macmillan for their interest in the project and their
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction: New Paths in Civil Defence
History
Marie Cronqvist, Rosanna Farbøl, and Casper Sylvest
For a number of years after the end of the Cold War and the proclaimed
ascendancy of Western liberal democracy, nuclear civil defence and emer-
gency preparedness were considered by many to be a relic of history,
a curiosity or vaguely familiar target of ridicule. In the 2020s, this is
no longer the case. As expressions of fear and a desire for survival and
resilience should the worst happen, institutions and practices of civil
defence have both predated and outlived the Cold War. In the age of
terrorism, global pandemics, rising political tensions between nuclear
armed states, and a deepening climate crisis, emergency preparedness
M. Cronqvist (B)
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is once again making headway on the political agenda in many coun-
tries. Continuities between Cold War civil defence and new logics of
(in)security (Masco 2013; Deville et al. 2014; cf. Collier and Lakoff
2008) have become apparent, and authorities, politicians and defence
intellectuals seem to be increasingly interested in updating material
infrastructures and revisiting core ideas of civil defence.
In a striking example of the Cold War echoing in our own time, in
May 2018 the Swedish Government distributed a leaflet entitled If crisis
or war comes to every household in Sweden. It highlighted the impor-
tance of emergency preparedness, asking citizens to prepare and stockpile
food and necessities and instructing the reader to ‘educate yourself!’,
while providing the location of nearby shelters (MSB 2018). By using
an expression already established in the 1940s and repeated constantly
throughout the postwar era—‘If the war comes’—the Swedish govern-
ment today is forging a peculiar connection between the Cold War nuclear
mindset and twenty-first-century narratives of fear and crises. In Europe,
new initiatives are also being introduced by the European Commission in
its multibillion-euro research programme Horizon Europe, a part of which
prioritises research into ‘Civil Security for Society’. Apart from improving
situational awareness, data-driven decision-making and the understanding
of risk exposures among authorities, the Commission seeks ways to culti-
vate a ‘“culture of disaster preparedness” for citizens, communities, public
administrations, business companies, practitioners…’.1The COVID-19
pandemic, which began in 2020 and has wreaked havoc across the globe,
has further fuelled demands for emergency preparedness in societies that
aim to be resilient in the face of a wide variety of risks. In particular,
the dilemma of how to communicate appropriately with the public in
times of crisis has multiple parallels in the history of civil defence. Old
technologies have also been revived. The pervasive climate crisis has, for
example, brought new attention to the use of shelters as vital protec-
tion from cyclones, hurricanes and wildfires, concluding a shift that began
during the late Cold War away from threats coming from a ‘stable enemy’
and towards an all-hazards approach to threats posed by ‘nonspecific
adversaries’ (Lakoff 2007).
At the same time, scholars are taking a new interest in risk, resilience
and emergency management. A recently funded American project, ‘Rein-
venting civil defence’, seeks to develop ‘effective non-partisan nuclear risk
communication targeted at Millennials’ in an effort to inspire change
in nuclear weapons politics (Karl and Wellerstein 2017; Karl and Lytle
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2019). Meanwhile, within the developing and highly publicised field of
Global Existential Risks, the value of civil defence thinking and mate-
rial structures like refuges and shelters is being revisited with a view to
assessing their importance for ensuring the survival of humanity in the
face of new all-encompassing threats like super volcanoes or mismanaged
geoengineering projects.2
As we enter an era in which civil defence and crisis preparedness
measures are on the rise, it is key to remember past lessons. One
motivation for this book lies in its aligning of historical research and
contemporary perspectives. Planning, executing and experiencing insti-
tutionalised forms of emergency preparedness did not historically—nor
does it today—take place in isolation from societal, cultural and political
agendas. The chapters in this book also testify to the intricate and complex
entwinement of civil defence with regional, national and global contexts.
Historical knowledge is relevant to understanding the logic, results and
consequences of contemporary attempts to secure the lives of citizens.
Thus, we must return to civil defence and study its modes of operation,
its material expressions, its underlying policies and mindsets, and not least
its imaginary, performative qualities. How were civil defence objectives
conceived, how were they implemented and with what consequences for
societies and everyday existence? What forms of power were embedded in
these systems and practices and how were they exercised?
Historiography, Trends and Aims
Cold War civil defence already attracted the attention of political and
cultural historians in the 1980s (Boyer 1985; Vale 1987; May 1988), but
the historiography developed significantly after the end of the Cold War.
For a long time, the research field generally focused on conditions in
the USA, which coalesced with a more general interest on the part of
American contemporary historians in looking back on Cold War culture
or ‘atomic/nuclear culture’ from the vantage point of hindsight.3 Studies
by Guy Oakes (1994) and Tracy C. Davis (2007) have focused on the
entanglement of civil defence, administration and bureaucracy, Kenneth
D. Rose (2001) and David Monteyne (2011) have researched the Amer-
ican shelter system, and Laura McEnaney (2000) has demonstrated how
the home became a Cold War front line as civil defence contributed to
a militarisation of domestic space. Recently, the first truly comparative
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study of the nature of civil defence in the USA and the Soviet Union has
appeared (Geist 2019).
When European researchers developed a sustained interest in the
history of civil defence, gradually from the early 2000s, one side-effect
was an expanded chronological scope. From the clear focus on the
1950s that characterised the scholarship on American Cold War culture,
later decades, not least the 1960s and 1980s, began to receive atten-
tion. Though the perspectives changed, the themes largely followed
those in the established American research field: the organisational and
political rationale behind civil defence (Hennessy 2002; Grant 2010),
civil defence literature and propaganda (Molitor 2011; Cronqvist 2012;
Stafford 2011), the role of cultural norms and emotions in mobilising
the citizens around national values (Cronqvist 2015; Biess 2009; Hogg
2016), bunkers and shelter construction (Bennett 2011; Berger Ziauddin
2017b; Bennesved 2020) and the role played by scientific uncertainty
about the properties and of radiation in public appraisals of civil defence
(Bennett 2018; Sylvest 2020a).
Taken together, the field of civil defence history today displays a
rich and productive mix of political and cultural historical perspectives
following the so-called cultural turn in the 1990s. While much has been
achieved in terms of charting the political significance and cultural dimen-
sions of civil defence, especially within national frameworks,4 important
dimensions are still missing. With this edited volume, we aim to build on
previous research on civil defence by actively seeking to integrate three
central dimensions.
First, the role of technology, science and materiality in preparing for
and rehearsing the worst warrant more attention. For decades histo-
rians have taken an interest in science and technology, as the voluminous
subfields of the history of science and the history of technology testify,
and the study of material culture is now also well integrated into historical
scholarship. Yet, these aspects of history and historical experience have not
so far been systematically explored in civil defence history. Several scholars
have taken important steps in this direction,5 but the field of civil defence
history would benefit from a more sustained and theoretically informed
focus on these themes.
Second, transnational and comparative perspectives in civil defence
history are long overdue. As a subfield of history—a discipline with strong
ties to the nation—dealing with a core task of the state, defence, it is
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hardly surprising that it has remained overwhelmingly national in orien-
tation. Still, it is striking how limited our knowledge is about variations
both within and between countries when it comes to how civil defence
developed as a response to the threat of nuclear war and the effects it
had on societies, politics, cultures and citizens. Moreover, existing schol-
arship has not paid enough attention to the actors and arenas that were
central for the transnational circulation of ideas about civil defence and
emergency planning. They include international organisations like NATO
but also more informal ties between civil defence officials or professionals
in allied and neutral countries.
Third and finally, we seek to bring more attention to the divergent
and various everyday experiences of civil defence in different contexts.
These contexts are not only national, but sometimes also—and perhaps
more importantly—local or regional.6 Experiences of civil defence also
include imaginaries and narratives about Cold War civil defence that
inform collective memory, as well as affective patterns or structures that
actively contribute to contemporary views of civil defence and the forms
of emergency management now enjoying political attention. What Cold
War imaginaries linger on in our everyday lives today?
It is in dialogue with the abovementioned historiography on civil
defence that this volume seeks to formulate new ambitions for the field
and bring together scholarship on Europe during the Cold War. We
aim to advance the field by collecting histories of civil defence within
an analytical framework that (1) enhances our understanding of similari-
ties and differences in national civil defence efforts as well as in local and
transnational dynamics and (2) places special emphasis on the interplay
between technology, materiality, culture and politics in civil defence. Indi-
vidually and collectively, the chapters in this book pursue these aims, and
in doing so they operate on three levels of analysis that are highlighted in
the organisation of the volume.
The geographical scope of the book is centred on North-Western
Europe. We assemble and seek to integrate historical scholarship on civil
defence in six European countries—Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands,
West Germany, Switzerland and the UK—and one international organisa-
tion, NATO. While the majority of these countries were united by NATO
membership and a transatlantic bond, several chapters focus on the role
of neutral countries. Sweden and Switzerland are important to include
because of their extensive efforts and prominent status in civil defence.
After all, these countries allocated the largest funding per capita to civil
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defence in the postwar era (Vale 1987). It is clear that the countries that
invested the most in civil defence in the Cold War were indeed those that
culturally, materially and financially were not too bruised by the Second
World War (Cronqvist 2012).
Chronologically, the focus of the book is the Cold War. However, in
contrast to much previous research on Cold War civil defence, our time
frame extends well beyond the 1950s and early 1960s in order to grasp
some of the interesting trajectories and discrepancies not only between
different countries, but also between different periods composing the
postwar era. The Cold War is thus more an empirical time frame than
a concept with inherent and distinct qualities across more than four
decades. As will be apparent in the chapters that follow, other chronolo-
gies appear that are equally key to understanding civil defence in its
historically and socially situated contexts. Some histories will need to be
anchored in the Second World War or the interwar period, while others
will resonate with present-day visions of civil defence.
Sociotechnical Imaginaries:
Introducing and Exploring a Concept
The ambitions of this volume place several demands on our analytical
approach. Apart from being attentive to the role of science and tech-
nology in social life and being open to transnational dynamics, it also
aims to capture some of the most fascinating aspects of civil defence as
policy, materiality, practice and vision while being able to accommodate
a wide range of themes that coalesced in the institutions, practices and
norms of civil defence. We argue that the concept of sociotechnical imagi-
naries developed by Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim (2015) provides
a productive starting point for exploring new paths in civil defence histo-
riography. In its latest incarnation, Jasanoff has defined sociotechnical
imaginaries as
collectively held, institutionally stabilized, and publicly performed visions
of desirable futures, animated by shared understandings of forms of social
life and social order attainable through, and supportive of, advances in
science and technology. (Jasanoff 2015a: 4)
The underlying logic of sociotechnical imaginaries is based on the
idiom of co-production, a way of seeing ‘knowledge and its material
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embodiments’ as ‘at once products of social work and constitutive of
forms of social work’ (Jasanoff 2004: 2). The concept has been devel-
oped with the explicit ambition of uniting two views of modernity: a
focus on utopias and dystopias prevalent in much political theory (and
cultural studies) and a sophisticated understanding of the role(s) of
science and technology in social life developed, above all, within Science
and Technology Studies (STS).
Apart from a strong attraction to social theory, STS is characterised by
a sustained interest in specifying how science and technology matters.7
This is clearly reflected in a recent edited volume (Jasanoff and Kim 2015)
where the concept of sociotechnical imaginaries is explored on a very
broad canvas. The foci of the individual contributions cover a wide variety
of topics, some of which deal with themes and dynamics that are related,
if indirectly, to central concerns of civil defence history.8 As an analytical
concept, sociotechnical imaginaries appear to be catching on. An openness
towards interdisciplinary scholarship and a theoretical and methodological
approach that resonates in the contemporary human sciences are certainly
part of the explanation. Substantially, the concept also appears to capture
central features of modern existence. Sociotechnical imaginaries provide a
gaze on the future that in part serves to structure it. Yet, they are rarely
complete nor are they static, and they are often the subject of debate and
contestation.9
In developing the concept, it has been an explicit ambition of Jasanoff
to bridge two binaries that tend to stifle research in the human sciences.
The ambition to overcome the first binary, that between ideas and mate-
riality, is reflected in the very term sociotechnical imaginary , and this is,
arguably, especially relevant for that large part of civil defence activities
that contended with the threats posed by nuclear weapons technologies.
After the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, few observers
doubted the devastation that these weapons could produce; yet, at the
same time, it became a peculiar quality of nuclear and later thermonuclear
weapons that their subsequent use was restricted to testing and political
signalling. Consequently, the threat of nuclear war was both vivid and
real, and many of the defensive measures employed had a tangible mate-
rial quality to them—yet the war itself unfolded in a future that was the
province of the imagination (Grant and Ziemann 2016).
The second binary that this approach seeks to transcend, that between
agency and structure, points towards analytical strategies that combine
‘some of the subjective and psychological dimensions of agency with the
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structured hardness of technological systems, policy styles, organizational
behaviours, and political cultures’ (Jasanoff 2015a: 24). This ambition
fits well with a marked trend in historical scholarship over recent decades:
the rapprochement between cultural and political history where the cate-
gory of ‘politics’ is expanded to encompass ‘the political’ and where
power is conceived as multidimensional and not merely instrumental.10
This ambition must be integral to any history of civil defence intent on
venturing beyond personal testimony or organisational history. Even a
brief glance at civil defence history highlights the difficulties of sepa-
rating the political from the cultural—exercises and evacuation plans are
obvious cases in point—and recent work is clearly in tune with these
broader developments in historical scholarship (e.g. Cronqvist 2015). By
foregrounding this ambition, however, Jasanoff encourages scholars to
exploit a wide variety of source material that is available. In the case of
civil defence, this includes official archives and policy documents, mate-
rial artefacts and architecture, scientific work and philosophical reflection,
official information and popular culture, as well as personal memoires and
oral history.
Finally, Jasanoff has concluded the first sustained attempt to demon-
strate the reach and insights of the concept by providing a heuristically
useful structure for analysing the operation and life cycle(s) of sociotech-
nical imaginaries. This structure is divided into four phases. The first,
origins, examines the mutual imbrication of scientific advances, techno-
logical developments, and social and political ideas in their historical
context in order to determine how the contours of such imaginaries
emerge. The second phase, embedding , is, broadly speaking, concerned
with the institutionalisation of an imaginary whereby ‘the merely imag-
ined is converted into the solidity of identities and the durability of
routines and things’ (Jasanoff 2015b: 323). The third phase, resis-
tance, refers on the one hand to the fact that large-scale reorganisations
of human societies or their infrastructure typically involved slow and
tardy processes. On the other hand, resistance points to the political or
normative opposition that is a typical response to the formulation and
institutionalisation of new imaginaries. What is resisted, however, can be
anything from specific policies to visions of the future and their underlying
social norms. The final phase, extension, places special emphasis on how
imaginaries travel in time and space, often with the assistance of ‘transla-
tion agents who are capable of moving imaginaries from one sociopolitical
setting to another’ (Jasanoff 2015b: 333).
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Applying and Adjusting the Concept
The concept of sociotechnical imaginaries provides an instructive frame-
work for exploring the hybridity of the ideational and the material that
is characteristic of civil defence efforts as they developed during the Cold
War. Apart from drawing attention to the intersection of science, tech-
nology and social life and facilitating transnational perspectives, there
are several, more specific reasons for why the concept is productive and
promising to think with in advancing civil defence history.
First, it is highly useful to place technology centre stage in approaching
civil defence. After all, civil defence efforts were initially conceived as secu-
rity measures against technologically mediated, man-made risks, above all
forms of warfare that targeted civilian populations from the air by means
of conventional explosives and later atomic bombs. In this early phase as
well as in later developments, the logic and operation of civil defence were
dependent on the employment of new scientific knowledge and a host
of modern technologies (from technologies of governance and commu-
nication to those of underground construction and radiation detection)
in an extensive and often overwhelming quest to ensure the survival of
civil society. Science and technology were imbricated in this core ratio-
nale from the outset, since the foremost threats were products of weapons
technologies based on scientific advances.
This circular logic and central (co-produced) predicament of civil
defence became especially urgent and challenging in the nuclear age. It is
a predicament, we contend, that comes into sharper focus by approaching
civil defence history through the analytical perspective offered by a focus
on sociotechnical imaginaries. The reference to desirable futures in the
definition of the concept is likely to raise some eyebrows when the
concept is applied to civil defence. Yet, notions of the desirable and the
undesirable are hard to disentangle, and many of the agents involved
in formulating, pursuing, practising or upholding civil defence were not
blind to risks or problems but sought to manage, solve or contain them
in ways that supported a desirable (or a least undesirable) future. Whether
and how such imaginaries were supportive of or opposed to specific devel-
opments in science and technology, however, is best seen as an empirical
question.
Second, the nature and history of civil defence efforts suggest that
they contain a deep, perhaps even constitutive, ambivalence between fear
and hope—an ambivalence that has also been found in wider studies of
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nuclear culture (Boyer 1985; Kinsella 2005; Hogg 2016; Sylvest 2020b).
Significantly, however, while the hopes invested in civil defence activities
may have had utopian qualities (see, e.g., Rose 2001), they just as often
reflected a longing for maintaining or extending into a postwar situa-
tion the operation of existing norms and aspirations governing social life.
The central place accorded to social norms in the study of sociotechnical
imaginaries is highly beneficial in this respect. Whether the objective was
to prepare for the worst or to discipline citizens (or both), the repeated
imagination, rehearsal and contemplation of the next crisis, the next war
and the postwar condition were central to civil defence.
The historical analyses in this book turn up many examples of how—
within civil defence organisations, among civil defence personnel and in
material civil defence structures—such dynamics translated into complex
representations and constructions of technologies, often with a view to
entrenching or shifting social norms (see also Clarke 1999). In this
context, a key ambition invested in the concept of sociotechnical imag-
inaries is to illuminate how power relations and governance affect—and
are affected by—visions of the role of technoscience in society. The excep-
tional shelter policy of Switzerland during the Cold War is an instructive
case in point. As Berger Ziauddin (2017b: 676–677) has convincingly
argued, Swiss nuclear bomb shelter policy can be viewed as a state-led
attempt to install ‘arrangements of protection and control into the private
sphere’ with a view to engineering ‘docile, calm Cold War subjects’. This
extensive quest to produce a ‘bomb-proof’ society was partly based on
and served to extend existing national mindsets relating to the Swiss
nation and the role of the family within it.11 The ambivalence towards
technology underlying this quest—channelled through vivid imaginations
of fear and hope in malevolent and positive uses of technology—may even
be constitutive of civil defence conceived as a sociotechnical imaginary.12
There is, then, ample potential in exploiting the concept of sociotech-
nical imaginaries for charting new courses in the field of civil defence
history. On the other hand, the concept does not constitute a formula
that can be applied to civil defence history without adjustments. While
useful to think with, the analytical value of central dimensions of the
concept can be developed and explored empirically using civil defence
as a case. If done right, we suggest historical scholarship on civil defence
can therefore both benefit from and contribute depth and texture to the
ambitions that inform this approach. While the individual studies in this
book display variation not only in how the concept is operationalised in
1 INTRODUCTION: NEW PATHS IN CIVIL DEFENCE HISTORY 11
relation to specific research questions but also in their reflections on the
value of this perspective, the exploration of the concept and its analyt-
ical potential undertaken in this volume has been informed by a collective
theoretical discussion. Two themes that warrant further elaboration or
comment have stood out: the notion of life cycles and the question of
scale.
First, while the conceptualisation of a ‘life cycle’ of imaginaries is
heuristically useful, we think the phases identified by Jasanoff are most
productively thought of as entangled and potentially reversible processes.
In existing civil defence history, processes of (what could be seen as)
embedding and resistance have been examined in some detail. It is not
hard to see why. The sheer scale and complexity involved in designing,
implementing and promoting a wide-ranging system like civil defence
has long fascinated historians, just as the multiple forms of resistance
such projects encountered—whether geographical, technological, finan-
cial, political, aesthetic or psychological—have attracted attention. Simi-
larly, extension is clearly important for advancing the transnational and
comparative dimensions of civil defence history, since it directs atten-
tion to the circulation, transfer and reception of ideas and artefacts that
undergird civil defence conceived as an imaginary.
On the other hand, theoretically speaking it is far from clear whether
and how embedding, resistance and extension follow one another or
develop simultaneously. For example, embedding is absolutely central
in studying civil defence, yet it is not clear at what point embedding
takes on the character of extension. The category of origins, while logi-
cally predating the other phases and referring to an inescapable facet of
historical scholarship, is deceptive. Indeed, to many historians it would
be hubristic to straightforwardly claim to have identified the origins of
any sociotechnical imaginary, as every apparent innovation is anchored
in and remediates other structures, imaginaries and technologies. Several
studies have pointed to important continuities between the Second World
War and the early Cold War with respect to civil defence (Grossman
2001; Cronqvist 2012), while other studies have emphasised the impor-
tance of the interwar imagination of the next war for the development of
defence practices during the Second World War (Bennesved and Norén
2020). In short, the linearity with which the notion of a life cycle and
its various categories seem to be imbued risk installing a teleological bent
in the concept of sociotechnical imaginaries. A great number of histor-
ical questions—for example about everyday experiences or memories of
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civil defence or the waxing and waning of the salience of nuclear war—
are likely to require these processes to be collapsed and studied as deeply
entangled, which in turn will disrupt lingering notions of sequence or
‘progress’.13
Secondly, the question of scale presents a practical problem in opera-
tionalising the concept of sociotechnical imaginaries for the study of civil
defence history. In Jasanoff and Kim’s work, the original definition of
the concept was national in scope, but for good reasons this has been
abandoned. While it does make sense intuitively to speak of national civil
defence policies and activities as constituting sociotechnical imaginaries,
it may be possible to speak also of local, regional and transnational imag-
inaries, rival imaginaries or official and unofficial imaginaries just as it
may be possible to conceive of forms of resistance as separate imaginaries
(Farbøl 2021). In the same vein, imaginaries can be studied at various
level of abstraction. Thus, whether civil defence is conceptualised as a
separate imaginary in a particular historical context or whether it is best
approached as forming part of or intersecting with a broader imaginary
operative in a particular time and place (e.g. security politics, industrial
modernity or a particular understanding of national purpose) will depend
on a combination of empirical factors and the guiding scholarly interest.
In this context, it is also worth highlighting that several contributions
to this volume also seek to attune the concept of sociotechnical imagi-
naries to one of the central challenges of civil defence history: to resist
the temptation to study civil defence from the top down and instead
to direct scholarship to how it was lived and practised on the ground,
which was not always consistent with blueprint designs. Clearly, central
dimensions of civil defence history are embedded in the decisions of poli-
cymakers and the documents and routines of organisations, but they are
also produced by groups and individuals who through training exercises
and everyday activities accorded the phenomenon alternative or additional
meaning and purpose. In these practices, as they manifested themselves on
different levels, we learn more about the ‘collectively held, institutionally
stabilized, and publicly performed visions’ (Jasanoff 2015a: 4) of both
peaceful and postwar futures. In the conclusion to this book, we offer
further reflections on how the empirical analyses of this volume contribute
to the approach.
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Outline of the Book
The chapters in this book can be read as independent empirical analyses,
but as a collective they provide valuable insights into transnational and
translocal connections, similarities and differences in European histories
of civil defence. The reader may identify an overall chronological move-
ment from the early 1950s to the 2010s, but more importantly, there is
a three-step thematic movement in the volume. The first two chapters
deal predominantly with the planning and structuring of civil defence,
the following four chapters largely centre on exercising and communi-
cating civil defence, whereas the final two chapters are concerned with
the resisting and remembering of civil defence.
In the following chapter 2, ‘Order on Their Home Fronts: Imag-
ining War and Social Control in 1950s NATO’, Iben Bjørnsson connects
the history of fear to civil defence efforts and analyses the discussions in
NATO’s Civil Defence Committee and Senior Civil Emergency Planning
Committee following the introduction of the H bomb in the 1950s. By
highlighting the relation between security politics and civil defence at a
crucial period in the Cold War, the chapter is an ideal starting point for
the volume as a whole. The main objective of NATO military and civil
defence planners at this time was to secure the morale and obedience of
populations by combining previous wartime experiences with scientifically
grounded knowledge of the challenges of the thermonuclear age. In her
analysis, Bjørnsson argues that the concepts of civil emergency planning
and civil defence were closely intertwined with social control and hence
also desirable social orders. The chapter also illustrates the importance of a
transnational view of civil defence by paying attention to the coordination
beyond national borders.
The planning of civil defence is also addressed in Chapter 3, ‘The
Imagined Disastrous: West German Civil Defence Between War Prepara-
tion and Emergency Management 1950–1990’, by Jochen Molitor. The
experiences of the Second World War were in no other country as complex
as in the two Germanies. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the concept
of civil defence appeared attractive after notions of ‘total defence’ had met
with resistance and accompanying shelter construction programmes were
discontinued. Officials who had initially spoken of ‘disasters’ to avoid
the unpopular term ‘war’ began focusing on less obtrusive, attainable
all-hazards measures such as volunteer relief work from the mid-1960s
onward. Similarly, as Molitor shows, the majority of German physicians
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involved in disaster medicine pragmatically imagined scenarios up to, but
not exceeding, a nuclear reactor meltdown or isolated nuclear strikes. In
the wake of political détente and various technical disasters during the
1980s, most critics came to agree that at least some specialised preparation
for more extreme scenarios might be warranted and did not necessarily
amount to warmongering.
The following four chapters shift the focus from civil defence as a
writing desk product to the different challenges facing the practitioners
of civil defence on various levels and in different countries. Exercising
and communicating civil defence brings to light the professional and
everyday practices. Chapter 4, ‘Normalising Nuclear War: Narrative
Scenarios, Imaginative Geographies and Sites of Leisure in 1950s Britain’
by Jonathan Hogg, directs our attention to the localised social, geograph-
ical and discursive contexts in which civil defence was anchored. There is
a clear element of planning and structuring here, but since Hogg situates
it on a local and not national or transnational level, the enactment and
narrativisation of civil defence are at the centre of inquiry. The chapter
brings up the narrative scenarios that were created to frame civil defence
exercises, their public representation and also the sites of leisure and forms
of civic engagement linked to civil defence activity.
Chapter 5, ‘Embedding Preparedness, Assigning Responsibility: The
Role of Film in Sociotechnical Imaginaries of Civil Defence’, studies film-
making in two neighbouring countries that differed both in terms of their
political position in the Cold War and in the scale of their civil defence
efforts: Sweden and Denmark. The comparison of the two countries finds
a considerable degree of similarity in how films and their circulation were
used to frame technologies and script and perform social norms during
a period when the H bomb disrupted existing notions of civil protec-
tion. Zooming in on the functions of film in imaginaries of civil defence
during the long 1950s, Bennesved and Sylvest argue that the difficul-
ties of embedding sociotechnical imaginaries of civil defence in the early
nuclear age are incapsulated in these filmic attempts to recruit volunteers
and mobilise citizens for the cause of preparedness.
The thematic focus of Chapter 6 is the role of volunteering women
in civil defence, and the scene here is the Netherlands. In ‘“The World
is Her Home’: The Role of Women Volunteers in Dutch Civil Defence
in the 1950s and 1960s’, Dick van Lente compares the efforts to set up
and maintain a civil defence organisation with a campaign designed to
prepare Dutch women for dealing with the consequences of a nuclear
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attack. Van Lente argues that the relative success of the women’s organ-
isation, compared to the poor performance of the male-dominated civil
defence organisation, is best pursued in the context of changing views
of the general role of women in Dutch society at the time. Indeed, van
Lente identifies a conflict between the imaginary of civil defence advanced
by Dutch civil defence authorities and the ideals and self-understanding
of women volunteers, which was based on a rearticulation of social
responsibility in the face of the Cold War.
Chapter 7, ‘Ruins of Resilience: Imaginaries and Materiality Imag-
ineered and Embedded in Civil Defence Architecture’, brings up yet
another area of civil defence practice, namely the material and tech-
nological history of civil defence training. Rosanna Farbøl examines a
specific architectural phenomenon here, the so-called ruin town, that was
built as a civil defence training ground. The phenomenon was present
in several countries and Farbøl’s particular case is Denmark. By analysing
the ruin town as a stage for enacting and performing the anticipated war,
she demonstrates how the ruins textualised and spatialised a sociotech-
nical imaginary that emphasised resilience and regeneration. The material
powers of the ruins, in turn, standardised and homogenised the imag-
inary. In fact, Farbøl argues that ruin towns caused a ‘taming’ of the
nuclear catastrophe and helped reinforce existing social norms and visions
of the good society.
The last two chapters in this volume bring up different aspects of
reacting to, resisting and remembering civil defence. In Chapter 8,
‘Framing Civil Defence Critique: Swiss Physicians’ Resistance to the
Coordinated Medical Services in the 1980’, Sibylle Marti brings up
the so-called Coordinated Medical Services in Switzerland, whose task
was to create prevention measures for a future nuclear war through an
all-encompassing system of underground hospitals and first-aid stations.
Marti analyses the criticism and resistance from different groups in the
1980s, and one in particular, Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR),
who refused to serve in the Coordinated Medical Services and in doing
so gained much public and media attention. As Marti shows, by envi-
sioning the impossibility and hopelessness of a life after a nuclear war, PSR
challenged the authorities’ sociotechnical imaginary with widely acclaimed
alternatives.
Finally, in Chapter 9, ‘Remembering Desirable Futures? Civil Defence
Memories and Everyday Life’, Marie Cronqvist and Matthew Grant
explore to what extent the concept of sociotechnical imaginaries can be
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employed to examine civil defence as remembered. Using oral history
sources from Sweden and the UK collected in the 2010s, they discuss
the memory work of civil defence on three levels: localities, temporalities
and mediations. Their analysis points to not only the ever-present and
remaining narratives of resistance in both countries, but also the extent to
which civil defence memories tend to diverge from the neat paths of any
civil defence sociotechnical imaginary. It also shows that there is a certain
‘fuzziness’ of everyday life which problematises the binaries set out in
the sociotechnical imaginaries framework regarding ideas/materiality and
structure/agency.
The concluding chapter of the book provides reflections on the
potential and limitations of the concept of sociotechnical imaginaries in
historical scholarship. It also sums up the findings in the book as a whole
by bringing forth the principal empirical similarities and differences that
emerge from the chapters. Finally, we highlight the value of civil defence
history for current imaginaries of security for European civil societies in
the face of a highly diverse range of real and perceived threats.
Notes
1. Annex 6, Horizon Europe Programme (HORIZON), Draft Work
Programme 2021–2022, 6. Cluster 3: Civil Security for Society,
Version 16 October 2020, pp. 140ff.
2. See, for example, Hanson (2008), Baum et al. (2002), Jebari
(2015), and Turchin and Green (2017). See also http://immort
ality-roadmap.com/sheltersmaps2.pdf (28 January 2021).
3. See Weart (1988, 2012), Whitfield (1991), Henriksen (1997), and
Boyer (1998).
4. On USA civil defence history, see, for example, Brown (1988),
Oakes (1994), McEnaney (2000), Rose (2001), Garrison (2006),
and Davis (2007). On Germany, see Biess (2009), Diebel (2017);
on the GDR, see Heitmann (2006). On the UK: Grant (2010),
Douthwaite (2019). Canada: Burtch (2011). Sweden: Cronqvist
(2012, 2015), Bennesved and Norén (2020), Bennesved (2020).
Denmark: Sylvest (2018, 2020a), Farbøl (2020). Switzerland:
Berger Ziauddin (2017a, b), and Berger Ziauddin and Marti
(2020).
5. Recent work has ventured into some of these areas. See, for
example, Masco (2008), Monteyne (2011), Grant (2019), Deville
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et al. (2014), Douthwaite (2019), Berger Ziauddin (2017a), and
Berger Ziauddin and Marti (2020). Cf. also Berger Ziauddin et al.
(2018).
6. Recently, studies of urban civil defence have demonstrated the
value of a localised perspective, see Singer (2015), Schregel (2015),
and Farbøl (2020).
7. STS scholarship has played a major role in drawing attention to
the social import of non-human entities and materialities, how
anything from microbes to buildings matters in social life. This
dimension of STS scholarship is primarily associated with Actor-
Network Theory (ANT) and the work of Bruno Latour. See Latour
(2005).
8. These include studies of US military science policy in the early
Cold War (Dennis 2015) and the risk assessments underlying
contemporary global health policy (Lakoff 2015).
9. See Sismondo (2020: 505). For examples of recent studies that
deploy the concept to study airspaces and oceans as well as sustain-
able energy provision and the fourth industrial revolution, see
Lawless (2020), Robinson (2020), Sovacool et al. (2020), and
Schiølin (2020).
10. Especially in Germany, this form of history that places special
emphasis on the role of communication in social life has been
developed under the heading of ‘new political history’. See Stein-
metz and Haupt (2013).
11. The intimate relationship between civil defence, identity, statehood
and citizenship in the nuclear age has been noted by a number
of scholars (including Grant 2011; Cronqvist 2012; Deville et al.
2014; Sylvest 2018).
12. By retrieving visions, structures, practices and materialities of civil
defence and exploring their relations to science and technolo-
gies, the concept may also carry potential for integrating civil
defence with contemporary discussions of cultural heritage. See,
for example, the discussion in Rindzevičiūtė (2019).
13. We thank Matthew Grant for raising this concern.
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CHAPTER 2
Order on Their Home Fronts: Imagining
War and Social Control in 1950s NATO
Iben Bjørnsson
‘Keep Calm and Carry On’. The iconic UK wartime poster is one of many
examples of governments instructing people how to behave in war or
crisis. From Duck and Cover cartoons, to farmers’ handbooks, civil popu-
lations grew used to seeing such instructions in the twentieth century.
In this chapter, I ask what ideas they built on. What were the origins
and expressions of those ideas, their traces in modern history and their
development with (thermo)nuclear weapons?
The subject of analysis is the NATO Civil Defence Committee and the
Senior Committee for Civil Emergency Planning. Being fora for exchange
and (some degree of) coordination between Western countries, these
committees are obvious but understudied sources when dealing with civil
defence cultures and attitudes. They will be analysed in a broader frame-
work of Western scientific culture, total war and, not least, the theoretical
framework of the sociotechnical imaginary.
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The time frame is the 1950s, which established the thermonuclear age.
It is also NATO’s first decade of existence in which it negotiated its role
in the new world order.
The article falls in four sections. First, I introduce the theoretical frame-
work of the study, as well as the historical background: the modern
Western cultural tradition of dealing with human fear in times of crises.
Following this I investigate how war and civil populations were imagined
in NATO in the 1950s and, in the next section, how this was underpinned
by science. Lastly, I ask what NATO thought could or should be done. In
the conclusion, I will tie the analysis to the theoretical framework, to say
something about the larger picture of what preparedness meant to NATO
and Western society.
Sociotechnical Imaginaries and Concepts of War
The notion of the sociotechnical imaginary rests on the idiom of co-
production, which holds that development is powered by intertwined
processes of technology and science informing culture and politics, and
vice versa. Sociotechnical imaginaries are such negotiations of science into
power structures. Hence, they are normative: they express (un)desired
orders and strive to have a governing and/or disciplining function; they
too are instructions in behaviour (Jasanoff 2004: ch. 1–2; Jasanoff 2015:
2–4).
The definition at first glance seems to favour the positive, ‘desirable
futures’. But Jasanoff notes that a desirable outcome correlates with an
obverse scenario: ‘shared fears of harm’ and ‘negative imaginings’—utopia
vs. dystopia (Jasanoff 2015: 4–5). She does actually extend the definition,
albeit in a parenthesis, beyond ‘collectively held and performed visions of
desirable futures’ to ‘resistance against the undesirable’ (Jasanoff 2015:
19). With this subtle addition, a sociotechnical imaginary can also be a
safeguard against an undesired future or dystopia. As we shall see, this is
the case in this chapter.
Imaginaries are constituted by ‘[p]erformances of statehood […] tied
to demonstrations and to public proofs employing scientific and techno-
logical instruments’ (Jasanoff 2015: 9–11). Most obvious is the scientific
test, but such performances can also take the form of moon landings,
complicated surgery—or civil defence exercises: calm, rational behaviour
acted out as both rehearsal and theatre, aimed to ensure ‘calm and
2 ORDER ON THEIR HOME FRONTS: IMAGINING WAR … 27
composed […] subjects’ (Ziauddin 2017: 9; Cronqvist 2008; Davis
2007).
In this chapter, I will operationalise the framework of sociotechnical
imaginaries to look at how science underpinned social order(s) and what
this can tell us about what was (un)desirable. For this purpose, it is impor-
tant to note that the sciences employed might not only be technological,
but also human and social.
One of the most common human reactions to war or catastrophe
(and indeed danger at large) is fear. But while fear is among the most
basic of instincts, historian Joanna Bourke shows how fear as a soci-
etal phenomenon changed character in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. Scientific developments created new things to fear, and rising
secularisation of Western societies shifted responsibility for handling soci-
etal fears from the church to secular authorities (Bourke 2006: 23–24).
These authorities sought help from the burgeoning psychological and
social sciences around the turn of the century. Hence, these sciences came
to serve as a tool not only for better understanding the human mind, but
also for defining desirable states of mind and treating undesirable ones.
They were employed by authorities to make sense of modernity, but also
advanced by modernity itself.
One manifestation of fear is panic. And a phenomenon of urban living
is so-called mass panic. That this could be deadly became clear in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when it broke out in enclosed
areas, like theatres and on factory floors. Thus, panic was now some-
thing to be handled by authorities, and the regulation of public space for
the purpose of (emotional) management of people became a marker of
modernity (Bourke 2006: 51ff). Panic also became an area of research for
the psychological sciences. In the late nineteenth century, theories of ‘the
group mind’ identified panic as a contagious phenomenon, causing other-
wise sensible and rule-abiding individuals to behave irresponsibly and
immorally. Panic was the opposite of civilisation and sociability, efficiency
and progress. The volatile crowd, uncontrolled, could wreak political,
social and economic havoc. Sociologists spoke of disorganised and selfish
behaviour as an expression of instinct normally covered in the veneer
of civilisation, but susceptible to activation by fear (Bourke 2006: 61ff).
Human fear, if not handled, could be a steppingstone towards chaos.
With the great wars of the twentieth century, the insights from these
scientific delvings into human fear were put into practice on soldiers.
A finding from the First World War was that fear could be calmed
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by, or channelled into, activity. The worst thing for the mental well-
being of a soldier was being unable to do anything—the best was to be
prepared and trained. Fear took nourishment from rumours and insecu-
rity and could be relieved by the presence of calm and confident authority
figures (Bourke 2006: 208ff; Davis 2007: 115). These observations were
confirmed during the Second World War, in which the view also evolved
that fear was not something one should strive to eradicate or be free
of, but rather a natural and even healthy reaction to a critical situation
which could spur further action (Biess 2009: 219–220; Bourke 2006:
212; Oakes 1994: 50, 62–64).
These studies, which initially looked at soldiers, were replicated in
civilian life. In 1939, the British War Office conducted investigations
into avoiding civil panic, the results of which were in line with what
had already been established: fear and panic could be relieved by proper
preparation, information control and a sense of responsibility. The ability
to do something was essential, and this should be trained beforehand, as
recognisability and repetition promoted a sense of security. If this did not
work, however, there were other, hands-on methods: British civil defence
personnel were trained in 1940 to ‘treat’ panic-stricken persons with a
bucket of water or a punch in the nose or ear. Panic was contagious and
had to be shut down immediately (Bourke 2006: 224, 244ff).
Studies of civilian populations’ actions and their role in a war was a
result of the totalisation of war, another feature of the twentieth century.
This indicates that war was no longer just a military matter, but also a
civil one. Total war was facilitated by technological advances, especially
in air force technology, which led wars far into territories beyond the
front. It was also helped along by radio and (moving) images bringing
faraway battlefields into theatres and living rooms. Hence, governments
sought to mobilise the home front, where maintaining the morale of civil
populations was essential. Civilians were rallied to participate in the war
effort through a steady stream of messages: grow vegetables, ‘keep mum’,
buy war bonds. Keep calm, carry on. Civil defence is in itself an expression
of the totalisation of war, which civil society was now asked to confront
and tackle (McEnaney 2000; see also Hogg, this volume, Fig. 2.1).
In Cold War USA, civil panic was deemed so decisive for a war that
it could even be used deliberately. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff believed
the ‘chaos and extreme confusion’, ‘hopelessness and shock’ and ‘aimless,
even hysterical activity’ following a nuclear attack on the enemy could
work effectively to their own advantage (Oakes 1994: 33, 35–36).
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Fig. 2.1 The mobile civil defence exhibition ‘Alert America’ travelled the
USA in 1952–55
It was one of many attempts to mobilise the ‘home front’ and make preparedness
for war a feature of civil society (Photo: US National Archives, https://www.dig
italcommonwealth.org/search/commonwealth:h128rr89n)
In 1951, the US Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) and
the Pentagon launched a civil defence research project, Project East River,
that repeated earlier conclusions: panic could lead to disobedience and
even resistance, protests, vandalism and riots. The road from panic to civil
unrest to uprisings seemed all too short, and panic was viewed as a subver-
sive, perhaps even revolutionary, phenomenon. But project East River also
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found remedy in the established methods: preparation and having some-
thing to do combined with establishment of authority and information
control (Oakes 1994: 40–42, 62ff; Grossman 2001: 59–61; Bourke 2006:
270ff; McEnaney 2000: 31–33; Davis 2007: 120).
Project East River’s results became authoritative within American civil
defence. It stood on the shoulders of existing war and disaster research,
both American and European, and the results and recommendations were
fundamentally the same. As such, East River both drew from existing
research trends and fed back into them.
With Project East River in mind, it is perhaps not strange that the USA
took a keen and early interest in panic prevention. President Eisenhower
believed that, in war, both civilians and officials would lose their minds,
and he was generally pessimistic about being able to do anything about
it. According to Val Peterson, US Federal Civil Defense Director from
1953 to 1957, ‘mass panic may be far more devastating than the bomb
itself’.1 One FCDA official estimated that the larger part of their work
in the 1950s was about panic prevention (Oakes 1994: 41–42, 150–151;
Davis 2007: 122; Bourke 2006: 268–269).
Another expression of the interest in (unwanted) mental reactions to
disaster, which began in military medicine and worked its way into civil
defence circles in the 1950s, was the development of psychological first
aid as a field—the skill of soothing a shocked mind (Blain et al. 1945;
Drayer et al. 1954).
We see here the contours of a sociotechnical imaginary in which
panic and disorderly, individualised behaviour was undesirable. Its precise
origins are hard to pinpoint, but modernity, urban masses and modern
warfare were all elements in its creation. Formulated positively, this imag-
inary envisioned calmness in catastrophe fostered by proper training and
education and adherence to authority: a civil defence culture of prepared-
ness and deference (Cronqvist 2012). However, it was mostly formulated
negatively, in terms of what would happen if preparedness failed: as an
undesirable.
According to Lord Ismay, NATO General Secretary from 1952 to
1957, when he took office, he asked Supreme Allied Commander in
Europe (SACEUR) General (later US President) Eisenhower how he,
Ismay, could best be of service. Eisenhower answered that he needed
Ismay to keep up morale on the home fronts.2 In a memorandum to the
North Atlantic Council shortly thereafter, Ismay wrote that modern war
was no longer just a military effort, but ‘a trial of strength and willpower
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between whole nations or groups of nations’, and without a stable home
front, the military effort would be futile.3 The NATO Civil Defence
Committee (CDC) were formed around the same time, in the summer
of 1952. Civil defence was a direct result of the totality of modern war.
Imagining War and Civil Defence in 1950s NATO
When imagining war, people usually go by experience. This was also
the case in postwar Europe (Grant 2016: 96). However, the Cold War
contained a threat with which very few people had experience‚ namely
nuclear weapons. The only people who had actually experienced their
impact were in Japan. But while images were available to European
audiences, this did not fundamentally alter the European vision of war:
a bombed-out city looks the same whether its name is Hiroshima or
Hamburg (Ziemann 2016: 117–118; Molitor and Hogg, this volume).
Thus, Hiroshima and Nagasaki were woven into the existing European
visions of war without fundamentally altering them.
Not having a recent memory of war on their own territory, Americans
had to go ‘on imagination alone’ (Oakes 1994: 5). According to UK plan-
ners, this caused American authorities to focus more on panic, whereas
British authorities considered their population already well trained in
handling war (Grant 2010: 11). Or perhaps the Americans just took
seriously their own research from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which stated
that:
… the primary reaction to the bomb was fear – uncontrolled terror,
strengthened by the sheer horror of the destruction and suffering witnessed
and experienced by the survivors. (…)
The two typical impulses were those: aimless, even hysterical activity, or
flight from the city to shelter and food.
An interviewee was quoted: ‘I became hysterical (…) and we just ran
around without knowing what to do’.4
Apart from these differences, both US and Western European author-
ities and (civil) defence planners initially thought a Third World War
would be survivable. A war was not thought to be wholly nuclear, and the
atomic bomb was mostly considered a very large, but otherwise normal
bomb. Civil defence could build directly on the Second World War expe-
rience and did not have to undergo fundamental change. Oakes considers
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this ‘conventionalisation’ of the A bomb a stunt to reassure the popula-
tion (Oakes 1994: 51ff), but the general impression from at least Danish
and NATO sources is that civil defence authorities sincerely believed this.
Whether that was just a case of them being duped by the Americans is not
to be speculated on here. But it should be added that all discussions about
nuclear weapons in the CDC were informed by Hiroshima/Nagasaki and
nuclear tests made by the USA. As such, the American interpretation held
sway.5
At a CDC meeting in late 1953, the American delegation showed
the nuclear test film Operation Doorstep. It showed the effect of the A
bomb on such things as wooden houses, subterranean shelters and cars.
The blast was 15 kilotonnes (kt.)—Hiroshima-sized—and the comforting
message was that less than a mile from the explosion itself (ground zero)
humans could survive if properly prepared and sheltered. What it did
not say, but which the American delegate disclosed at the meeting, was
that 15 kt was already considered relatively small and that this bomb had
been detonated at an altitude which minimised its effect. A larger bomb
detonated higher in the air would have been ‘much more devastating’.6
In May 1955, the FCDA invited the entire CDC to visit the Nevada
desert themselves and observe another test, Operation Cue. This test was
also framed reassuringly: although the reinforced wooden house 5,500
feet from the explosion lost roof, chimney and windows, the mannequins
serving as the family in the basement were unharmed. The model power
plant and communication lines also survived. Once again, the conclu-
sion was that with proper preparation, an atomic explosion could be both
managed and survived.7 Footage of these tests were broadcast to the
American public and are a prime example of the publicly performed scien-
tific test which sought to attest to and solidify the civil defence imaginary
(Fig. 2.2).8
However, in the early- to mid-1950s a new type of nuclear weapon
emerged: the hydrogen (H) bomb. The strength of the H bomb
is not counted in kilo- but in megatonnes (a thousand times more
powerful), which made it increasingly impossible to pretend—or believe—
that nuclear weapons could be likened to conventional bombs. The H
bomb was accompanied by a shift in US and NATO strategic doctrines;
the 1953 New Look strategy of the Eisenhower administration was based
primarily on nuclear weapons and was followed by the NATO doctrine
of massive retaliation—all-out nuclear response to an attack. Not only
did nuclear weapons become more terrifying, but a future war became
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Fig. 2.2 The nuclear test as a public performance and media event
FCDA Director Val Petersen is interviewed at the observer area of the Operation
Cue atomic blast in 1955 (Photo: US National Archives, https://www.digitalco
mmonwealth.org/search/commonwealth:h128s189g)
almost wholly nuclearised (McMahon 2010: 293). As these developments
made war equally unpredictable and indeed unimaginable on both sides of
the Atlantic, experience no longer counted (Rose 2001: 38; Grant 2016:
101ff, 132; Horn 2016: 33–34, 47). British authorities started doubting
that their otherwise experienced population would ‘keep calm and carry
on’ in thermonuclear war. Panic ceased to be mainly an American concern
(Grant 2010: 50, 112; Hennessy 2010: 153–154, 177).
Initially, the FCDA did try to maintain an image of the H bomb as
merely a VERY big, but otherwise still normal, bomb (Oakes 1994: 58–
62). This was evident at a May 1954 CDC meeting where FCDA Deputy
Director Katherine Howard stated that its destructive effects were greatly
exaggerated by the media. Though more powerful, it was not essentially
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different from the A bomb, so nothing would fundamentally have to
change. She concluded that ‘precautions could be taken against the effects
of this weapon’ and showed ‘no sign of pessimism on this point’.9
This time, however, the rest of the committee was not convinced.
During 1954, the Danish Civil Defence Directorate’s scientists began
questioning assumptions about protection against the H bomb.10 This
reached Director Arthur Dahl during his tour of the USA in autumn
1954, where he saw for himself that American civil defence planners—
contrary to Howard’s statements—were adjusting to thermonuclear
reality by transitioning from a strategy of shelters to evacuation.11 Upon
return, he brought it up in the CDC, stating that many of the known
protective measures were already outdated and that civil defence also
needed a ‘New Look’. British representative General F. Irving agreed.
He stated directly that they had to stop talking about what had worked
in the last war and start talking about what to do in a future one. The UK,
he said, had no intention of spending more money on measures that did
not also protect against thermonuclear weapons. Val Peterson admitted
that the best defence against the H bomb was dispersal of people and
vital installations, and he confirmed that the USA had started making
extensive evacuation plans. CDC chairman Laborie asked for a revision of
current work, and NATO Civil Defence Advisor John Hodsoll promised
to do a review.12 He was not the only one: centrally, NATO had also
started work on new planning assumptions, which Hodsoll drew upon in
preparing his report.
Hodsoll’s report (ready in just a week) stated that the H bomb funda-
mentally altered things and that the ‘general arrangement’ of the last
war was no longer sufficient. Where the goal then had been to uphold
everyday life and production albeit at a reduced level, everything now had
to be about immediate survival. ‘Business as usual’ did not exist when
everything within a radius of seven miles from ground zero was devas-
tated. Now, ‘everything would have to be temporarily subordinated to
the maintenance of life and health; in other words, to the basic essen-
tials of human existence’. Invoking the language of total war, Hodsoll
stated that measures would be ‘aimed at preserving the civil population
and sustaining their morale, since if they collapse their country will cease
to be a combat unit’ and concluded: ‘The Home Front is fundamental.
If it collapses all is lost’.13
The new NATO planning assumptions, which had informed Hodsoll’s
memorandum, were adopted by the North Atlantic Council in May 1955.
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They heralded a new era, foreseeing that ‘on the outbreak of hostil-
ities, the enemy will launch thermo-nuclear attacks with first priority’
and that ‘thermo-nuclear weapons can create destruction and chaos on
a scale exceeding anything hitherto contemplated’.14 It was thought that
an initial intense nuclear bombing period of three to seven days would be
followed by a 30-day period which determined whether or not a nation
survived. In this light, the Council encouraged NATO members to priori-
tise planning for survival in the first 30 days of war. Survival was defined
as ‘maintenance of the authority of the government and the preservation
of human life’.15
These changes led to a reorganisation in which all NATO commit-
tees on civil planning, including the CDC, were put under a new Senior
Committee for Civil Emergency Planning, for the purpose of securing
cohesive and focused planning. This included but also went beyond
civil defence: civil emergency planning encompassed all civil and societal
measures directed at securing the survival of the nation in accordance
with the Council’s definition, including safe locations for governments,
emergency laws, communication lines, infrastructure and shipping.16
Bringing in Science
The preoccupation with panic and upholding authority spread across
the Atlantic and took a hold in NATO circles, even its top tier: in
1955, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander of Europe (DSACEUR) Field
Marshall Montgomery stated that one of nuclear war’s big dangers—
which might even end up costing victory—was ‘hysteria’.17
It also became the subject of interest for civil defence and preparedness
sciences which, up to that point, had mainly dealt in more quantifiable
topics such as thickness of bunker walls, blast effects and radiation levels.
A sociotechnical imaginary is underpinned by, and intertwined with,
science. Therefore, the emergence of psychology in scientific debates in
civil defence circles also tells us something about how the imaginary devel-
oped. The increased focus on psychological sciences in NATO/Western
European civil defence circles in the 1950s informs us of a sociotechnical
imaginary that increasingly explicated its visions of behaviour.
By comparing and contrasting four articles by medical professionals on
the subject in the time span of 1956–1958, we shall see that, although
the thermonuclear era was new, the particular problem of panic and
unrest, as well as its cure, were closely in line with previous thinking.
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The articles are ‘Views on psychological reactions in war’ (‘Synspunkter
på psykiske reaktioner under krig’) by Swedish Civil Defence Surgeon
General Dr Walo von Greyerz, ‘Maintenance of morale among civil-
ians during a nuclear emergency’ by Chairman of NATO’s Medical
Committee Dr Svend Toftemark of the Danish Ministry of Health, ‘Civil
morale under the threat of nuclear attack’ by psychiatrist at the Depart-
ment of Psychological Medicine at London University College Hospital
Dr Roger Tredgold and ‘Psychological considerations in Civil Defence
Planning’ by British professor of psychology Thomas Ferguson Rodger.
All four articles struck the following themes in more or less detail: desired
and undesired symptoms of fear and remedies in the form of preparation,
information, activity, authority and—in some cases—force.
Some were very particular about describing symptoms. Von Greyerz
divided fearful reactions into two categories, each containing three
subcategories with symptoms ranked from mild to severe. The first cate-
gory contained uneasiness, apprehension and anxiety. Uneasiness was a
normal reaction to war, but via apprehension it could escalate to anxiety,
which demanded treatment. Whereas the first category was permanent
or longer-lasting problems, the symptoms in the second category—fear,
dread and terror—were more immediate reactions. Otherwise the prin-
ciple was the same—a normal reaction could escalate into an unhealthy
one:
During an air raid, we share fear with everyone around us, and we don’t
have to be ashamed of it. We must receive it as something natural. But if
fear – via the intermediate stage, which I call dread – increases to terror,
it will have reached proportions where it can no longer be accepted as an
ally.18
If fear was allowed to escalate into terror there were two possible
outcomes: apathy, where people would lose all ability to act and ‘the
storm’, where they would run around bewildered, incapable of reason-
able action, perhaps even displaying symptoms such as blindness, deafness,
numbness or unconsciousness (a state which he labelled ‘hysteria’). If
a ‘terror psychosis’ ‘infected’ the surroundings, it could ‘drive a whole
group to actions that go against common sense; this is when panic
arises’.19
Tredgold ranked reactions to fear more simply: as either ‘healthy’
or ‘unhealthy’. Unhealthy reactions were ‘panic, paralysis, overactivity,
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bodily complaints (based largely on anxiety) and depression which may
lead to fatalistic (and fatal) resignation’. Fear in itself, however, was
natural and only ‘exaggerated’ reactions to it were unhealthy.20 Much
the same was expressed by Toftemark and Ferguson Rodger. The latter,
however, ranked panic as more detrimental than apathy. He stated that
a ‘dazed apathetic state’ was a relatively normal reaction to catastrophe,
and preferable to ‘excited behaviour’.21
There were different views as to what panic looked like. To Tred-
gold, panic (or ‘overactivity’) might on the surface look purposeful, but
on inspection it was more like a fish on dry land, ‘floundering about to
no purpose, gasping and with an occasional convulsive jerk’.22 Ferguson
Rodger took almost the opposite approach: purposeful behaviour could
look like panic for the uninitiated, who only saw ‘what appears to be
random, uncontrolled activity’ with people ‘running or driving vehi-
cles in opposite directions, often at times passing each other without
acknowledgment or seeming awareness’. This, however, was ‘not panic,
but social disorganization. Many individuals and small groups are working
within the disaster area with purpose and some degree of organization’.
Nor was flight necessarily panicked; in fact, ‘it is more often orderly
and controlled’, but could also, to the uninitiated look disorganised—
which was why journalists often exaggerated and over-reported panic.
He reminded the reader that panic had actually been rare during the last
war.23 This point was also made by von Greyerz, who reassured the reader
that panic had ‘only in exceptional cases been a serious problem’. He also
made the point that what could look like panic at first glance, like mass
flight, could in actuality be rational and ‘have an objective in sight’.24
As such, they differed on how reactions should be categorised and on
the nature of events of panic. But they all thought it best to prevent
them altogether, and largely agreed on the means: ‘The three big musts
of panic prevention are preparation, information and action’—these were
the words of Toftemark, although he was himself rather pessimistic as to
how well it would work. He thought that even prior education of people
could not ensure that they would react correctly in an emergency. Its
effectiveness required them to be both psychologically and emotionally
involved, which in turn required authorities to counter indifference not
only with information, but also with positive motivation and a realistic
picture of the options.25 Von Greyerz also expressed the view that peace-
time preparation and education was of the utmost importance—including
the knowledge that fear was natural and could be remedied.26 Tredgold
38 I. BJØRNSSON
made the same point, noting that what a threat meant to the individual
‘will depend largely on what he has been told about it’.27
Ferguson Rodger thought that a prepared population would react
adaptively and that the civil population could be trusted with the initia-
tive in an emergency—the most important thing was that they be
properly informed both ahead of but also during a catastrophe.28 So
everyone agreed that preparation was key, even if Toftemark was some-
what pessimistic about people’s involvement in the prior preparation. This
problem was, however, a known one. Civil defence authorities hit this wall
time and again trying to ‘educate’ a public which seemed indifferent to
or even ridiculed the attempts. However, the stance of the authorities was
clear: it was better to repeat the message and hope something stuck than
to have an utterly oblivious population (Davis 2007: 170).
Everyone also agreed that information to the population once disaster
had struck was as crucial as information beforehand. Information could
itself relieve fear: for instance, noise from anti-aircraft weapons would be
perceived as less unnerving if people knew that it was a welcome part of
their own defence. As von Greyerz stated: ‘People who know what has
happened are considerably better equipped to bear the burden of reality,
than those who are in the dark’.29 Ferguson Rodger recommended giving
people ‘clear and unambiguous information, even if it is of the gravest
import’. If people were ‘as well informed as possible’, then they would
stay rational and make the right choices. Lack of information, on the
other hand, was a source of panic.30 This also implied that even bad
news was better than none. The unknown was always scarier than reality.
According to Tredgold, there was a real chance of ‘panic caused by gross
over-imagination. I can understand that there may be reluctance to tell
people horrible facts, but they will indulge in more horrible fears if they
are not told’.31
This information, obviously, should come from people in authority,
and this was another common feature of the articles. Von Greyerz stated
that fear in a person could be relieved alone by someone else’s ‘firm
demeanour’,32 and Toftemark emphasised the necessity of constructive
and authoritative role models to prevent the spread of uncontrolled and
individualised behaviour. While some initial ‘disorganization’ could not
be avoided, the trick was to quickly establish organisation and action by
strong leadership.33 Ferguson Rodger’s biggest worry was people isolated
in fallout shelters for too long. This was not only bad for mental health in
general but could also lead to the very lack of information which incited
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fear—and panic. Therefore, fallout shelters should be regularly patrolled
by authorities with tidings.34
Authorities could also give people something to do, and this was
another most relished remedy of fear with all authors. Fear and action
were intertwined: fear could spur action and action remedied fear. Activity
of any kind was good—according to von Greyerz, ‘preferably a simple task
which is physically strenuous, like handing water or carrying bricks’.35 It
could not only hinder fear from turning into panic, but also, according
to Dr Threadgold, even remedy paralysis and ‘bodily complaints’.36
Lastly, the authors mentioned those instances where the sufferer was
not able to act on their own or under instruction because they had entered
a state of panic. Both Toftemark and Tredgold mentioned the relatively
new term ‘psychological first aid’ as a remedy that should be trained
in advance. Tredgold recommended that people be led away from the
disaster and calmed down before further action could be taken. Calming
down could mean anything from a cup of tea to sedation, and the
article focused on treating people with empathy, praising them when they
did something sensible or worthwhile. If people turned to religion, this
should be encouraged (whatever one’s own personal attitude), as it could
soothe mental suffering. Through these remedies, the doctor thought
morale could be raised considerably, and mental damage prevented from
being long-term. Von Greyerz also recommended sedation as treatment
for both apathy and terror. Furthermore, he recommended removing the
sufferer from others so as it would not ‘rub off’. If this was not a possi-
bility, for instance in a shelter, a last resort could be to tie down and gag
the afflicted person, although not without taking care to explain to others
present why such extreme measures were necessary.37
Apart from differences in nuances and categorisation, it is striking how
similar these articles are, in both their diagnoses and recommended reme-
dies. It is fair to say that Western civil defence psychology was a research
field marked by consensus, and it is also worth noting that it correlates
with earlier military psychology. Although it was a new field of research,
it was rooted in a firm tradition (as was civil defence and disaster medicine
as a whole, see Molitor, this volume). This sociotechnical imaginary that
favoured calmness and preparedness had been extended from military
medicine to civil defence science and thus reinforced.
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Control
Mass panic is tied to a loss of control: the individual losing control over
themselves and authorities losing control over populations. With main-
taining government authority as a top priority, control of the population
also quickly became a main priority for the Senior Committee, and it
delegated the issue to the CDC. Val Peterson agreed and even stated
in a Civil Defence meeting that control of the population was the most
important aspect of any defence, civil or military. ‘In his own country they
were still very dubious regarding public reaction in the event of a war’.38
The message was also employed at top level. Leaving office in 1957,
NATO General Secretary Lord Ismay stated that it was the ‘bounden
duty of every Government to do its utmost’ to ensure that in a war, ‘the
civil population and civilian activities would be efficiently controlled and
directed’.39
Hence, control of the population was one of the first things the
Senior Committee asked the CDC to review. Hodsoll responded with
a September 1956 memorandum in which he earnestly stated that it was
not something they had hitherto considered or even defined. In his defi-
nition, control meant having the population ‘(a) maintain their morale;
(b) do what they are told, (c) do everything possible to help them-
selves’. The reasoning behind putting morale before obedience was that
Hodsoll thought it was a prerequisite for exercising ‘reasonable control’
over people. Once people lost their spirit, it ‘might easily result in the
population degenerating into an unorganized and undisciplined mob,
with all the consequences which that would imply’. While admittedly not
previously having dealt with the issue, Hodsoll had quickly learned the
language of this particular imaginary and its dystopia of the uncontrolled
mob.
To sustain morale—and thereby control—Hodsoll, in line with the
existing research consensus, considered it ‘of cardinal importance’ that the
population be prepared and educated in peacetime. This was, incidentally,
also all that NATO could do. Procedures for ‘actual control’—execution
of orders and regulations—were a matter for the individual countries’
executive powers.40 But as these functions may also be halted during
a war, Hodsoll underlined that ‘control, to be successful, must rely in
the main on the self-discipline of the population, their ready acceptance
of whatever orders are issued and their co-operation in such a way as
to make such orders succeed’. Ideally, control was not to be enforced
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by already strained authorities but exercised from within subjects them-
selves. Self-help was ‘a relief for the trained forces’, but—also in line with
existing research—he recommended some presence of authority to keep
up morale and control. Martial law might be necessary in ‘very adverse
circumstances’, but he recommended it only as ‘a last resort’.41
Throughout 1957, several member countries submitted memoranda
to the CDC on the issue. With slight variations, their focus was roughly
the same: peacetime education and training and wartime establishment
of authority and communication.42 In an attempt to further structure
these efforts, Hodsoll, in a January 1958 memorandum, divided measures
into three situations: peacetime, a period of tension and war. Education
and preparation should be done in peacetime, as surprise by the nature
of nuclear war ‘might rapidly […] lead to panic and disorder’. If there
were a period of pre-war tension, governments should issue preparatory
instructions. In war, communications should be established as quickly as
possible, especially to spread the message that ‘the Government is still in
control and knows what it is doing’. This should be backed by visible
action and presence by local authorities or civil defence forces.43 The
sudden and overwhelming focus on control in the CDC made the Turkish
representative remark at a 1957 meeting that some extent of population
protection was presumably still needed—otherwise there would be no one
left to control (Fig. 2.3).44
In 1958, NATO’s Military Committee adopted a document known as
MC70, which re-evaluated the alliance’s force requirements and strategy.
The document mentioned enemy psychological operations against morale
and suggested the necessity of forces ‘for maintaining order behind the
combat zone’, without going into further detail.45 MC70 was an elab-
oration of MC14/2 of May 1957, which stated as a ‘Defence Principle’
under the North Atlantic Treaty, that
[i]t is a responsibility of national authorities to develop plans and measures
which will ensure the continuity of governmental control following a
sudden outbreak of hostilities and will also ensure the maintenance of
civilian morale coupled with the ability to prosecute the war to a successful
conclusion.46
The North Atlantic Treaty itself, however, does not mention morale or
continuity of government. One previous strategic document, MC48/1 of
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Fig. 2.3 A vision of a government that is in control and knows what it is
doing
In the ‘Alert America’ exhibition, people were assured that civil defence personnel
would have a cool overview, guide citizens to proper locations and inform them
what to do (https://www.digitalcommonwealth.org/search/commonwealth:h12
8rn65f)
December 1955 mentioned it in more lofty terms. Thus, the thermonu-
clear era had worked the issue of morale and control into official NATO
strategy documents. This fact was taken as further confirmation by the
CDC that an increased focus on ‘prevention of panic’ was warranted
and that ‘nations must be prepared to maintain order on their Home
Fronts’.47
But once again, studying and making recommendations was all the
CDC was able to do.48 While the Senior Committee encouraged these
studies it also recognised that the issue itself lay beyond the scope of
‘purely civil defence […], since it entered into the maintenance of public
order and consequently was related to the maintenance of government
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control’.49 As was once again established, actual maintenance of law and
order was a job for the national governments.50 The Senior Committee
would, however, in the following years continue to urge nations to
prioritise planning for maintenance of government control, including
emergency laws and preparation.
Although not equipped with authority to execute it, the CDC
continued studying and discussing related issues such as wartime
command, control and communications, assistance of armed forces to civil
defence, and the role of central and local government employees in war.
As such, the element of (controlling) human reactions had made its way
into emergency planning with the thermonuclear era.
Conclusion
When authorities imagined war, it wasn’t always with the greatest of confi-
dence in their populations. Authorities feared that citizens’ fear would
express itself in panic, which was considered dangerous and destruc-
tive. The need to tackle and control the base instincts of the population
was older than, but intensified by, the advent of nuclear and thermonu-
clear weapons. In the early 1950s, fear of panic thrived especially with
American civil defence planners, but the H bomb spread it to Europe.
While it might not be possible to pinpoint an exact origin, we see a
consistency of Western cultural thought dating back to the establish-
ment of the modern psychological and social sciences. The civil defence
dystopia of the uncontrollable mob was culturally consistent with earlier
images, as was the belief (or hope) that this was somehow manageable by
science. The nuclear and thermonuclear ages were thus negotiated into
pre-existing frameworks of both civil defence and desired social order and
were informed by research preceding it.
While the nuclear apocalyptic was (re-)negotiated into these lines of
thought, the advent of the H bomb added a new sense of urgency. Prior
to the establishment of the Senior Committee, the CDC and articles in
the Civil Defence Bulletin had often enough underlined the importance
of morale, but never entertained scenarios of chaos and human liability
to the extent that it was done in the mid to late 1950s. Morale, having
previously mainly been about spirit and support, was now directly tied
to control. From not having been articulated at all, control of popula-
tions was now catapulted into top priority—especially as civil emergency
planning emerged with its focus on maintaining government authority. In
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this particular nuclear dystopia, losing the lives of the population would
be bad. Losing control over them would be even worse.
Imaginaries are mostly group achievements (Jasanoff 2015: 25). So
was this one: it was formulated, shared and distributed by a civil defence
community not only informed by, but equipped with, its own scien-
tists, media and advisors. With nations employing their own scientists and
experts, as most national civil defence directorates did, this also secured
the continued co-production of this imaginary. In this case it also received
the backing of the mighty NATO, which not only worked to extend the
sociotechnical imaginary back to national governments, but also served as
a forum for spreading and solidifying it.
But there were limitations. NATO’s Civil Defence and Senior Civil
Emergency Committees never faced up to a full panic scenario. While
experts talked about physical measures like sedating or even fixating
people, official documents consulted for this article only hinted at phys-
ical measures such as riot control or martial law. This was not solely due
to unwillingness to discuss an unpleasant topic, but also due to the fact
that execution of such powers was a national affair. NATO could nego-
tiate, streamline and seek to extend the imaginary, but its final embedding
was up to national governments. Some embraced it, pouring millions
into both material and non-material preparations,51 whereas most re-
negotiated it into a local setting. And while the imaginary might be
collectively held by authorities, how it fared in civil society, and the resis-
tance it met, is another, no less interesting, question (which is explored
in several chapters in this volume).
Viewing the culture of Cold War preparedness promoted by civil
defence organisations as a sociotechnical imaginary makes sense—
although in this case, one must insist that science is not only technological
or material. Science is also humanities, social, political and psycholog-
ical, and those were the primary sciences at work here. This particular
sociotechnical imaginary was also not formulated as a utopia, but a
dystopia—nuclear war and, with it, a total collapse of society and the
humans in it. Any desirable images in here were those of well-behaved,
adaptable and docile citizens, a best-case scenario within the worst.
But this does not only tell us something about how war was imagined.
Sociotechnical imaginaries are often a function of existing power/social
order and aimed at preserving it (Jasanoff 2015: 21, 25–26). And what
the fear of populations tells us about Cold War Western society might be
the most tangible lesson. Civil defence, as other research has pointed out,
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was as much about reassuring people and securing their support for the
security politics du jour as it was about, as this chapter has shown abun-
dantly, upholding the control of existing orders. If the docile, calm and
obedient behaviour desired in war was extended ‘backwards’ into peace-
time, both governments and planners were better off. The Cold War was
also total, and the home front needed mobilisation in peacetime as well.
Civil defence did not just serve the purpose of assuring the public that
they would be able to ‘do something’—it was also about making them
do the ‘something’ which they were told to do.
Thus, civil defence and preparedness were not only narratives of a
future war, but also a narrative of the desirable citizen at large. The
fixation on upholding government control as the most important prereq-
uisite for a nation’s survival and the almost nightmarish visions of panic,
chaos and destruction say a lot about another dystopia, one in which
Western populations would no longer support the Cold War ideolog-
ical order. Making people feel like they would be okay, it was hoped,
would make them less likely to revolt, and that was a central tenet of civil
defence as well as society in general. As such, the sociotechnical imagi-
nary of preparedness culture had the purpose of supporting and enforcing
existing power relations.
The imaginary had a function not only in war, but also in peace. Educa-
tion and preparation were one side of a coin that had social control as the
other.
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CHAPTER 3
The Imagined Disastrous: West German
Civil Defence Between War Preparation
and Emergency Management 1950–1990
Jochen Molitor
There is a ubiquitous quality to the term ‘disaster’.1 While it is certainly
used to refer to worst-case scenarios or—adhering to a more technical
definition—to events which exceed locally available resources (Münkler
2013: 135), it is probably more often utilised to describe mere incon-
veniences, especially in everyday life. The inherent character of the
expression seems to encourage its use in vastly different circumstances
ranging from the outrageous to the casual, from the horrific to the banal
(Münkler 2013: 95). Without denouncing the pressing factuality of many
catastrophic events, as some scholars tend to do,2 an event does not neces-
sarily have to be disastrous in and of itself to be labelled as such, and
a disaster may just as much be considered a product of communication
than of the forces of nature or the dangers of technology (Imhof 2004:
145). It is this relativity and context-dependency which has encouraged
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scholars to be mindful of the term and observe the specific circum-
stances of its use. Beyond influencing two of the more recent general
studies on contemporary West German3 history, which has been char-
acterised as a ‘search for security’ (Conze 2009) in a ‘republic of fear’
(Biess 2019), questioning who prepared when and for what ‘disasters’
seems highly instrumental for studying the civil defence endeavours of
the Federal Republic of Germany. Accordingly, this chapter will focus
on retracing the nature of the dystopian sociotechnical imaginaries (see
the introduction to this volume) put forth by West German civil defence
institutions, how they changed over time and what measures were taken
to counter them. Using the term ‘imagined disastrous’ to stress both the
act of imagining and that of labelling, it shall be argued that the rela-
tivity of the employed terminology allowed civil defence officials to model
and adapt their proposed sociotechnical imaginary to befit the amount of
preparation actually attainable by them.
Disaster as Rhetoric, War as Reality:
Early West German Civil Defence 1950–1968
The Second World War and the experience of national defeat are
frequently referred to as ‘the disaster’ (die Katastrophe) in early sources
of the Federal Republic. Since labelling something as such is usually
connected to the assumption that what has happened was the unin-
tentional result of external forces (Münkler 2013: 97), this seems to
reflect the widespread tendency of the new state to look for excuses
rather than face accountability for the war (Moeller 2001: 94). During
the 1950s, West German civil defence officials regularly employed similar
terminology to obscure that the object of their preparations was, indeed,
another military conflict, in which the divided Germany constituted the
most prominent frontline between the opposing military alliances of the
NATO and the Warsaw Pact. However, the underlying imagined disas-
trous was not so much based on the theoretical premises of nuclear
warfare, but rather on first-hand experiences of the allied bombings of
the recent past (Steneck 2005: 126–129).4 Thus, early civil defence
concepts had more in common with National Socialist air raid precau-
tions than any kind of modern emergency management.5 In addition,
much of the same personnel was present (Diebel 2017: 36–37), and after
talks started in 1948, official preparations intensified from 1950 onwards.
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The foundation of a so-called Protective Commission (Schutzkommis-
sion) in 1951 aimed at funding scientific research on, for example,
radiation sickness and the protective effect of different shelter types,
while two organisations—the Federal Air Raid Protection Association
(Bundesluftschutzverband, BLSV) and the Federal Agency for Technical
Relief (Bundesanstalt Technisches Hilfswerk, THW)6 aimed at educating
volunteers in self-preservation measures and rescue operations. In late
1958, the basic organisation of a new West German civil defence system
was finalised with the establishment of the Federal Office of Civil Defence
(Bundesamt für zivilen Bevölkerungsschutz, BzB), which was to coordinate
the various efforts.7
Although this organisational setup might in retrospect seem quite
structured, its factual effectiveness beyond mere bureaucracy may well be
questioned. A good example is the constant denial of policymakers to
adhere to the central demand of basically all West German civil defence
officials during the 1950s and early 1960s: for the widespread construc-
tion of shelters to protect the population at least from conventional bomb
blasts and nuclear fallout. The first law including a prerequisite that all
newly built houses were to have some sort of shelter facility was passed
as early as October 1957. However, its main paragraph was immediately
postponed and later dismissed due to its financial implications. Additional
attempts to legally enforce or at least effectively support privately funded
shelter construction suffered a similar fate; politicians of all parties simply
did not want to commit to it (Steneck 2008: 82). Germany was thought
to be a traumatised country with a populace bent on forgetting about the
possibility of war rather than being constantly reminded of it (Molitor
2011: 44–50). Thus, even during the high point of construction efforts
and across all crisis situations of the Cold War, West Germany could only
provide public or private shelter spaces for approximately three per cent
of its inhabitants (e.g. Geier 2003: 56). Civil defence officials glanced
enviously at their neighbours in Switzerland, where basically everyone was
provided for (cf. Berger Ziauddin 2017) and continued to insist: ‘Without
shelters, there can be no civil defence, and without them serving as the
backbone, even the most effective organisational preparation will remain
bogged in the merely hypothetical’ (Sautier 1961: 47).
It was in this context that West German officials of the time often spoke
of ‘disasters’ and shied away from the unpopular term ‘war’ as much as
they could. However, in contrast to first aid or firefighting training, shelter
construction eluded any serious kind of secondary use in times of peace
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and continuously brought home what the purpose of civil defence really
was. Ultimately, the notion of any need for shelter construction revealed
that the discourse around ‘disasters’ was merely a façade erected by offi-
cials who simply did not dare to tell the truth about their own profession.
The separation of jurisdictions in the Federal Republic also highlighted
this incongruity. While civil defence was, and still is, part of the national
defence strategy, falling under the remit of the federal ministry of home
affairs, disaster relief is considered a local endeavour, with the individual
states governing their own varying regulations and institutions. Due to
this legal separation, any talk of disasters by federal institutions such as
the BzB was bound to come across as disingenuous, since they had no
jurisdiction in these matters to begin with. Thus, the imagined disas-
trous of West German civil defence officials during the 1950s and early
1960s was clearly focused on a war against the forces of the Soviet Union
and the Warsaw Pact. Initially it was imagined that this war would be
fought with conventional weapons, but later it was envisaged as an all-
out nuclear exchange for which West Germany, as the front state, would
have to engage in total defence—reversing the National Socialist dictum
of total war.
During the early 1960s, this line of thinking began to change. The
widely debated paradigm shift in NATO’s strategic doctrine from ‘mas-
sive retaliation’ to ‘flexible response’ (cf. Schmidt 1961 as a contemporary
treatise from a German point of view), which promised ‘appropriate’
military reactions to perceived threats rather than total annihilation,
made smaller conflicts more likely and meant that civil defence measures
could actually prove somewhat effective (see also chapter by Farbøl this
volume). Additionally, the idea that at least some such measures might
also be helpful during natural or technical disasters became gradually more
widespread. An early example was the North Sea flood of 1962, in which
West German civil defence organisations—especially the THW, but also
the BLSV—provided substantial assistance, despite not being officially
responsible for local disaster relief (cf. Molitor 2014). While these organ-
isations had traditionally spoken of disasters as a metaphor for a possible
war, many contemporary sources show how much the actual disaster was
now portrayed as warlike: the flood was described as an aggressor which
had to be fought by daring heroes in a selfless struggle. This kind of
work, for example within the uniform-wearing THW, might have offered
many veterans of the former Wehrmacht—the army of National Socialist
Germany—the opportunity to bask in a form of well-known martial
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rhetoric, now targeted at a non-human enemy and utilised for benefi-
cial purposes, thus harking back to a cherished set of ideals purged of its
former ideological content (Molitor 2014: 204–210).
Among other developments, events such as the flood of 1962 paved
the way for the dual-use strategy put forth by civil defence officials
from the mid-1960s onwards, resulting in probably the most signif-
icant West German civil defence law: the Act on the Expansion of
Disaster Relief (Gesetz zur Erweiterung des Katastrophenschutzes, KatSG-
68), passed in 1968. Misleadingly referring to civil defence as ‘expanded
disaster relief’, the law was a political reaction to the dilemma that even
a substandard civil defence system required cost-intensive investments,
which—according to West German jurisdictions—could not be legally
used except in the case of war, which everybody was desperately seeking
to avoid. In contrast to that notion, the KatSG-68 demanded that federal
authorities support the individual states’ disaster relief efforts and, for
example, grant them access to the THW as long as the states guaranteed
the use of their equipment and institutions for civil defence efforts should
the need arise. While this did not dissolve the traditionally split respon-
sibility between federal civil defence and local disaster relief, it entangled
them systematically in making one reliant on the other. The premise that
preparedness in general had to be improved furthered the prioritisation
of measures which could be useful in a variety of scenarios—alert systems,
first aid education and so on—over prohibitively expensive and unwieldy
genuine civil defence preparations such as shelter construction (cf. Diebel
2017: 76–79).
This trend towards what should later be called the ‘all-hazards’
approach can clearly be illustrated by comparing two of the key West
German civil defence documents: the educational pamphlets Jeder hat
eine Chance (Everybody has a Chance) and Zivilschutzfibel (Guide to civil
defence). Both were published by the BzB and distributed for free to
all households in 1962 and 1964, respectively. At the time, Jeder hat
eine Chance was massively criticised for downplaying the nuclear threat,
because it maintained that, depending on the distance of a nuclear detona-
tion, even simple measures such as taking cover, protecting naked skin and
looking away might prevent harm. The Zivilschutzfibel, however, fared
somewhat better in the eyes of the public (Steneck 2005: 284–285; Biess
2009: 87–88). Released merely two years later, it contained all the rele-
vant information of Jeder hat eine Chance, but while the original had
clearly focused on the threat of war, the revised version (at fifty pages
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more than twice the size of its predecessor) began with the following
statement, signed by the minster for home affairs at the time, Hermann
Höcherl:
Every day, we read or hear of unfortunate events. They threaten us at
home or on the street. We’re not even safe on our holidays. And, time and
time again, humanity is threatened by natural disasters. […] Even war, the
biggest disaster of them all, is still a threat to many people of this world.
(BzB 1964: 1)
War, as delineated in the Zivilschutzfibel, was not only labelled a
disaster, but embedded within a larger framework of a multitude of
possible dangers. Arguably, this played down the potential horror of an
all-out nuclear conflict a lot more than Jeder hat eine Chance. Yet it
also displayed a mindset which envisioned the disastrous as ranging from
the trivial to the apocalyptic, with all possible dangers being somehow
connected to each other, differing more in scope than fundamentally.
Right in the middle of the pamphlet, a page headlined as ‘An interim
remark (It has nothing, absolutely nothing to do with war)’ expressed
this even more clearly:
There will always be natural disasters. Floods – dyke breaches –
earthquakes – massive fires. Don’t you think that it would be hugely bene-
ficial to know how to protect your life and your belongings? Think of the
North Sea flood disaster for instance! Think of Hamburg! And what if a
fire started in your own home? Maybe you could put your knowledge to
good use for that! And if someone gets hurt at home or in a car acci-
dent, there’d be someone there to offer first aid – that would certainly be
welcome! Even if you disregard all other arguments, these points should
convince you to continue reading. (BzB 1964: 23, emphasis in original)
Again, the Zivilschutzfibel did not exclude the threat of war—it did
in fact contain images of weaponry, of people taking cover and so on—
but it also displayed a staggering array of possible alternatives, ranging
from natural disasters to mere household fires, for which the same kind of
preparation was declared useful. While its authors clearly tried to utilise
disaster preparation as a less controversial means to get their point across,
it must thus still be regarded as an early document publicly pushing the
idea that civil defence should be generally useful.
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As darkly comical as the brochure may seem from today’s perspec-
tive, with the authors’ insecurity about their potential readers’ disposition
unambiguously showing through, the Zivilschutzfibel did have a point,
and the car crash photograph illustrating its ‘Interim remark’ was not
only chosen to downplay nuclear annihilation. From the 1960s until the
1980s, more than 16,000 people died in West German traffic every year,
reaching a tragic peak with over 21,000 casualties in 1970 (Kessel 2008:
52–53). If one compares these figures to the approximately 3,200 yearly
traffic casualties during the 2010s, applying to a significantly more densely
populated, reunified Germany, it seems obvious that not only civil defence
was deficient during the 1950s and 1960s. General emergency manage-
ment, too, failed to find answers to the ‘modern’ threats of the time,
and with most people not wearing seatbelts, no first aid courses during
drivers’ training and no organised emergency medical system whatso-
ever, even smaller car accidents could easily end up being fatal. Keeping
these observations in mind, the sometimes naïve-sounding arguments put
forth by the Zivilschutzfibel should not be too easily dismissed. After all,
it foreshadowed a significant change in both the civil defence authori-
ties’ sociotechnical imaginary and what kinds of activities would remain
popular in West Germany from the late 1960s onwards: those which not
only claimed to prepare for disasters, but actually did so in some way.
From the Sensationalist to the Pragmatic:
Later West German Civil Defence
It has been stated that the move away from more dedicated measures
to focusing on volunteer work and multipurpose skills rather than on
building shelters effectively ended West German civil defence. Conversely,
more recent studies suggest that it was this very move from the sensation-
alist to the pragmatic which saved it (Diebel 2017: 115–116). Because
historians are, by and large, prone to telling good stories and have often
shown considerable sympathy for contemporary peace movements which
dismissed all kinds of civil defence as government propaganda at best
and war mongering at worst (e.g. Garrison 2006; Klinke 2018), many
accounts have focused on the more sensational aspects, glancing over its
more pragmatic variants and all but overlooking its manifold connections
to disaster relief. This has narrowed the viewpoint of many studies to
the timeframe discussed thus far: the early Cold War period of the 1950s
and 1960s. In the case of West Germany, however, it may be argued
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that its civil defence measures became (somewhat) successful after the
big crisis situations of the early Cold War, with officials widely adopting
the all-hazards approach from the late 1960s onwards.
In order to trace the later developments of civil defence in the Federal
Republic, it is imperative to look beyond the state and its agencies.
As already hinted at, civil defence in West Germany relied heavily on
various relief organisations (Hilfsorganisationen).8 Unlike the construc-
tion of shelters, the THW, for instance, was not abandoned in the 1960s,
but thrived and flourished (Diebel 2017: 141–149). Today, it serves as
one of Germany’s foremost general relief organisations, providing refugee
accommodation as well as giving aid during global pandemics.9 The
German Red Cross (DRK), too, was hardly ever criticised by even the
most adamant peace activists, yet continuously supported civil defence
and was quite successful in influencing its actual course during the 1980s
(cf. Diebel 2017: 313–315). Just glancing at these two organisations—
boasting current volunteer counts of c. 80,000 (THW) and 443,300
(DRK), respectively10—should clarify that there was (and is) a culture
of preparedness that extends beyond lofty shelter construction plans put
forth by a select number of officials but repeatedly cancelled before public
discussion could even start.
This chapter now turns briefly to the development of West German
disaster medicine (Katastrophenmedizin), not only to examine whether
or not the imagined disastrous of physicians mirrored the general devel-
opments of West German civil defence, but also to further elaborate on
the thesis that there was a move from a failed, expansive total defence
approach to a partially implemented, more subdued one.
The Emergence of All-Hazards Disaster
Medicine in West Germany 1956–1989
Physicians are interesting historical agents in civil defence research for
several reasons. First of all, in the case of either a disaster or war, they
are immediately involved at the frontline of the event and cannot enjoy
the relative comfort of office professions. Most physicians do not work for
the state but in hospitals or are self-employed, and they are generally well-
respected, well-paid and used to a high degree of professional autonomy.
However, since their work requires specialised training for which there
is no easy substitute, all of them are required to help in times of crisis,
especially those usually more occupied with treating the common cold
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than dealing with mass casualty situations. Depending on the perspective,
physicians are thus both influential actors in a field that involves multiple
professions combating for areas of exclusive jurisdiction (cf. Abbot 1988:
90) and a scarce and valuable resource for politicians or civil defence
officials preparing for the worst.11
It is hardly surprising that the first physicians trying to establish some
sort of medical civil defence in West Germany belonged to the military. In
contrast to some of the civilian officials at the time, the imagined disas-
trous of most medical officers quickly focused on nuclear war.12 Some
certainly downplayed the potential destructiveness of this scenario and
maintained that—if the planning was sound and the individual physicians
masters of their craft—adequate preparations could be made (cf. Bayer
1962). However, the medical system (Sanitätsdienst ) of the new West
German army, the Bundeswehr, was deemed to be unfit to tackle such a
task alone. Especially in the late 1950s and early 1960s, proposals were
occasionally made to combine both the civilian and military spheres into
an ‘omnipotent’ medical service, ready to face the most severe crisis situa-
tions and reflecting the sociotechnical imaginary of a shelter-based system
of total defence. Still, even during the 1950s these proposals remained
in the minority, since most military physicians deemed their powers to
counteract the damage of the new weapons to be frightfully slim.
The 1962 large-scale NATO war exercise Fallex (fall exercise),
renowned in German national history as the origin of the infamous Spiegel
affair,13 may serve as an example. During the exercise, military physicians
professed that under the imagined circumstances of an all-out nuclear
bombardment, they could maintain their service for a mere couple of
days, if at all. Navy physician Karl-Wilhelm Wedel noted in his exercise
diary that Fallex imagined 89 nuclear strikes on West Germany on day
one, while official sources of the Ministry of the Interior mentioned 300
nuclear strikes within a six-day period.14 Wedel warned that the general
military’s assessments of the casualties were far too low, stressed the large
number of quick losses among the available medical personal, and pointed
to an overall spread of panic and epidemics which would soon render any
idea of organised medical help as completely unrealistic.15 To allow for
a wider field of possible decision-making, later NATO exercises, such as
Wintex in 1975, usually referred to more restrained scenarios with only
a limited use of nuclear weaponry. However, medical officers still held
the opinion that they could only function with any degree of effective-
ness as long as weapons of mass destructions were not used, and the
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criticism was made that even a single day of chemical warfare would
render their services so ‘heavily afflicted’ that they would be unfit to offer
further assistance.16 While many military physicians presented themselves
as ‘uncomfortable reminders’ within the general command structure,17
it must be stressed that their largely pessimistic views did not stop them
from preparing for the worst as well as they could. Befitting the prototyp-
ical soldier’s duty not to give in easily, most of them remarked that trying
to prepare was neither meaningless nor did it make a military conflict
more likely, as was the opinion of various peace movements. On the
contrary, a reasonable level of preparation, it was argued, could very well
be for naught, but might still lead to some good. In one of his books on
the subject, the Bundeswehr ’s foremost radiologist Otfried Messerschmidt
put it this way:
Some might pose the question whether, in such a situation, anything
should be done at all. Are not recommendations, as in this book for
treating wounds, burns and radiation injuries under conditions of a massive
holocaust, a pretense that a nuclear war can even be survived? Is it not
naive to offer advice for a catastrophe that can be absolutely hopeless? If
an impression of hopelessness results from reading this book, it is abso-
lutely not the intention of the author. On the contrary, the information
in this book is presented to spark initiative and imagination in a nuclear
catastrophe in the firm belief that it will save human life. The will to help
is not enough unless one knows what to do. […] To be sure, nuclear
war would be the most devastating event that could happen to mankind
today. Should this catastrophe occur, against the will of all reasonable men,
a medical service organization must stand ready to save as many lives as
possible. (Messerschmidt 1979: xiv–iv)
The utilitarian notion to do whatever possible for as many as possible
(cf. ZDv 49/50: 161) was a dominant motif of the early efforts of mili-
tary physicians in these matters. Derived from traditional professional
ethics, it served as a utopian counterpoint to the dystopian imaginary
of nuclear annihilation. The medical method for achieving the necessary
agency during the imagined disastrous was, however, highly controver-
sial: triage—the process of selecting whom to treat and whom not to,
in the case of injuries either too minor or too grievous, at times when
there are too few physicians to be able to care for an overwhelming
number of patients (cf. Koslowski 1969: 47). This last-resort measure of
emergency medicine, barely contested in most countries, reminded many
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Germans of the murderous selections which had occurred in Auschwitz
and other National Socialist concentration camps. Nevertheless, for the
military physicians dealing with civil defence issues, developing more
effective methods of triage was considered vital. For them, triage was not
linked to Nazism, but to their own professional past of practising surgery
on the battlefields of the Second World War.18 Most of the early medical
officers of the Bundeswehr had been part of the Wehrmacht as well and
ultimately regarded medical civil defence as a means of keeping something
‘honourable’, which had helped to save the life of many a soldier, from a
tainted past.
In comparison with the Federal Republic’s general military force, its
dedicated medical service had been founded belatedly (1956 as opposed
to 1955) and was deemed inferior to the army, air force and navy until—
depending on one’s viewpoint—1957 or even 1965.19 The prestige of
military physicians was often considered lacking,20 and early medical offi-
cers sought out civil defence as a possibility of re-entering a working
relationship with their civilian colleagues in a field which would affect
all physicians in times of national crisis.21 Apart from military officers
such as Gustav Sondermann or Kurt Groeschel, civilian officials, too,
supported such cooperative efforts, as they feared the military might
otherwise veer away from the civilian sphere as it had done in the lead-
up to and during the World Wars. Hans Neuffer, inaugural president of
the newly founded Bundesärztekammer (German Medical Association),22
expressly supported the military physicians’ efforts to counteract ‘disaster
situations’ while insisting that they had to remain medical doctors first
and officers second.23
It is difficult to assess whether such endeavours were motivated
primarily by an effort to keep the young democracy and its fragile insti-
tutions on track or simply to heighten their own professional power—or
both. While still enjoying substantial societal prestige and solid incomes,
it took German physicians some time to distance themselves from a past
in which they had played a problematic part at best. They had been
heavily involved in all top-level National Socialist organisations. As many
as 45% had been members of the NSDAP, 26% of the SA and 9% of
the SS (cf. Freimüller 2001: 14), and increasing revelations of nefarious
medical crimes motivated many to keep their ranks closed. It was believed
that strong ties between the diverse fields of the profession would quell
internal turmoil which, in the end, was not in anyone’s interest, as it
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endangered the strength of the profession as a whole. From this perspec-
tive, disaster medicine, which medical civil defence became increasingly
known as from the late 1960s onwards, was a viable subject for bringing
physicians from various fields together to work on. While it was originally
derived from war surgery, it could—in the eyes of its proponents—only
serve its purpose if every physician knew how to adhere to its central
premise: the ‘radical compulsion to think differently’ (Rebentisch 1979:
99), in other words to turn from individual medicine to mass medicine
in times of large-scale emergencies, using triage to save as many lives as
possible. It may seem ironic then, that for all these efforts the actual
implementation of disaster medicine was most effectively fuelled not by
the military, nor even by the threat of war, but by something which had
thus far eluded everyone’s imagination: nuclear power plants.
The first major working group of the Bundesärztekammer associated
with the potential dangers of the encroaching civilian use of nuclear power
was founded in 1973 by renowned radiologist Emil Graul. Its results
were published in 1975 (Scientific Council of the Bundesärztekammer
1975) and met with large-scale resentment at the 1976 German Medical
Assembly (Deutscher Ärztetag)—the so-called ‘parliament of the medical
profession’ in West Germany. Not only were its findings deemed too
positive overall, with little regard paid to the problems stemming from
radioactive waste materials, but the fact that several members of Graul’s
group had been on nuclear industry payrolls was also criticised.24 Because
high-ranking officials of the Bundesärztekammer were wary of political
controversies within its ranks, a potential follow-up panel was to focus
exclusively on the medical implications of nuclear power plants while
avoiding easily ‘politicised’ issues such as radioactive waste. Furthermore,
it had to refrain from inviting physicians with close ties to the industry.25
Apart from the nuclear industry, however, most physicians specialising
in radiation sickness belonged to the military. Thus, this latter demand
opened up the chance to realise the hopes for cooperation expressed early
on by military medical officers. More than twenty years after it had been
originally proposed, an eclectic group of well-respected civilian and mili-
tary physicians began creating a national scheme for disaster medicine,
among them: the first German anaesthesiologist, Rudolf Frey; the civilian
burn injury specialist Leo Koslowski; the already mentioned military
physician Otfried Messerschmidt, renowned for having trained with radi-
ology luminary Hanns Langendorff; and Ernst Rebentisch, retired chief
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inspector of the Bundeswehr ’s medical service, the highest rank any
medical officer could achieve.
Two working groups followed Emil Graul’s original one, the
first led by radiologist Hanno Poppe (cf. Scientific Council of the
Bundesärztekammer 1981) and the second by military surgeon Reben-
tisch. Although a detailed reconstruction of the actual meetings cannot
be provided here, the mere titles of the respective groups are telling.
Graul’s panel had been called ‘Risks of Nuclear Power Plants’—indeed
a title which did not necessarily restrict its focus to medical issues. In
contrast to that, Poppe’s working group ‘Emergency Response of Physi-
cians in Nuclear Power Disasters’ concentrated strictly on the medical
aspects of such disasters and imagined a single scenario: a reactor melt-
down, deemed highly unlikely but theoretically possible. The final group,
led by Ernst Rebentisch, began its work in 1981, resulted in two major
publications in 1986 and 198826 and was simply called ‘Deployment of
Physicians during Disaster Events’, its title being all but stripped of polit-
ical overtones while generalising the nature of the imagined disastrous to
effectively include almost anything.
Rebentisch himself was very much aware of the implications. For
him, the all-hazards approach which was dominating civil defence offi-
cials’ thinking at the time seemed all but mandatory. Indeed, he and
his peers rejected the possibility that a physician could seriously prepare
for the aftermath of a reactor meltdown without also preparing for
at least a limited nuclear attack. Whereas the scale was certainly envi-
sioned to be different, as was the asset of an intact medical service
during times of peace, the required professional preparation, learning
about triage, treating burns, radiation sickness and so on, seemed to
remain completely unchanged. Therefore, Rebentisch could and delib-
erately did refer to disaster situations to avoid mentioning the highly
unpopular term ‘war’ while still aiming for some basic wartime prepa-
ration of physicians.27 However, having served in a variety of alternative
scenarios himself—he had led the medical operation during the Pales-
tinian terrorist attack on the Israeli team of the 1972 Summer Olympics
in Munich, for example28—he did not regard talking of disasters solely
as a rhetorical cloak, either. Rather, he tried to push the less contro-
versial topic of disaster relief instead of civil defence because, as already
stated, the professional consequences of improving both were identical in
his opinion.
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The debates surrounding a proposed Gesundheitssicherstellungsgesetz
(GesSG) may serve as an example for this approach. The name of this
bill was—whether chosen deliberately or not—highly complex, potentially
misleading and difficult to translate. Sicherstellungsgesetze—laws ‘to safe-
guard something’—are meant to guarantee the function of specific key
services in times of national crises, in this case focusing on health. The
GesSG belonged to a set of emergency laws (Notstandsgesetze) which were
publicly embattled during the late 1960s. As an approved expert, Ernst
Rebentisch was asked by the Bundesärztekammer to comment on the
individual paragraphs of the draft. Rebentisch agreed with some of the key
measures proposed therein, such as the registration of all medical workers
(including those not currently employed) and the right to assess medical
facilities for their potential use in mass casualty situations. Nevertheless,
he and his peers remained highly critical of the bill. The knowledge
of physicians in all matters of preparation concerning both disaster and
war—which in Rebentisch’s view had to be included from the planning
stage onwards—tended to be ignored rather than sufficiently heeded.
Throughout all his annotations, however, one wish was clearly paramount:
to erase the term Verteidigungsfall (‘in the case of national defence’, a
common euphemism for war) as thoroughly as possible and substitute
it with ‘disaster’.29 Again, while Rebentisch was aware of the diplomatic
advantage of this proposed change in terminology, the reasoning went
beyond rhetoric. On multiple occasions, he insisted that the existing
framework of medical disaster relief was even worse off than respective war
preparations, which could at least rely on the Bundeswehr, and although
the federal GesSG bill had no immediate jurisdiction on disaster relief
issues as such, Rebentisch hoped that it would be interpreted by the
individual states as an urgent call for action to improve their own legal
situation.30 Moreover, because of the dual-use nature of civil defence as
delineated by the KatSG-68, any measures the federal state provided to
improve it could potentially be used by the individual states for disaster
relief as well.
Naturally, this all-hazards approach was, and still is, controversial in
and of itself. As was hinted at earlier, it is a generalisation, if not a
misconception, that civil defence measures may most easily be realised
in times of crises. For the West German case at least, the very opposite
seems to have been true. During times of détente, laws could be passed,
structures established which would have met with widespread public and
parliamentary resistance during the high points of the East–West conflict.
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The years surrounding the Cuban Missile Crisis and the construction
of the Berlin Wall in the early 1960s, as well as the NATO Double-
Track Decision of the early 1980s led to multiple failed civil defence
endeavours, since politicians feared public backlash. The outspoken peace
movements of the early 1980s, for instance, were highly active in West
Germany. Most dangerous to Rebentisch and other chamber experts were
dissenting, well-respected physicians such as Ulrich Gottstein or Horst-
Eberhard Richter who labelled specific preparations—especially training
in triage—as a professional brand of warmongering in line with National
Socialist’ genocidal politics. Organised as the West German section of
the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW)
and praised by being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1984, they
achieved a sizeable amount of popularity and influence during the first
half of the 1980s. They never represented a majority of physicians in
West Germany, though, and ultimately failed to prevent a majority of the
disaster medicine workgroup’s goals (for a case study of the Swiss IPPNW,
see chapter by Marti in this volume). It was not only the return of a poli-
tics of détente during the mid-1980s, however, which led to their defeat.
Parallel to the widely discussed publication of Ulrich Beck’s seminal work
Risikogesellschaft (Risk Society, cf. Beck 1986), the reactor meltdown of
the Chernobyl power plant on 26 April 1986 offered disaster medicine
an opportunity to shine. Since scenarios above mere accidents, but below
all-out nuclear war had always been those for which civil defence prepara-
tion might offer some kind of solace, physicians such as Rebentisch could
now point to Chernobyl to support their call for additional preparedness
while the West German section of the IPPNW gradually started to criticise
nuclear power just as much as nuclear weapons.31
In 1989, the KatSG-68 was somewhat revised, and though its
changes—brought about by the, again, awkwardly named Katastrophen-
schutzergänzungsgesetz (Amendment to the Disaster Relief Act)—could
hardly be considered revolutionary, this revision realised some of the
most important points professionals such as Ernst Rebentisch had been
demanding for many years. Physicians were now integrated into crisis
units from the planning stages onwards, and senior emergency physi-
cians were given full authority over medical issues.32 Over time, teaching
triage and general disaster medicine became less controversial—though
never unanimously supported—proving worthwhile in many a humani-
tarian relief operation, most of them abroad, during floods, earthquakes
and—indeed—military conflicts.33 However, contrary to the ambitions of
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Rebentisch and his peers at the time, disaster medicine never emerged as a
separate field of medical studies but became a part of emergency medicine,
from which it does not fundamentally differ at the present time, apart
from in its scope and severity.
Conclusion
For the year 1988, Martin Diebel states that the combined financial
efforts at federal and state level for their dual-use ‘expanded disaster relief’
amounted to 3.7 billion Deutsche Mark—a sizeable sum indicating that
civil defence had changed rather than failed in West Germany, as had the
underlying sociotechnical imaginary of its proponents.
In the most prominent front state of the Cold War, split apart between
opposing military alliances and hosting thousands of nuclear warheads,
concepts of total defence had a hard time being accepted. Even the most
expansive measures could not offer any guarantee, and ultimately, offi-
cials had to admit that everything hinged on the hope that the enemy
simply might not want to eradicate West Germany. To be sure, many
people chose to remain ignorant of the possible dangers out of comfort
or denial, but some also remembered vividly what kind of fury could be
unleashed by conventional bombardment alone. And while the equations
between National Socialism and medical prioritisation processes regularly
put forth by members of the West German IPPNW may seem absurd
from today’s perspective, if not downplaying the actual holocaust, they
attest to the paramount role national history played in rendering expan-
sive civil defence measures precarious to even utter. Additionally, every
year that nuclear war did not happen raised the perceived necessity to
focus on scenarios that did. The North Sea flood of 1962 was not hypo-
thetical but a reality, and it did not stand alone. The Ramstein air show
disaster of 1988, for instance, resulted in dozens of casualties and led
to massive criticism of the poor state of disaster medicine and general
emergency preparedness. Chernobyl motivated even IPPNW activists to
publish a pamphlet reminiscent of the 1960s’ civil defence brochures,34
lending credence to the saying that during an actual crisis, even the worst
critics of civil defence will try to seek shelter (Schneider 1962: 78).
Ultimately, civil defence in West Germany did not so much profit
from the crises situations of the Cold War as it profited from peace.
The respective officials and institutions who had initially talked of ‘disas-
ters’ to avoid mentioning their real objective gradually started to believe
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their own rhetoric from the mid-1960s onwards. In a society growing
ever more complex, the imagined disastrous expanded, including more
and more scenarios of varying severity, all of them unlikely, but none
impossible. Just as the discussions surrounding disaster medicine became
more pragmatic and less steeped in moralising subtext, the underlying
sociotechnical imaginary of general civil defence was gradually brought
in line with attainable countermeasures that focused on volunteer relief
work and medical training rather than digging holes in the ground.
Notes
1. This article focuses on German literature and sources. Although
‘catastrophe’ might seem to be the more literal translataion of the
German term Katastrophe, its actual use is much more akin to
‘disaster’, as can be showcased by numerous word pairings such
as Katastrophenschutz (‘disaster relief’), Katastrophenfilm (‘dis-
aster movie’) and so on. Thus, ‘disaster’ was chosen as the most
appropriate translation.
2. Both the writings of Agamben (cf. 2001: 8–14) and studies
belonging to the theory of ‘securitisation’ (cf. Buzan et al. 1998
as an introduction) tend to support the notion that very few disas-
trous events require additional executive powers, but they are often
abused by governments to this effect, e.g. by proclaiming states of
emergency to bypass parliamentary control.
3. In matters of civil defence, the German Democratic Republic had
more in common with the Soviet Union than with West Germany
(cf. Müller 2009).
4. While the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki provided a
grim database from which to extrapolate the effects of larger scale
conflicts, such deductions remained theoretical. Moreover, relevant
research was not yet widely available in Germany during the 1950s.
5. See also the chapters by Bjørnsson, Hogg and Farbøl in this
volume.
6. The BLSV, originally called Luftschutzverein, was founded as early
as 1946, while the THW followed in 1950. They were recognised
as federal institutions in 1951 (BLSV) and 1953 (THW).
7. For more detailed information on the genesis of the central insti-
tutions of German civil defence, cf. Steneck (2005) and, for the
BzB, Geier (2003).
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8. Many authors have underlined Germany’s reliance on private asso-
ciations (Verbände) in order to organise its politics, economy and
culture (cf. Sebaldt and Straßner 2004). It may not even be widely
known to the public, but although both disaster relief and general
medical services appear to function as professional entities, they are,
in fact, heavily reliant on the volunteer workers of various private
associations (e.g. the German Red Cross, the Arbeiter-Samariter-
Bund, the Johanniter-Unfall-Hilfe, the Malteser-Hilfsdienst, but
also the THW and countless local fire departments). The consent
of these associations proved to be a necessity for any civil defence
reform. Their voluntary nature was certainly instrumental in
achieving that status: politicians hardly dared to act against their
will because they feared losing the only workforce they had—a
workforce which, being unpaid, could easily quit at any moment.
9. Technisches Hilfswerk (ed.), Flüchtlingshilfe: Herausfordernde
Aufgabe für das THW. Mission report, 18 September 2015,
https://www.thw.de/SharedDocs/Meldungen/DE/Einsaetze/
national/2015/09/meldung_006_ fluechtlingshilfe.html?param
= 1,530,411,514,789&param3 = jsoff; Corona-Einsatz: THW-




5257BDEC.1_cid379?nn=924754 [both accessed 13 November
2020].
10. Cf. recent data taken from online press releases based on the








iegen [accessed 12 November 2020].
11. For more detailed sociological remarks concerning physicians and
other ‘professionals’, see the writings of Freidson (e.g. 1986).
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12. IV H an Abteilungsleiter IV vom 13.5.1957, Betr.: Organisa-
tion des Führungsstabes des Gesundheits- und Sanitätswesens der
Bundeswehr. BArch-MA, BW 24/20790.
13. The affair is usually considered a cornerstone in establishing the
early Federal Republic’s freedom of the press. It involved the polit-
ical magazine Der Spiegel being accused of treason because it had
published an article containing details about the German military’s
poor performance during Fallex 62 (cf. ‘Bedingt abwehrbereit’,
Der Spiegel 41/1962, http://magazin.spiegel.de/EpubDelivery/
spiegel/pdf/25673830).
14. Erfahrungsbericht über die NATO-Herbstübung ‘FALLEX 62’
vom 6.–27.9.1962; Anlage zu BMI VII B 5 (Gekürzte Fassung),
p. 10. DRK, 4274.
15. Üb-Kriegstagebuch Nr. 1—KNDS-SAN FÜ. BArch-MA, BW
24/173.
16. WITEX SILVER/InSan II 1, Lagebeitrag Sanitäts- und Gesund-
heitswesen vom 13.3.1975. BArch-Ma, BW 24/5432.
17. Gustav Sondermann, ‘Über das Leitbild des Arztsoldaten’, in
Gespräch über militärärztliche Fragen vom 22. bis 24. Oktober
[1956] an der Evangelischen Akademie Loccum, p. 28. BArch-MA,
BW 51/1.
18. C.f. Schreiben von Hermann Kater an Karsten Vilmar vom
28.8.1983. BArch, B 417/146.
19. The medical service became an independent part of the German
military in 1957, but its commander (Inspekteur) was deemed
inferior compared to the others until 1965.
20. c.f. Georg Meyer, Aktennotiz vom 7.3.1979. BArch-MA, BW
24/7796.
21. Kurt Groeschel, Gedanken zur Koordination von aktiven San.
Offizieren und Zivilärzteschaft, 20 June 1956. BArch, B 389/112.
22. The official translation—German Medical Association—is some-
what misleading, as the Bundesärztekammer is not a typical associa-
tion based on voluntary membership, but a ‘chamber’ (Kammer).
All German physicians are organised within a so-called chamber
system granting them professional autonomy as well as some
federally guaranteed privileges. Membership in one’s respective
state-level chamber (Landesärztekammer) is mandatory for every
practising physician. The delegates of these state-level chambers
constitute the Bundesärztekammer, which serves as both a lobby
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organisation and a professional think-tank usually focusing on
issues which demand federal standards, such as medical ethics.
23. Hans Neuffer, ‘Die deutsche Ärzteschaft zum Aufbau des
Sanitätswesens der Bundeswehr’, in Gespräch über militärärztliche
Fragen vom 22. bis 24. Oktober [1956] an der Evangelischen
Akademie Loccum, p. 18–23. BArch-MA, BW 51/1.
24. Cf. Das Risiko der Kernkraftwerke, in Deutsches Ärzteblatt
1/1973, p. 21–23.
25. Hanno Poppe, 18. Plenarsitzung des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats
der BÄK (5.5.1979, Köln, Bundesärztekammer), TOP 3 C–Arbeit-
skreis ‘Ärztliche Hilfe bei Katastrophen’, p. 1. BArch, B 417/864.
26. The first publications were the Denkschrift Katastrophenmedizin
(Position Paper on Disaster Medicine, Bundesärztekammer 1986), a
short pamphlet primarily designed to put pressure on the legislative
process, and the second opus magnum by Rebentisch, the Hand-
buch der medizinischen Katastrophenhilfe (Handbook of Medical
Disaster Relief ), containing detailed instructions for a multitude
of medical fields in varying scenarios (Rebentisch 1988).
27. Letter from Ernst Rebentisch to Heinz-Peter Brauer vom
8.2.1982. BArch, B 417/154.
28. Cf. Laudatio zur Verleihung der Paracelsus-Medaille an Prof. Dr.
med. Ernst Rebentisch, https://www.bundesaerztekammer.de/fil
eadmin/user_upload/downloads/Lau-rebentisch.pdf [accessed 13
November 2020].
29. Letter from Ernst Rebentisch to Heinz-Peter Brauer vom
13.10.1980. BArch, B 417/160.
30. Cf. Ernst Rebentisch, Beantwortung des Fragenkatalogs zur
Anhörung am 6.10.1989. BArch, B 417/2924.
31. Since this paper focuses on civil defence rather than its critics, it
cannot offer a detailed analysis of the IPPNW. For a study on the
German section cf. Kemper (2016). As with general peace move-
ments, opinions of the IPPNW both then and now were and are
mixed. On the one hand, they were credited with softening the
dividing line between friend and foe during the Cold War and
for offering educational information on the ‘untreatable’ horror of
nuclear war. On the other hand, they were criticised for one-sidedly
condemning the defence preparations of liberal democracies while
turning a blind eye to the totalitarian nature of the USSR, which
cruelly persecuted dissenting activists at home.
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32. Cf. Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Ergänzung des Katstro-
phenschutzgesetzes und anderer Vorschriften (Katastrophen-
schutzergänzungsgesetz—KatSErgG), Stand: 8.9.1988. FZH, 16–
3 A/2.3.–7.
33. A former student of Leo Koslowski, surgeon Bernd Domres alone
led approximately 50 missions abroad (e.g. in Cambodia, Haiti,
Nigeria and Pakistan) and co-founded the German Institute for
Disaster Medicine, cf. https://www.stiftung-difkm.de/team/kur
zvitae/ [accessed 13 November 2020].
34. Lutz Castell and Katharina Strecker (Institut für Umweltunter-
suchungen Starnberg e.V.), Maßnahmen beim nächsten Super-
GAU, 10 April 1987. FZH, 16–3 A/17.3–5.
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CHAPTER 4
Normalising Nuclear War: Narrative
Scenarios, Imaginative Geographies and Sites
of Leisure in 1950s Britain
Jonathan Hogg
‘A roar of engines in the sky shattered the Sunday morning quiet, a
squadron of jet planes swooped low over Morpeth Dock–and the largest
fire service and civil defence exercise to be held in the North-West [UK]
since the end of the war had started’. This newspaper report, published in
Birkenhead News on 9 April 1952, went on to say that the civil defence
‘exercise was a realistic test, and an imaginative attempt was made to stim-
ulate the conditions under which the different services would have to
operate and co-ordinate in war-time’.1 In a briefing before the exercise, it
was explained that ‘as with all exercises, imagination must be brought into
full play’, which was an attempt to encourage participants to throw them-
selves into the exercise wholeheartedly.2 The public description of this
drill reflected ‘the imaginative and rhetorical force of military spectacle’
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(Rech 2015: 536), while also stressing the importance of both ‘realism’
and ‘imagination.’
This representation of preparedness would become normalised in the
early Cold War era. British citizens, via civil defence propaganda materials
and official publications disseminated in the local and national press, were
invited to imagine themselves as part of a new struggle which demanded
a form of active psychological and physical engagement with the nuclear
threat, and the acceptance of sustained militarisation in peacetime. As the
jet planes roared over the River Mersey in North-West England as part
of the Morpeth exercise, they acted out the imagined aerial attacks that
would feature at the beginning of most civil defence ‘narrative’ scenarios
in the 1950s. These scenarios acted as the starting point for training
exercises carried out by civic leaders and volunteer personnel who also
developed sites of leisure and forms of civic engagement that contributed
to a culture of civil defence activism in the 1950s. The scenarios, and the
physical responses to them in the exercises that followed, were also shaped
by a shared knowledge of the spatial and geographical specificity of the
region in which they were located.
In this chapter, civil defence is interpreted as one significant part
of a process of mobilisation after the large-scale national development
and institutionalisation of military nuclear technologies that occurred
in Britain after 1945. One central aim behind British nuclear mobili-
sation was the creation of nuclear weapons and, following Jasanoff and
Kim, once this initially secret technological development became public
knowledge, a sociotechnical imaginary emerged which (1) downplayed
the unique danger of nuclear weapons, (2) attempted to contain fear
and encourage survivability and control, and (3) promoted deterrence
ideology and the development of military nuclear technology as national
virtues.3 This imaginary pointed the way towards a desirable future, and
was encouraged systematically by official means. Civil defence played a key
role in ‘embedding’ this sociotechnical imaginary in British society, and I
argue that the process of embedding this imaginary can only be properly
understood with reference to localised social, geographical and discursive
contexts.4 Furthermore, I argue that the social impact and persistence
of nationwide nuclear sociotechnical imaginaries cannot be fully under-
stood without reference to the localised contexts in which civil defence
was located and enacted.
In order to explore this further, a particular reading of Jasanoff and
Kim’s definition of sociotechnical imaginaries is applied to materials in
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Wirral Archives (Merseyside, UK) and other relevant primary source
materials from the period. These archival materials offer a glimpse into
civil defence strategies in the North-West region of England, and espe-
cially the localised activities of volunteer activists and civic leaders on the
Wirral peninsula. Wirral Archives hold a wealth of national and regional
civil defence circulars, pamphlets and planning documents and, perhaps
most usefully, regular correspondence between the Chief Clerk of Birken-
head Council, Mr. D. P. Heath, and the Home Office in London. We are
afforded a glimpse of how national policies were enacted locally, and how
the nuclear sociotechnical imaginary was replicated and made durable.
To trace the ways in which these localised contexts appear to have
intertwined with and been shaped by a wider (officially maintained)
sociotechnical imaginary, I do three things in this chapter. After brief
discussions of general context and historiography, I explore some of the
bespoke narrative scenarios that were created to frame civil defence exer-
cises and analyse their public representation. Secondly, I focus on the sites
of leisure and forms of civic engagement linked to civil defence activity
more broadly. Third, I look to the concept of imaginative geographies
(Said 1978; Gregory 1995) to further unearth the localised nature of
sociotechnical imaginaries in this era.
Civil Defence in the UK
In the years following the conclusion of the Second World War, many
British citizens faced severe social and economic hardship. Food rationing
continued until 1954, and many urban communities struggled to deal
with the destruction caused by the indiscriminate aerial bombardment
that had become normal practice in the age of total war. A further shadow
was cast over British life with the advent of the atomic bomb, and by
1949 the Soviet Union had tested their first weapon. Although the civil
defence exercise at Morpeth Dock, Birkenhead—located on the Wirral
peninsula in the North-West of England—was based on a non-nuclear
scenario, it had become normal to devote time and resources to plan-
ning and performing realistic civil defence exercises in the early Cold
War era. Indeed, nuclear and non-nuclear exercises were planned and run
along similar lines: active nuclear preparedness dovetailed with older civil
defence methods.5 The news that the Soviets had successfully tested a
weapon led to increased funding to civil defence, enabled by the Civil
Defence Act of 1948, which by 1949 ‘empowered local authorities to
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appoint Civil Defence Committees and recruit members for the new Civil
Defence Corps’ (Campbell 1983: 71).
In this early atomic era—before the thermonuclear revolution, and
before the Hall and Strath Reports in Britain shaped more realistic
thinking about the likely impact of nuclear strikes on the British Isles
(Hughes 2003)—atomic civil defence was rudimentary, and largely
followed Second World War habits of thinking about survival and morale
(Grant 2010: 44–51). This large-scale peacetime effort depended on
volunteer recruits, and a significant Cold War propaganda campaign influ-
enced British culture in the 1950s and 1960s. Citizens were persuaded
of the necessity of Cold War participation, duty and responsibility both
by the dissemination of government publications to civic leadership and
then by advertisements placed in the national press, poster campaigns and
recruitment films (Grant 2010; Hogg 2016).
This propaganda and recruitment drive was central to how the
three main characteristics of the nuclear sociotechnical imaginary were
embedded in British culture. This broadly discursive context—where
particular ideas about nuclear weapons were disseminated by the govern-
ment—was intertwined with the physical organisation of significant
numbers of civil defence recruits in the 1950s.6 By the late 1950s,
civil defence organisation was conducted at sub-regional, regional and
national level, and throughout the decade, a series of large-scale exercises
were introduced as national policy, which would then be interpreted and
organised by regional leadership.
Historiography: Civil Defence
and Sociotechnical Imaginaries
In order to place civil defence activity within its localised social, geograph-
ical and discursive contexts, this chapter builds on a number of historio-
graphical strands. Surveys of postwar Britain are plentiful, but approaches
highlighting the powerful role of cultural memories of the Second World
War (Noakes and Pattinson 2013) and the politics of reconstruction
in the 1950s (Zweiniger-Bargielowska 2000) have especially influenced
this chapter. Some potent and shared ‘nation-building’ imaginaries with
longer traditions in British life that are also relevant to the history of
civil defence include patriotism, nostalgia, militaristic masculinities and
war commemoration (Anderson 1983). Temporally speaking, we might
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observe that these imaginaries stretch back in time, seeking solace in tradi-
tion or an imagined past. This is quite distinct from the future-oriented
imaginaries of civil defence policymakers (and their representations),
detailed in the work of David Monteyne (2011) and Joseph Masco
(2008).
Histories of civil defence in the UK have focused on both the strategic
‘façade’ that the organisation represented (Campbell 1983; Grant, 2010)
and localised histories of how Cold War policy impacted everyday life
(Barnett 2015; Hogg and Brown 2019). Interdisciplinary research on
atomic urbanism (Monteyne 2011) and imaginative geographies (Said
1978; Gregory 1995) suggest the importance of ‘influential presenta-
tions of the world and its contours that are made possible by particular
forms of knowledge about that world’ (Farish 2010: xii). What many
of these approaches to the Cold War have in common is an interest in
the power dynamics at play in Cold War societies where, for example,
‘nuclear spaces are constructed socially and politically’ (Alexis-Martin and
Davies 2017: 4). Jessica Douthwaite’s recent oral history of civil defence
personnel suggests that Cold War policy and ideology created perma-
nent, durable qualities in government and society that were hard to resist.
She argues that anti-nuclear protest faced an increasingly challenging task
against this durable system, stating ‘oral testimonies provide an invalu-
able means to demonstrate that where in its early years it made “sense”
to critique nuclear security, anti-nuclear politics became increasingly irrel-
evant in an established, legitimised Cold War system’ (Douthwaite 2018:
231). Furthermore, her thesis demonstrates the processes ‘by which
postwar Britain accepted and acclimatised to Cold War nuclear strategies’
(Douthwaite 2018: 176).
Work that has examined aspects of the ‘cultural Cold War’ (Shaw
2005) and the role of the mass media in the British Cold War (Hill
2018) sit alongside work on the importance of assessing how, why and
where nuclear anxieties were articulated in the 1950s (Hogg 2012).
In British life, a form of ‘nuclearity’ existed that can be defined as ‘a
shifting set of assumptions held by individual citizens on the dangers of
nuclear technology, assumptions that were rooted firmly in context and
which circulated in, and were shaped by, national discourse’ (Hogg 2012:
537). This can suggest that implicit understanding of the negative aspects
of nuclear culture had become normalised throughout the 1950s and,
further, official attempts were made to shape attitudes towards nuclear
weapons (Hogg 2016).
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This process, which we can identify through its discursive traces,
can help us to make sense of how nuclear sociotechnical imaginaries
became a normalised and persistent feature of Cold War life. Acknowl-
edging a recent surge in interest in the analytical utility of ‘sociotechnical
imaginaries’, the concept is conceived in this chapter as a powerful ‘imag-
inative infrastructure’ that serves ‘the possibility of shaping terrains of
choices and thereby of actions’ (Sismondo 2020). These social constructs
might have the potential to limit or encourage discussion in favour
of an imaginary which serves a powerful agenda (Polleri 2020). As
Robinson suggests, ‘the collective shaping of imaginaries is not simply
about creating communities, because they also allow states to more effec-
tively control society and “other” those who do not share their same
vision’ (Robinson 2020: 3). As other contributors to this book note,
imaginaries have the potential to ‘shape meaning and behaviour’, and it is
important to analyse the cultural components that enable this.7 Perhaps
most closely aligned to the approach in this chapter is a recent attempt
to trace the ‘intricate relationship between technology and social change
in relation to cultural memory and cultural perceptions’ (Kalmbach et al.
2020), especially also considering their contention that it is often fear that
provides the impetus for technological development.
The definition of sociotechnical imaginaries by Jasanoff and Kim cited
in the introduction to this book is a description of a tiered and inter-
locking process of structure and agency. Taking inspiration from this, civil
defence activities will be explored in this chapter as one crucial part of a
useful ‘collectively held, institutionally stabilised and publicly performed
vision of a desirable future’ that served to distort the reality of nuclear
weapons as destructive and radioactive weapons of war. Crucially, this
sociotechnical imaginary, animated as it was ‘by shared understandings of
forms of social life and social order’ was strengthened and made durable
once it became intertwined with localised contexts and, of course, individ-
uals working within them (Jasanoff 2015a: 4). It is through this process of
intertwining that we see how socially and politically acceptable knowledge
of nuclear weapons was produced by civil defence leaders and volunteers
at all levels of power, and then represented in British culture.8
This chapter examines how, at a regional level in 1950s Britain, a blend
of nuclear sociotechnical imaginaries and localised context provided the
rationale for civil defence exercises, parades and tournaments, and civil
defence clubs: or, as Cronqvist (2015) has explored, these ritualised acts
of civic duty. In the local and national press, the technology of nuclear
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weapons appeared benign or hidden through their imaginary alignment
with familiar, safe and reassuring activities and shared values. The nuclear
sociotechnical imaginary does not emerge as a ‘static or tightly bounded
belief system’, but elements of this imaginary proved ‘durable at the
national level because [of] powerful instruments of meaning-making and
goal-selecting […] within the control of nation states’ (Jasanoff and
Kim 2009: 123). This speaks to ‘embedding’, which is concerned with
the institutionalisation of an imaginary whereby ‘the merely imagined is
converted into the solidity of identities and the durability of routines
and things’ (Jasanoff 2015b: 323; see also Introduction, this volume).
Anything discursive, hyperbolic or fictive created on nuclear policy by
government that did not talk about the realities of nuclear weapons as
unthinkably destructive weapons of war was part of a useful sociotechnical
imaginary.
‘Narrative Scenarios’ of Nuclear
Attack: Normalising Imaginary War
In the 1950s, the North Western Region Civil Defence Group, like all
civil defence groups in the UK, performed various exercises to improve
coordination and organisation, with the additional purpose of creating
publicity for civil defence efforts. These exercises included elaborate intro-
ductory ‘narratives’ for the participants that imagined how the war had
come about, described the resulting bomb damage, and outlined the
likely consequences of this. These imaginary scenarios were common-
place and served to ‘stabilise’ the idea of survivable and manageable
nuclear attack, thus performing a vision of acceptable nuclear use and
promoting the viability of nuclear deterrence. They also represented a
strand of denialism—a denial of reality in order to push away a psycho-
logically uncomfortable truth—where undesirable future situations could
be marshalled, controlled and made orderly. If denialism seems extreme
and unlikely, then the idea of nuclear survivability can be made sense
of by remembering the direct links that civil defence personnel habitu-
ally made to their experiences of civil defence work during the Second
World War to the Cold War context.9 In a short foreword to ‘Exercise
Miller’, H. H. Schofield (Principle Officer, Home Office), said that ‘to
those who, like himself, served in Civil Defence during the last war he
felt he need not here dilate on the importance of emergency feeding
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and improvisation’.10 For many civil defence personnel who felt right-
fully proud of their wartime service, Cold War civil defence was both a
replication and extension of previous experience and knowledge, where
survival and recovery were the achievable ultimate aims in a time before
unpredictable radiation hazards. By the mid-1950s, official histories of
civil defence were published and circulated to commemorate and celebrate
pre-nuclear work.11
Many of the narrative scenarios deployed ‘imagination’ and ‘reality’ as
active concepts to help frame or describe the exercises, and this language
was echoed in local newspapers, demonstrating the construction and
embedding of a stable sociotechnical imaginary that could be collectively
understood. The scenarios tapped into the dramatic potential of the Cold
War era, stressing the scale of nuclear devastation and the unthinkable
catastrophe that could unfold. While these were, on the whole, sombre
descriptions of the descent into World War Three, humour is occasionally
detectable in the archival materials, suggesting some cynicism towards the
Cold War situation more generally. In 1958, ‘Exercise Joint Effort 2’ was
an exercise between eight different Joint, Civil and Military headquar-
ters in the North-West region. The narrative begins in a familiar enough
manner: ‘The time is the winter of 196X [sic]’, before turning to satire:
‘The Eastern Bloc has achieved many further successes. For example two
rhinoceros, bred in captivity, have just completed their millionth circuit
of the earth in Sputnik 101’.12
More representative of the earnest approach to civil defence activi-
ties was the narrative scenario for ‘Exercise Miller’ in December 1952:
‘[I]t will be assumed that atomic bomb bursts have completely blocked
both entrances of the Mersey Tunnel, severely damaged the underground
railway station […] many people are homeless’. A two-day conference
was held in Birkenhead Town Hall on Merseyside, attended by around
‘80 local government, Home Office, Ministry of Food, Civil Defence
and Women’s Voluntary Service officials’.13 The conference discussed
how to feed citizens in the event of an atomic attack and ‘Exercise
Miller’ was run on the Wirral, which led to specific sites being earmarked
as emergency feeding centres. The conference required an exercise in
imagination because the scenario involved the destruction of vital infras-
tructure. This nightmare scenario was represented in local newspapers,
with headlines such as ‘If an Atomic Bomb Fell on Birkenhead’ or
‘If A-Bombs Landed Here’ or ‘If Atom Bomb Hit Tunnel’ accompa-
nying reports on the conference.14 This dramatic use of language sat
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alongside reassuring reminders that civil defence work was effective and
increasingly well organised by devoted leaders and volunteers, while being
crucial to ensuring the safety of British citizens in the nuclear age. Public
discourse around civil defence generated the familiar representation of
dutiful citizens supplementing the work of the state, offering a humane
and altruistic face to nascent deterrence ideology, and a rejection of Cold
War anxiety. These discursive and social constructs helped embed the
nuclear sociotechnical imaginary at a local level and helped establish the
‘real’ and the ‘imaginary’ as familiar Cold War tropes.
The general awareness of the need to publicly imagine future nuclear
catastrophe or come to terms with the uniquely powerful and dangerous
properties of nuclear weapons was placed alongside the reassurance that
‘real’ civil defence work could allay fear.15 Of course, this chapter argues
that discursive construction of the ‘real’ was itself part of a social process
that supported the sociotechnical imaginary of nuclear weapons. This
preoccupation with both realism and imagination was explicit in civil
defence exercises and their representation. For instance, a report on ‘Exer-
cise Wirral’ in 1954 stated ‘it was a difficult job to make an appreciation
of what were to some extent imaginary incidents’.16 On 15 March 1958,
the Birkenhead News reported on ‘Exercise Edinburgh’ where ‘many
fires were raging in the area of operations and the cries of the injured
and trapped victims could be heard above the roar of the flames […]
consisting of cases of fractured spines, severe head injuries, fractured legs,
whilst in a smashed-in cellar they found and rescued victims with fractures
of the arm or legs as well as those suffering from concussion and severe
shock’.17 This dramatic representation of the exercise was followed by
reassurance to the reader about how well the highly trained civil defence
personnel were able to deal with the situation. In a similar vein, but six
years earlier, the Birkenhead Advertiser reported that as part of ‘Exercise
Morpeth’ in 1952, ‘for two hours nearly 500 volunteer firemen and Civil
Defence workers, National Hospital Services Reserves and the W.V.S.
dealt with imaginary incidents’.18 Of course these incidents, and the
scenarios, were imaginary, but the responses were real, and readers were
invited to admire the personnel who could solve problems and survive.
This discursive context downplayed the potential devastation of nuclear
weapons, contained fear and promoted deterrence: this supported and
embedded key aspects of the nuclear sociotechnical imagery and was a
consistent discursive feature throughout the 1950s.
86 J. HOGG
Also representative was the narrative used for ‘Exercise Signal Fire’, a
fallout exercise in 1960. The exercise followed the apocalyptic sounding
large-scale exercise ‘Four Horsemen’ in 1959, which involved ‘Civil
Defence Control, Signal, Scientific, Fire, Police, Hospital and Military
Staff at Regional HQ and the Royal Observer Corps […] grafted on a
large-scale NATO air defence exercise’. The narrative for ‘Signal Fire’ was
elaborate, detailing the context for worsening tensions between East and
West, and then describing how the British public were being advised to
‘take reasonable steps to preserve family life and to remain in their own
homes’. The narrative ends on a dramatic note: ‘Attack, if it comes, is
expected to be from the east’. As the exercise unfolds, the report describes
multiple ‘5-megaton’ nuclear weapon air bursts and ‘additional fallout
hazard from bombs on the Continent and on the south of the United
Kingdom’.19 It was assumed that people would evacuate to Cheshire from
Liverpool through the Mersey tunnel. ‘Exercise Mermaid II’, held on 27
May 1962, offered a blander description: ‘[I]n the early hours of this
morning widespread nuclear attacks have taken place on this country’.20
The juxtaposition was constant throughout the early Cold War era—
reassuring rhetoric and activities sat alongside actively imagining nuclear
attack. This also characterised representations of civil defence, and this
discursive context should be seen as an important aspect of the sociotech-
nical imaginary that was generated to support deterrence. For instance,
the recruitment film The Waking Point (1951), screened in local cinemas
throughout the 1950s, encapsulated this perfectly: nuclear fear was repre-
sented as an inevitable part of life, but joining civil defence—ideally as a
citizen who conformed to the gendered behaviour and thinking appro-
priate to the Cold War era—was presented as an active way to counteract
it (Hogg 2016: 81–82; Grant 2013: 11–12). This brief example shows
how ideas and particular framings of real and imagined nuclear danger
were appropriated for propaganda purposes in the name of nuclear deter-
rence.21 In the 1950s, fictional nuclear attack scenarios were a common
feature in popular culture and the national and local press, which created
an influential discursive context that informed the articulation of civil
defence narrative scenarios.22
Once the scene was set and exercises were completed, they were eval-
uated. ‘Exercise Miller’ was deemed a huge success because disparate
groups within government had worked together effectively to plan how to
provide food for a dispersed population. At its simplest, improvised ovens
and campfires would be provided at large outdoor sites, a clear throwback
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to Second World War-style organisation. The huge challenges involved,
including predicting where (or advising how) people would congre-
gate, ensuring secure and plentiful food supplies for a fixed period of
time, loomed larger than considerations of radiation danger or acknowl-
edging the possible chaos of a post-nuclear scenario. Press reports focused
on the excellent levels of organisation and competence displayed by
(predominantly male) government officials taking part in these imaginary
scenarios. As with many civil defence exercises in the 1950s, the public
representation of nuclear war was both dramatic and controllable.
The narrative scenarios used to frame civil defence and then the
localised responses to civil defence exercises produced socially and politi-
cally acceptable knowledge of nuclear weapons, which both normalised a
postwar nuclear ‘peace’ and reinforced aspects of the dominant sociotech-
nical imaginary. The promotion of imagined nuclear survivability as a
possible future gave the impression that there were no insurmountable
problems for civil defence volunteers and their leaders. Exercise narra-
tives and the way the exercises were reported after the event assumed an
orderliness and predictability, and the archival record holds few echoes of
emotional responses, or the likelihood of human unpredictability.
Civic Engagement and Sites of Leisure
As part of the process of implementing nuclear civil defence strategy,
various sites of leisure (such as social clubs) were created and activities
(such as quizzes, motor rallies or regional tournaments) were intro-
duced to promote participation, entrench membership and community
belonging, and to generate positive publicity. Although small in scale,
these practices fed into similar efforts on a national scale and promoted
values that helped embed the nuclear sociotechnical imaginary (such
as militarism and duty) through ‘ritual’ and spectacle (Kong and Yeoh
1997; MacDonald 2006). The materiality, social organisation and physical
institutionalisation of civil defence on a local level promoted deterrence
ideology by representing the nation’s military nuclear technology project
as peaceful and normal.
Matthew Grant has argued that civil defence ‘from 1951 was repre-
sented as inclusive, providing associational opportunities and leisure
satisfaction’, but as the Cold War progressed ‘the culture of civil defence,
and the assumptions of political culture concerning its popular appeal,
were increasingly divorced from the realities of British culture’ (Grant
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2011: 54, 60). In the 1950s however, ‘the core message of participation
in national defence was adapted, stressing “patriotism” less and empha-
sizing that to serve in civil defence was to fight for peace and to protect
the local community’ (Grant 2011: 54). Notions of participation and
duty were central ideas to encourage and rework in the nuclear age.
As Miss Hornsby-Smith said in her speech that concluded the North-
West regional ‘Tourney’ in 1958: ‘Today you have given us a display
of skill and techniques which has earned well-merited applause; but you
have also the deeper satisfaction of performing a public service of the
highest order.’23 The results of the Tourney were sent to 42 local newspa-
pers, demonstrating the public relations objectives of these tournaments.
Serious effort went into organising regional civil defence tournaments,
mainly because they were viewed as good publicity for civil defence initia-
tives: Hornsby-Smith argued that ‘we have got to “sell” civil defence’.24
The tournaments comprised of exhibitions and demonstrations, as well as
competitions between civil defence groups in the region.25 On successful
completion of the tournaments, congratulations from national leaders and
dignitaries (such as the Duke of Gloucester in 1959) always followed,
which suggests the level of prestige and importance attached to the
success of these meetings, for both morale purposes and publicity.26
Civil defence groups were an active part of communities, would attend
commemorative events such as Remembrance Sunday, and take part in
civic parades.27 In a more durable social sense, a physical ‘Civil Defence
Club’ was created in Birkenhead in 1956, offering an indication of the
way in which civil defence practices and personnel became embedded into
the fabric of everyday life in the North-West region. The archives hold
plenty of detail on the plans to create a club that would allow volunteers
and visiting civil defence personnel to enjoy the (then) overwhelmingly
masculine pursuit of playing billiards, drinking at the bar, and trying out
Home Office financed luxury wicker seats and tables.28 These mundane
developments gently interwove normative imaginaries around leisure
pursuits with nuclear civil defence aims. As with the discursive context
we saw in the previous section, these efforts socialised and normalised
soft militarisation in the postwar era as part of the modernising project of
nuclear deterrence. One example of how this militarisation became more
visible was the use and representation of Cold War machinery. In 1955,
a civil defence helicopter toured UK civil defence groups to demonstrate
how radiation might be measured.29 By exhibiting reassuring, new and
virtuous technologies capable of controlling risk, and therefore containing
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fear, the sight and sound of a helicopter overhead aided the normalisation
of the peaceful nuclear weapons imaginary.
As part of the discursivity of ‘embedding’ ideas that supported civil
defence socialisation, regional groups regularly received civil defence
information and propaganda films from central government. The Amer-
ican documentary film, Survival Town (1955) was shown in cinemas,
and was accompanied with civil defence promotional material.30 An offi-
cial civil defence circular received by the Birkenhead town clerk in 1956
described the effects of ‘new weapons’ and the importance of a new imag-
inary: ‘an attack with new weapons […] would be a struggle for survival
of the grimmest kind’.31 In the same year the Mayor of Birkenhead and
other local dignitaries received an invitation from Whitehall to view the
premiere of the government produced film The Hydrogen Bomb (1956)
at the Walker Art Gallery, Liverpool.32 The film begins with the slow,
solemn beat of a drum, matched by the funereal and foreboding tone
of the narrator. Warning the audience of ‘this new horror’ he reminds
everyone that ‘we must prepare ourselves, every one of us’ and that if
nuclear war happens, ‘we must accept the fact that we shall all be in it’.
Touching upon the shared cultural memory of the Second World War,
the narrator states that, ‘as was experienced in the last war’, calls for help
were never left unanswered. Presumably this national character would live
on and defines the civil defence volunteers who are ready to help in the
event of nuclear war. The point is reiterated: ‘when peace returned to
our islands, we had hardly taken stock of our resources when we were
confronted with a new danger more frightful than ever before […] grad-
ually our minds began to accept this horror […] are we to sit back
complacently and say “bad luck Jack, I’m alright”’.33 The weapons were
presented as inevitable, but recast as manageable and passively defensive.
Yet, the response of British citizens needed to be active: good char-
acter, duty and responsibility need to be demonstrated in the nuclear
age. The initial introduction of fear as an understandable reaction to the
thermonuclear era is systematically rejected. The familiar visual vocabu-
lary of concentric circles, blast effects and ineffective citizens was used
to promote civil defence aims.34 These strategies and imaginaries were
consistent: one film from the year before, Civil Defence Shows Its Paces
(1955), claimed that ‘enough of us can remember the real thing to hope
that the far greater horror of nuclear war will never become a reality’.35
With the advent of the H bomb, central government advised that ‘offi-
cers must think about vast areas of damage, and in terms of homeless
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amounting to hundreds of thousands […] the accent must be on planning
in the future and not upon training as in the past […] all future planning
must be based upon dispersal, mobility and maintenance of commu-
nications’.36 Additionally, The Hydrogen Bomb (1957), a government
produced civil defence pamphlet, reinforced the importance of public
acceptance of deterrence and argued that dissent ‘might have serious, or
even fatal, consequences’.37
Leaders in the region were being encouraged by national government
to coordinate new types of civic engagement and information dissemina-
tion in the nuclear age. The communal viewing of The Hydrogen Bomb in
the grand setting of the Walker Art Gallery is a good example of how the
sociotechnical imaginary of nuclear weapons became embedded in this
localised social context. The use of existing sites of leisure and culture
was subtly transformed for Cold War purposes, and new permanent sites
were created. The intertwining social context and physical enactment
on the local level were enabled and made durable through assumptions
that were reiterated through communication with national leadership,
and also echoed in the national press. After exploring sites of leisure,
civic engagement and associated propaganda, we can conclude that civil
defence personnel were simultaneously producing their own collective
civic identity and embedding the nuclear sociotechnical imaginary in
society.
Imaginative Geographies
The final way in which we might unpack the nuclear sociotechnical
imaginary as ‘imaginative infrastructure’ is to examine the localised
geographical context of civil defence work on the Wirral peninsula. I
argue that imaginative geographies helped create the illusion of safety,
control and predictability in local civil defence planning, and also partic-
ular representations of airspace promoted deterrence ideology and the
development of military nuclear technology as national virtues.
The exercise scenarios analysed earlier often deployed, and depended
upon, an imagined nuclear geography. In ‘Exercise Miller’, references
to geographical context shaped the imagined scenario and the exer-
cise that followed in important ways. Mr. Pugsley, the Regional Food
Officer stated that ‘because of its geography, Wirral had its own partic-
ular problems that had to be faced’, with particular reference to the likely
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destruction or blockage of the Mersey tunnel, and the fact that the popu-
lation would be surrounded by water on three sides.38 Yet, the materiality
of the Wirral peninsula apparently made the movement of people more
predictable in the event of nuclear war. It was assumed that tens of thou-
sands of people from Birkenhead and Wallasey on the banks of the Mersey
would move west into ‘open country’ or parkland. People would most
likely eventually travel south-west towards the more ‘remote’ region of
North Wales, deemed safer due to the lack of industrial targets. The focus
of civil defence planners was on containing and controlling large groups
of people in open spaces where possible ‘who might otherwise restrict
movement of incoming forces who are known to be on their way’.39
Interestingly, there is no discussion of northward evacuation by boat or
ship, which would doubtless be an instinctive move by a proportion of
the population of Merseyside with seafaring ability and knowledge, but
an obvious potential flashpoint of disorder if masses of people attempted
to board boats destined for the open sea, The Isle of Man or Ireland.
Nowhere is the likely scenario discussed that burn victims might look to
the treacherous tidal waters of River Mersey for relief, or that, with good
knowledge of the tide, it is possible to walk and swim to North Wales via
the River Dee on the west side of the Wirral peninsula. Knowledge of the
sea could prove an invaluable skill in a post-apocalyptic world. Of course,
these are my own speculative attempts to create imaginary geographies
of unpredictable post-nuclear reality. The archival record reflects a more
rigid control of the parameters of nuclear emergency.
Perhaps the geography of the peninsula offered planners a degree of
overconfidence in predicting how people would react in the event of
atomic war, when in actual fact peninsula geography could lead to espe-
cially unpredictable and perilous patterns of behaviour in the days and
weeks after a nuclear strike. The imaginative geographies in the archive are
limited in scope and of course reflect the desire to achieve the practical
aims of the exercises. Yet, these assumptions about nuclear emergency
reflect confidence in survivability and necessarily downplay nuclear harm.
In this sense, it was clearly important to control the fictive elements of
civil defence work and thus define the imaginative boundaries for civil
defence personnel.
Following Edward Said’s formulation of the concept (Said 1978),
Matthew Farish describes imaginative geographies as ‘influential presen-
tations of the world and its contours that are made possible by partic-
ular forms of knowledge about that world. However propagandistic or
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fantastic they might seem [they] are only fictional in the sense that
they have been fabricated. With sufficient circulation, or attendance, they
could alter attitudes or policies’ (Farish 2010: xii). In a similar style to the
concept of sociotechnical imaginaries, these constructs have the poten-
tial to be powerful social agents. The creation of imaginative geographies
in civil defence work activated reassuring and non-problematic spaces,
therefore playing a role in embedding the three elements of the nuclear
sociotechnical imaginary introduced in this chapter.
As we saw in ‘Exercise Morpeth’, jet planes were a new feature
in British skies in the postwar era. As well as a potentially dangerous
physical space containing jets, missiles, nuclear weapons and military
personnel, Cold War airspace was represented as a space of vulner-
ability (Hogg 2016). Yet, particular representations of airspace were
crucial to the promotion of deterrence ideology and the development
of military nuclear technology as a ‘safe’ national virtue. Representa-
tions of new nuclear ‘V-bombers’ in the national press, Pathé news-
reels and popular science magazines contributed to the soft propaganda
surrounding Cold War militarisation.40 The increasing popularity of
airshows, those jingoistic jamborees of the nuclear age, reflected people’s
fascination with ultra-modern aircraft like the Avro Vulcan. These futur-
istic machines effortlessly reflected British engineering ingenuity, and their
public appearances served to promote and normalise the militarised deter-
rence posture that was increasingly dependent on the complete control
of airspace.41 This element of the sociotechnical imaginary was useful in
counteracting discourses of nuclear threat and fear, influenced perceptions
of nuclear danger, and was capable of contributing to a positive Cold War
spectacle.
Conceptions of airspace proved to be a powerful part of the reorgan-
isation of the relationship between citizens and state that the Cold War
entailed. In the Cold War era, an unusually high percentage of land in the
UK (1.5%) was eventually assigned to all military practices in the Cold
War (Williams 2011; Flintham 2010). As jet and missile technologies
developed, the British nuclear state needed to inhabit, police and regu-
late airspace. Thus huge defensive installations (such as Fylingdales) were
developed to detect incoming airborne threats alongside the aggressive
machinery created to ‘preserve peace’ (Edgerton 2013). David Edgerton
argues that a myth of ‘niceness and decency’, with its roots in the nine-
teenth century, meant that the UK did not foster a tradition of ‘serious
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analysis or critique of technology’, so the scale and persistence of the ‘war-
fare state’ became more-or-less invisible in the postwar era. Defined and
policed airspace had become a normal method of territorial control by
the end of the Second World War. Concentrating on military practices,
Flintham views airspace as ‘partly organized around the vulnerabilities
of the human civilian body’ (Flintham 2010: 14). Airspace is defined
by varieties of control, where the space ‘project[s] its many lethal forms
across the landscape and into the skies and fashion[s] the most convoluted
structures to protect and deliberately restrict the movements of a civilian
community’ (Flintham 2010: 14). So, airspace can be a vital controlling
mechanism as well as a vulnerable space.
Cold War airspace was the space through which missiles or jet planes
would travel and find their targets and where radioactive fallout could
travel unpredictably on the wind. In March 1958 Exercise Edinburgh was
carried out in Merseyside, and its success was proclaimed in Birkenhead
News with the headline “A” Bomb Exercise was Staged in Birkenhead.
The main report said, ‘an imaginary “Inter Continental Ballistic Missile”
landed on Merseyside at 8.30 a.m. last Sunday, bring[ing] the elements of
nuclear warfare to the Birkenhead area where “damage” ranged from total
destruction in some quarters to only slight damage in others’. The news-
paper extended the illusion of attack and included gruesome details of
imagined injuries. Yet, the official exercise narrative included the sentence
‘no problem of fallout is set in this exercise’, and there was no mention
of radiation to the readership of the local press beyond the mention of
‘A-bomb’ in the headline. The public were reminded once again of the
imaginary potential of nuclear attack from the sky, but not the radiolog-
ical after-effects of nuclear weapons.42 This again demonstrates that when
exercises were made manageable in practical terms, the dangers of nuclear
war were routinely compartmentalised and sanitised to accommodate the
fictive sociotechnical imaginary. These spatialised imaginaries once again
reveal how the limits placed on the Cold War imagination aided the
promotion of particular ideas and attitudes.43 As Matthew Farish suggests
of the Cold War:
[A]t no other juncture in history had global, regional, continental, and
urban spaces been wrapped into a single “regime of truth” that delineated
the parameters of reliable knowledge in the antagonistic and divisive terms
of national strategy and in turn defined strategic knowledge literally along
specific geographic lines. (Farish 2010: xvii, xiii)
94 J. HOGG
Nuclear sociotechnical imaginaries not only transformed how British
citizens understood urban and regional space, but also functioned to
control those spaces.
Conclusion
This chapter has explored civil defence culture from the perspective of the
regional leadership tasked with implementing national policy. Faced with
the unthinkable consequences of nuclear attack, regional civil defence
leaders interpreted the exercises they were tasked with through the lens
of their social and geographical context and the limited horizons of the
official nuclear imagination.
Seen in the light of normative assumptions about the danger of nuclear
war, the narrative scenarios that accompanied the civil defence exercises
can appear uncreative and repetitive and can conform to the limitations
imposed by the processes of the nuclear sociotechnical imaginary. The
scenarios reinforced existing Cold War imaginaries (control, predictability,
permanence of the bomb) through controlling the fictive elements of the
exercises, meaning that imagined disaster conformed to a normalised and
sanitised vision of nuclear war. Thus, the sociotechnical imaginary, at
least through the way civil defence exercises were conceived, remained
discursively familiar and predictable.
Although beyond the scope of this chapter, international Cold War
research suggests that we can detect similarities in how imaginaries
translated into civil defence practice in different national contexts. Obser-
vations in recent research on 1950s Denmark (Farbøl 2020) suggest that
parallels might be drawn when looking at how national policy was trans-
lated to localised contexts, particularly when looking at how civil defence
leadership attempted to achieve the impression of realism during exercises.
It is hoped that this chapter has offered one way to conceptualise the
local–national–international analytical frame in relation to sociotechnical
imaginaries.
The chapter also suggested that powerful discourse reinforced the
sociotechnical imaginary, implying that individuals would gravitate
towards supporting these imaginaries. It is necessary, though, to remind
ourselves that civil defence personnel would have had a variety of feelings
and attitudes towards their Cold War roles. As Douthwaite states:
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[T]he environments in which civil defence recruits embarked on training
were mixed and contested in meaning and purpose. Recruits were obliged
to understand and engage with several different nuclear experiences at
once by training to protect the public in a real nuclear attack, enacting
their symbolic roles in deterrence strategy, and navigating multiplying and
contradictory narratives of deterrence policy and nuclear vulnerability in
the public sphere. (Douthwaite 2018: 180)
When discussing discourse or sociotechnical imaginaries, ignoring indi-
vidual agency is a danger. Although this chapter has not focused much
on the agency of civil defence personnel, it is hoped that it has offered
some ideas on how we might historicise the structural role and function
of imaginaries.
We know that the key aspects of the sociotechnical imaginaries
described here came under increased scrutiny as the 1950s progressed,
not only by anti-nuclear activists but also by regional leaders tasked with
implementing civil defence policy as well (Barnett 2015). While this
chapter has historicised the influence that imaginaries had, it has also high-
lighted some of the fragile and contradictory social elements at play at the
local level which would be lost with a sole focus on the national picture.44
Reflecting one last time on the work of Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun
Kim, in this chapter I have attempted to show that the nuclear sociotech-
nical imaginary that emerged around civil defence in the UK in the 1950s
did ‘describe attainable futures and prescribe[d] futures that states believe
ought to be attained’ (Jasanoff and Kim 2009: 120). The case studies at
the heart of my analysis suggest that imaginaries ‘and the policies built
upon them, ha[d] the power to influence technological design, channel
public expenditures, and justify the inclusion or exclusion of citizens with
respect to the benefits of technological progress’ (Jasanoff and Kim 2009:
120). Ideas, imaginaries and illusions perpetuated the nuclear state and
allowed deterrence ideology to remain legitimate, because ‘in activating
collective consciousness, imaginaries help[ed] create the political will or
public resolve to attain them’ (Jasanoff and Kim 2009: 123). What was
attained in real terms (the desirable utopian future) was the continued
existence of nuclear weapons and all the institutional, scientific and tech-
nological apparatus that is required to enable and contain this. A detailed
examination of the localised social, discursive and geographical contexts
within which civil defence activism occurred has allowed this chapter to
identify and understand the ways in which these nuclear sociotechnical
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imaginaries became embedded in British life. Perhaps it is the improvised
oven used in the atomic age as part of ‘Exercise Miller’ where we see
‘imagination, objects and social norms – including accepted modes of
public reasoning and new technological regimes – becom[ing] fused in
practice’ (Jasanoff 2015b: 322).
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Responsibility: The Role of Film
in Sociotechnical Imaginaries of Civil
Defence
Peter Bennesved and Casper Sylvest
By the late 1950s and early 1960s, it was common for anti-nuclear
campaigners and government officials alike to complain about public
apathy towards the nuclear threat. Explanations offered for this nuclear
withdrawal displayed some similarities, although their implications were
poles apart. Public intellectuals like Günther Anders and Lewis Mumford
essentially faulted the alienating dynamics of modernity and capitalism
(van Munster and Sylvest 2016), whereas a 1962 US National Research
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Council report on Behavioral science and civil defense suggested that
widespread anxiety led to an unwillingness to confront difficult ques-
tions (Baker and Cottrell 1962: 75–76). Commenting on the latter study,
Spencer Weart concluded in the mid-1980s that ‘up to a point, most
people could understand what war might really mean’, but soon after
‘the imagination rebelled’ (Weart 1987: 20). In sociotechnical imaginaries
of civil defence during the Cold War, the role of film was to assist the
imagination in order to recruit and educate and to do so in a manner
that provided hope and reassurance and served the political objectives
with which civil defence organisations were invested. Visual media were
central to public information campaigns at a time when cinema audiences
were substantial and television began to make inroads in Western soci-
eties. Expanding state apparatuses had already exploited the potential of
film during the Second World War. In the atomic age, inaugurated in
popular consciousness by the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in
August 1945, state-sponsored film found a new territory.
The study of civil defence films has had an American tilt, which reflects
the central standing of the USA at the time and the postwar dynamics
of Americanisation. Their differences notwithstanding, American films
rehearsed a familiar theme: something could be done, and preparation
was of the essence (e.g. Masco 2008; Jacobs 2010; Matthews 2012;
Nowak 2016). Historians have initiated studies of civil defence films in
other parts of the Cold War West (e.g. Cronqvist 2008; Norén 2012;
Grant 2013; Bennesved and Norén 2020), and scholarship in this area
carries significant potential for deepening our understanding of the simi-
larities and differences of national civil defence efforts. Neutral Sweden
and NATO-allied Denmark differed significantly in terms of civil defence
in the postwar decades.1 Still, their close relationship in the immediate
postwar years and their increasingly divergent positions in the Cold War
present an opportunity to break out of national narratives. Like the
technology that came to define it in the nuclear age, civil defence and
its associated cultures were transnational phenomena (also Berger et al.
2018). Against this background, it is the ambition of this chapter to
place the study of civil defence films in a transnational framework and
to initiate efforts of comparison through a theoretically informed study
of films produced in Sweden and Denmark during the early nuclear age
(c. 1949–1965). We conceptualise civil defence as a sociotechnical imag-
inary and focus on the role of film in processes of embedding during the
early nuclear age. We ask: What was the function of film in these two
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countries in embedding an imaginary of civil defence before and during
the thermonuclear revolution? And how was the film medium exploited
to structure the imagination of nuclear war and ways of surviving such a
catastrophe?
Underlying our analytical strategy and the decision to analyse early
(c. 1949–1954) and later films (c. 1954–1965) in this period is a
historically informed assumption revolving around the development of
thermonuclear weapons technology: though irregular and occasionally
unsystematic, the general drift of civil defence thinking during the late
1950s was towards increasing individualisation of responsibility.2 Whereas
early postwar civil defence witnessed much continuity with the concept
of aerial protection—signalling an uneven adjustment to the risk of
atomic warfare—the mid-1950s was marked by new, fraught questions
about the nature of H bomb warfare. What protective measures were
available against the immediate and longer-term effects of these unfath-
omable bombs at a time when new means of delivery were clearly on the
horizon—and were available measures credible? Such questions became
central to civil defence. Over time, they gave rise to new policies. In this
process, collectively organised civil defence efforts and notions of civilian
preparedness and responsibility were transformed. This transformation
appears to have been central to the subsequent reshaping of civil defence
in the 1970s and 1980s, yet our main focus is on determining whether,
how and with what consequences this trend is reflected in filmmaking of
the early nuclear age.
Sociotechnical imaginaries and visual history:
Civil defence films as practices of embedding
The concept of sociotechnical imaginaries is promising for advancing civil
defence history (see Introduction, this volume; Jasanoff and Kim 2015;
Jasanoff 2015a). While civil defence in Sweden and Denmark can be
analytically approached as imaginaries in their own right, it is also apparent
that these organisations played a part in upholding a wider vision of
stability and progress, in part by containing and curbing the consider-
able risks of Cold War security politics. In this section, we attune the
concept of sociotechnical imaginaries to the study of films and televi-
sion. Though visual material took many forms and was used for a host
of purposes, we focus on moving imagery about civil defence produced
by state authorities and their associated partners intended for education,
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instruction, recruitment and propaganda. We zoom in on one particular
dimension of such imaginaries: the study of intended use of visual media
for embedding purposes, which we conceive as a combination of material
structures and artefacts, a thoroughly technologised set of activities and
a state of mind. We argue that the study of films harbours a potential to
harness and refine the approach set out by Jasanoff and Kim (2015). We
make three theoretical contributions.
First, a significant part of the conscious effort to embed postwar imag-
inaries of civil defence in Sweden and Denmark was centred on film, a
potent medium for recruitment and information aimed at large audiences.
Jasanoff develops the concept of embedding primarily with reference
to the ‘production of things’ or collective forms of ‘remembering’ that
transform ‘the merely imagined into the solidity of identities and the
durability of routines and things’ (Jasanoff 2015b: 329, 323). While she
places considerable theoretical emphasis on ways of seeing and the role
of perception (Jasanoff 2015a: 13–14), she does not explicitly mention
film among psychosocial forms of embedding. We contend, however, that
moving imagery is important precisely because it is endowed with special
properties in relation to authenticity, anticipation, persuasion and disci-
plining.3 In doing so we draw on and contribute to existing scholarship
that has focused on the dissonances of emotion management in film (for
example, in relation to fighting apathy, sustaining attention and avoiding
panic).
Here we draw inspiration from Carey’s (2008, 1989]) idea of a balance
between two views of communication: the ritual view and the trans-
mission view. The films we study cannot be reduced to containers of
information about a dominant imaginary. Embedding through moving
imagery may (on the ritual view) be associated with and reflective of the
continuous creation of community, fellowship and social norms. Repeti-
tion is central to such practices. The transmission view, on the other hand,
is more closely tied to instruction, often for purposes of disciplining and
control. Although both views of communication are typically present, the
analytical value of the distinction lies in the recognition that ‘commu-
nication is a symbolic process whereby reality is produced, maintained,
repaired, and transformed’ (Carey 2008: 19). This is no less true of visual
communication. Hence, we pay attention to an entire life cycle of film
production, from decision, financing, production and dissemination right
up to the social and cultural practice of viewing. We focus especially on
the latter, identifying a gradual shift during the 1950s away from films
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circulated through civil defence organisations and cinemas towards the
comparatively new mass medium of television. We identify an overlap
between a shift of content and message and a shift in media and circula-
tion. The transition away from ritualistic methods of organised public film
screenings towards transmission of information into the home of citizens
was accompanied by a new balance of responsibility for in civil defence.
In short, our point is related to McLuhan’s (1964) famous dictum that
the medium is the message.
Our second and third contributions require less elaboration. Although
Jasanoff (2015b: 226–230) points out that embedding is not a smooth
process, the place of this phase alongside other phases in the framework
introduces a risk of flattening dissonance and crises. By reading films in
the specific national contexts in which imaginaries of civil defence were
conceived, practised and promoted and by focusing on a period of contes-
tation and transformation, we highlight crises and complexity. Moreover,
our attention to the connection between media and messaging can shed
light on (some of) the ways in which imaginaries undergo transformation.
Given the severity of the challenge to the concept of civil defence during
the 1950s, we examine how and how successfully moving imagery sought
to assist the imagination of audiences in negotiating leaps between the
present and the future, fear and hope, realism and utopianism. Our focus
in this endeavour is predominantly on the content of the films, yet we
also pay attention to pace, editing and music where relevant.4
Finally, we draw on Lee Clarke’s concept of ‘fantasy documents’, which
was originally developed with reference to detailed plans for managing
disasters. One of the properties Clarke ascribes to fantasies is an ability to
shape meaning and behaviour, a perspective that is compatible with the
concept of imaginaries. Clarke’s analysis, however, emphasises the role
of assumptions and scenarios. Indeed, fantasy documents seek ‘to trans-
form uncertainties into risks, rationalizing problems previously outside the
realm of systematic control’ (Clarke 1999: 11). Some civil defence films
produced in the 1950s and early 1960s can be read as fantasy documents,
we suggest, exactly because they presented ‘live’ crises to which citizens
and organisations responded (and, in the case of the films we have studied,
successfully so). The most potent method by which the films achieved this
effect was by specifying threats through scenarios. These anticipations of
the crisis were typically informed by assumptions that, although within
the bounds of possibility, were both contestable and also, especially in
the early 1960s, contested. Approaching filmmaking from this perspective
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brings out more clearly its role in (successful or unsuccessful) embedding
practices.
It is with these theoretical ambitions in mind that we approach Danish
and Swedish films produced or co-produced by civil defence authorities
or volunteer organisations (working closely with the state). The number
of Danish films—produced by the Danish Civil Defence Directorate
(DCDD, Civilforsvarsstyrelsen) and the Danish Civil Defence League
(DCDL, Civilforsvars-Forbundet ) with state involvement5—is modest,
and we have included most of the 10–12 films produced during the
period. The number of Swedish film productions is considerably higher
(+30) and harder to specify, since several of these were co-productions
between a wider range of authorities (including the military and the fire-
fighting services). Not all of these films, however, were intended for the
wider public. Following a screening of a majority of the available films
and a process of triangulation with civil defence journals, newsletters and
archival material, we identified a number of films that we have used as the
primary materials for our analysis.6
Early films (c. 1949–1954)
Both Swedish and Danish civil defence authorities placed a premium
on the use of film during the early 1950s, and they spent a consider-
able amount of energy and funds on producing films for purposes of
recruitment and propaganda.7 Danish authorities were under financial
constraints, whereas the Swedish system was more flexible and better
funded (Norén 2012: 35–46). In both countries, however, there was
considerable continuity both in relation to the use of the film medium
stretching back to the interwar period and in relation to an established
framework of Second World War aerial defence. The films also display
many of the traits that are associated with the early development of
the genre (Aufderheide 2007: ch. 1). Dramatic sound (drums, shrieking
bombs, air-raids, music), a voice of God and an instructional modality are
central characteristics.
In productions from both countries, the specific threat posed by the
atomic bomb plays only a marginal role. Despite discussions about the
radical nature of the atomic bomb, within civil defence organisations it
gradually came to be seen in the framework of the strategic bombing
known from the Second World War. Radioactivity was often mentioned
as a special property of this technology, but it was not accorded much
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weight. Such factors conspired to keep much planning and certainly
a substantial part of the existing imaginary of the next (aerial) war
intact. Hence, civil defence authorities incorporated the atomic threat
into an existing set of practices and maintained the emphasis on collective
organisation.8 In other words, Danish and Swedish civil defence organi-
sations functioned essentially in the same way in 1950 as they did during
the war—only they were more extensive, better equipped and better
drilled. War loomed large in the background, and it was unquestion-
ably conceived to be catastrophic. But it remained an un(der)specified
phenomenon, corresponding to a sense of unease and Angst, which
recruitment efforts appealed to.
These features were mirrored in the films’ manner of circulation. Both
countries struggled with the dissemination of instructions and propa-
ganda in written format and soon turned to other media (Bennesved
and Norén 2020; Sylvest 2018). Moving imagery came to play an
important role here, yet the specific circumstances of viewing are signif-
icant.9 Screening films in social settings involved both limitations and
a normative commitment that fitted the underlying imaginary. In local
associations, film screenings were cumbersome, since they required expen-
sive equipment and film distribution. To solve this problem, civil defence
organisations in both Sweden and Denmark began offering cheap or free-
of-charge rental services by mail as well as film tours.10 Still, the function
of films hinged on the willingness of citizens to gather and respond to the
message, whether in local associations or at the cinema (where audiences
were larger but presumably also less motivated). Local associations consti-
tuted an important site of screening in which recruitment was combined
with curating, educational activities and exercises in a social setting in an
effort to inspire and impose norms.11 Strikingly, this way of organising
and distributing early films reflected their core message: civil defence was
seen as a collective effort in which it was incumbent on citizens to gather
and organise under the watchful eye of the authorities in order to help
themselves, their fellow citizens and their country during war.
Looking closely at the content of the films, civil defence is portrayed
in part as an insurance policy against unforeseen events and in part as
a natural extension of existing social practices. There are few references
to the specific nature and causes of war, but the films imply that the
next war will be total in a new way; yet this phenomenon is typically
visualised by scenes from the previous war.12 Consequently, a vague fear
of the Cold War turning hot is pervasive, while the arrival of war is
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described as something beyond national control. The embedding efforts
of these early films are dominated by an elaborate, state-led social organi-
sation of human resources in protecting the homeland. The rationale and
efficiency of collectively organised civil defence is displayed in a myriad
of ways, but some are especially prominent and revealing of the imagi-
nary informing these newly reorganised and renamed organisations. Four
interrelated strategies stand out: the display of technologies and mate-
rial resources; the seamless nature of the civil defence organisation and
its transition from peace to war; a powerful image of efficiency based on
the utilisation of technology and human resources; and, finally, a repre-
sentation of volunteering as symbolic of a positive, imagined future for
citizens.
The first of these strategies for communicating a message of compe-
tence and reassurance manifested itself in the display of a plethora of
modern technologies, ranging from aircraft, trains, trucks and telephones
to more mundane artefacts such as fire hoses. The distinctively modern
look of specific artefacts or their mere abundant existence was used to
signal organisational efficiency. In the Danish film Protecting the Popu-
lation (Befolkningens beskyttelse, 1953), for example, almost a minute
of the ten-minute information and recruitment film is taken up with
panoramic views of the technologies necessary for facing the spectre of
modern war. Swedish films communicate a similar message by zooming
in on a civil defence organisation operating underground. Displaying hi-
tech equipment and the operation of collective organisations was central
to the imaginary of defending the homeland. An emphasis on scale
hints at the national purpose and positions of the Danish and Swedish
authorities (local and state) as guardians of its citizens. Identification
is achieved through elaborate descriptions of the organisation of civil
defence (including its various functions and branches, as well as charts
of local organisations) and demonstrations of the smooth efficiency of
the machinery in action. Among several objectives, the films sought to
instil confidence in a collective, technocratic and hierarchically organised
effort.
The second strategy revolves around the seamless nature of the collec-
tive social organisation and its transition from peace to war. This logic
is visualised in the Swedish film Bombed Town (Bombad stad, 1949), a
popular film at the time.13 A highly technologised set of activities are
used to demonstrate the efficiency of civil defence, from military radar
observation centres and alarms to the evacuation of citizens into urban
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air-raid shelters and firefighting activities in the aftermath of an air-raid.
Reflecting a general trend, the scenario is based on a conventional (rather
than atomic) attack from the air (‘a massive attack, around 50 planes’ as
it is stipulated in the Swedish production Bombad stad from 1949). Core
themes of anticipation, control and order shape the imaginary. Phones,
trains, observation posts and air-raid shelters are not only perfectly organ-
ised, but also function flawlessly in concert with personnel that under
strict emotional control handle everything by the book. In these highly
stylised but underspecified scenarios, the early films acquire some of the
qualities that Clarke associates with fantasy documents. Thus, when the
bombs fall, the element of surprise is sometimes missing—both for the
enemy and the audience (in one Swedish production, the evacuation train
even leaves shortly before the alarm goes off). A ticking clock in the
background emphasises order and anticipation, adding to the image of
control. Consequently, the damage is reduced, lives are saved, and the
necessity and efficiency of civil defence are validated.14
The first and second strategies are both undergirded by a strong social
(and ethical) creed that spoke to the national communities and the bonds
between citizen and state, typically through simple yet powerful analo-
gies between the private and the public spheres. Protecting the Population
(DEN 1953) explicitly extended care in the private sphere to the entire
national community. Having opened with displays of maternal care and
vigilance in relation to children, the film ends by admonishing the audi-
ence that ethics of order, vigilance, preparedness and humanitarianism ‘is
so natural when it concerns the little ones, but it also applies to grown-
ups, for everyone, for all in this country that is worth preserving’.15
Similarly, in the Swedish film Evacuation of Urban Centres (Utrymning av
tätort, 1950), evacuation routines clearly mimicked conventional forms of
social organisation. Families were split from individual family level up to
the societal level; men were sent into the military organisation and women
into the social and healthcare system, while children were evacuated from
the cities with their schools. In a similar manner as Marie Cronqvist iden-
tified a civil defence organisation of the 1950s saturated with welfare-state
symbolism, an imaginary is promoted and sustained in these films through
existing social norms and moral coda.16
The third strategy on display in the early films revolved around a
tight bond between social organisation and the technologies that satu-
rated the imaginary. Human resources are not only technologised, but
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are also compartmentalised so that they can be harnessed within a hier-
archical, specialised structure. As a result, the efficiency of civil defence
organisations is amplified. Humans are equipped with and master modern
technologies of transport, communication and firefighting. Officers use
phones for orders and reports, and workers in uniforms use drills and
welding equipment to free trapped civilians. A scene in the Swedish film
Bombed Town subtly connects the social and technological dimensions of
civil defence. In a meeting between an elderly couple, the Berggrens, who
had their homes bombed, and a young female civil defence volunteer in a
civil defence service centre, Mr Berggren’s social status is described with
reference to his technical skills. Consoling the bereft couple, the young
woman smilingly exclaims that Mr Berggren is a welder, and thus worth
his ‘weight in gold’. The couple remains uneasy but nevertheless accepts
their situation while the young civil defence official ends the conversation
by shouting: ‘NEXT!’17 The conversation here not only valourises the
technical and technological skills of workers, but also highlights how the
(gendered) social skills of the young official allow her to console fellow
citizens, contain their discontent and inspire a restrained, positive attitude.
Fourth and finally, since public confidence in civil defence and/or
the recruitment of volunteers were constant concerns, early films cele-
brated the humanitarian spirit of volunteers and their devotion to the
noble cause. In depicting imagined futures where such qualities were on
display, filmmakers walked a tightrope. They played on fears of war and
catastrophe but also used this nightmare vision for socially useful, regen-
erative purposes. This Janus-faced character of embedding the imaginary
was apparent from the outset, and it had implications for recruitment
strategies. In the Danish case, the initial plan was to recruit hundreds
of thousands of volunteers.18 The very first civil defence film sought to
draw them in by playing on fears of war and using ‘powerful effects’
while maintaining what the director called a ‘positive’ tone.19 In several
productions, the narrative revolved around a protagonist of civil defence
work encountering an apathetic or ignorant character in need of conver-
sion.20 The films provided that by pressing the analogy between good and
rational behaviour in everyday life and in circumstances of catastrophic
war. In the Swedish case, in which recruitment was less of a problem
because of compulsory drafting from 1944, citizen confidence in state
efforts was of greater importance. In the closing scene of Bombed Town
(1949), a couple going to bed reflects on their anger with compulsory
civil defence activities the previous year. Having survived a bombing raid,
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however, they express their gratitude towards the state. In Bombed Home
(SWE, Bombat Hem, 1950) viewers are presented with a tense and slightly
confused atmosphere in a shelter during an (unspecified) aerial attack.
Order is imposed by a uniformed woman who directs the sheltered citi-
zens and instructs fellow civil defence personnel.21 In such contexts, the
uniform functioned as a symbolic and material manifestation of successful
recruitment and as a marker of competence and authority. Displays of
authority, however, were also tempered by the commonality among citi-
zens and civil defence personnel. Towards the end of the film, uniformed
and non-uniformed citizens emerged arm-in-arm from the ordeal into a
destroyed urban area.22 Such messages of reassurance achieved through
a display of both formal, skilled authority and community and familiarity
were common in early filmmaking.
In sum, the core message of early Swedish and Danish films revolved
around the mantra, ritually repeated on screen, that collectively organ-
ised preparation for catastrophe was essential, necessary, rational and
the best available measure for avoiding panic and death. By mirroring
the social order of society within a hi-tech civil defence organisation
that valued technical skills and appealed to an existing moral economy
in efforts to secure public support and draw in volunteers, these films
sought to embed an imaginary of civil defence that displayed considerable
continuity with recent experiences of war. The collective, uniformed and
state-controlled national effort was deemed crucial for survival. Distinct
roles were performed by individuals according to age, gender, class and
function, yet this stratification served to reinforce a collective, national
and humanitarian effort.
Later films (c. 1954–1965)
By the early 1960s, civil defence films in Denmark and Sweden had taken
on a new character. They struck a different tone. The opening scene of
the Danish production Radioactive Fallout (DEN, Radioaktivt nedfald,
1961) is an instructive example. Set on a beach to unnerving music, the
speaker addresses the viewers directly and asks them to reflect on the
possibility that what we fear most—the dropping of an atomic bomb—
may become reality. ‘You don’t want to imagine this? Is that what you
are thinking?’ The film then proceeds to assist the imagination of the
viewer. The transformation embodied in Radioactive Fallout did not
occur overnight, and it arguably had its roots in the gradual and uneven
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response to the thermonuclear disruption of civil defence that was inau-
gurated by the US Castle Bravo test on Bikini atoll on 1 March 1954.
Step by step, information and a string of worries about the H bomb
made their way to the public sphere. In both Sweden and Denmark, it
was soon apparent that this new weapons technology could potentially
have enormous implications for civil defence, partly because of the sheer
power of thermonuclear weapons and partly because of a new property
that followed in its wake: radioactive fallout. Danish and Swedish author-
ities did not react immediately. The consequences of the disruption took
time to gestate and only began to show towards the end of the decade
following an intense period of information gathering and strategic delib-
eration. On film, it translated into a shift in tone and message: the later
films focus explicitly on the nuclear threat, they struck a new balance
between the responsibility placed on organised civil defence and that of
the ordinary citizen, and they evinced a far more complicated and darker
vision of life during and after a catastrophe.
Film kept its status as an important tool in embedding practices, as
the rate of production testifies. Towards the late 1950s, the number of
productions went up, and increasingly they moved away from the ideal–
typical features of the early films. In Sweden, several productions dealt
with the exposure of urban environments to atomic weaponry, evacuation
and the Swedish air-raid shelter system (especially large-scale popula-
tion shelters and radioactivity).23 Danish productions, though smaller in
number, display a similar pattern: films produced during the late 1950s
and early 1960s were more forthright in acknowledging the nuclear
dimension of civil defence.24 The changing message was accompanied
by a shift in production and screening practices in both countries. Films
were still made for cinemas or available for screening in local associations,
but civil defence organisations increasingly turned towards the televi-
sion medium. In 1958, Swedish authorities also rejected a series of films
produced during the early 1950s, branding them outdated and inappro-
priate.25 In Denmark, the transition was more gradual, and productions
up until 1959 continued to pass on advice of the Duck-and-Cover variety
that US authorities had declared retrograde.26
This shift in the dominant imaginary of civil defence was mirrored by
changes in the media landscape and the prevalent view of communication.
In contrast to the early period, where the circulation of civil defence films
was marked by a ritual form of communication, the hydrogen-induced age
of risk management eventually became characterised by a trend towards
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communication as transmission. The turn to television in communicating
preparedness to wide audiences signifies the shift. Eager to find new ways
of disseminating authoritative information, authorities began educating
and instructing all citizens, enabling them to secure their own survival.
Famously, this was done through pamphlets distributed in several Western
countries during the early 1960s (including Germany and the UK), but
television broadcasts also became increasingly popular. Moreover, these
strategies also worked in tandem. State television functioned as visual
companions to the mass distributed leaflets. In Denmark, the pattern
was similar, although as a small country it placed less emphasis on mass
evacuation.27
Where previously films had sought to draw citizens into a social organ-
isation that would provide detailed information (and exercise) only in a
second step, specific advice was now funnelled directly into the homes of
ordinary citizens. Local civil defence organisations no longer functioned
as mediators. Consequently, a symbolic gap emerged between the safely
bunkered civil defence broadcaster and the public recipient. Recruit-
ment was no longer a top priority. Authorities would do their utmost
to assist the citizen in the struggle for survival, but the buck stopped with
the responsible citizen. Efforts to embed the imaginary were, therefore,
aimed at the ‘general public’—typically understood as a household father
and mother facing a television set in the relative comforts of their home.
The new political and technological context in which civil defence
operated was also clearly reflected on screen. Gradually, from the mid-
1950s, the raison d’être of civil defence became a matter of (some) public
controversy. Swedish civil defence witnessed a major change in tactics
that reflected the significance of the hydrogen bomb and new means of
delivery that drastically reduced warning time. At the same time, debates
about the nature and properties of radioactive fallout transformed civil
protection. During a period when individual responsibility attracted more
attention, collective civil defence in Sweden came to revolve around two
distinct methods of protection: preparedness evacuation of whole urban
environments and large-scale nuclear-proof population shelters for those
who remained (Cronqvist 2012, 2015; also Bennesved and Norén 2020).
The effectiveness of both measures was, however, in dispute.28 The shift
in Danish policy was slower and less explicit but was also reflected in
public debate (Sylvest 2020). By the late 1950s, some peace activists and
radicals viewed civil defence as wildly utopian in its focus on local, atomic
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(rather than thermonuclear) warfare, and even when civil defence organi-
sations explicitly addressed questions of fallout, the reception was mixed.
While several newspaper reviews, for example, commended Radioactive
Fallout for providing specific advice, critical voices—from both left and
right—questioned the film’s scenario and implied that civil defence was
outmoded or utopian.29 Thus, public debate in both countries increased
the pressure for information and solutions, and authorities were increas-
ingly criticised from two directions: one flank accusing civil defence
of being in league with militarism and the other accusing it of being
inadequate and outmoded.
This burgeoning criticism shaped the focus, message and format of
films produced in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It is reflected in three
features of filmmaking in the period. First, the films produced during this
period often explicitly focused on the threat posed by atomic or nuclear
weaponry. Two ideal–typical forms of this shift of focus are apparent
(some films, of course, displayed a mixture of these). On the one hand,
a number of films focused on the role of civil defence in the event of
a smaller atomic attack, a scenario that displayed continuity with the
portrayal of civil defence as a modernised air-defence structure. In such
films, however, it was increasingly made clear that the speed of modern
warfare made it essential for every citizen to ensure their own imme-
diate survival—often through simply acquiring information on where to
go. In Denmark the production Civil Defence (1959) is an example
focusing on the general population’s immediate survival through air-raid
shelters and evacuation.30 In Sweden, films such as Also a City Problem
(1960) similarly emphasised the necessity of having ‘simple instructions’
for the ‘individual’ in situations in which speed was of the essence.31
On the other hand, productions of the early 1960s tended to focus on
the more complex scenario of defending Denmark or Sweden against the
effects of thermonuclear war. Here war—rarely if ever involving a direct
H bomb attack on either country—was portrayed as a meteorological
phenomenon, with radioactive fallout silently and invisibly striking the
country (rather than being the direct effect of an H bomb explosion). The
most iconic films in this respect are Radiak (SWE 1962) and Radioactive
Fallout (DEN 1961). These films are at once more futuristic, vague and
sombre, and they involve an element of public education for the nuclear
age.
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Second, it was during this period that civil defence films evinced a
tendency to individualise responsibility for survival, which in turn trans-
formed the role(s) of collective civil defence. The stress on individual
responsibility had been apparent for some time in the USA, but with the
hydrogen bomb, it gained ground across countries in the West. Signifi-
cantly, NATO committees concerned with civil protection began pushing
this agenda in the mid-1950s.32 Recruitment into volunteer organisa-
tions became less important. A redistribution of responsibility—gener-
ally speaking, from collective towards individual responsibility—involved
difficulties. These problems concerned science education (necessary for
understanding the properties of nuclear weapons technology) and how to
make the effects of the H bomb intelligible. In these matters, filmmaking
had to chart a course between inducing action and avoiding narratives
that risked undermining the imaginary. Hence, it became a common
strategy to use abstract visualisations, maps or other forms of modelling
and experimental imagery. The properties and dangers of radioactivity
and fallout were often visualised through drawings and cartoons.33 Simi-
larly, the nature and effects of thermonuclear weapons were typically
demonstrated by animations of nuclear explosions, sometimes in combi-
nation with footage from (US) tests. Despite their abstract nature, such
sequences could be chilling.
Third, it was a characteristic strategy of the later films in both countries
that they sought to mitigate the horrors of nuclear war by obfuscating
politics and the causes of war while installing an ever-present risk of
nuclear war into orderly and ordinary everyday life. Clearly, new weapons
technologies placed new demands on civil defence, but the arrival of
(thermo) nuclear war (just like the fallout that would follow) appeared
as wind, clouds and rain with temporary effects. So while the risk of war
is a pervasive feature of these films, the political nature of war is oddly
absent and disconnected from the main message that preparedness is
(also) an individual responsibility. Taken together, the films are emblem-
atic of a drift of policy in Swedish and Danish civil defence at the time. In
Sweden, self-protection was launched in earnest after 1960–1961.34 Soon
after, in early 1962, Danish authorities finally informed the public about
the dangers of (thermo) nuclear weapons and the consequences of their
use. The filmic strategies designed for embedding this incarnation of ‘pre-
paredness’ revolved around calm, well-prepared and methodical citizens
taking responsibility for themselves and their families in times of crisis.
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When every citizen became a target—also of information—their
conduct was depicted in new ways. In one Danish film from the period,
the speaker intones that ‘in modern war, the warning will be so short
that you must seek shelter immediately’.35 The housewife, the farmer and
the worker are typically unfazed on receipt of warnings about incoming
attacks or fallout. Attentive to the instruction of authorities, they go
about their duties in a highly disciplined fashion, whether they concern
the safety of children, livestock or co-workers. In Sweden, the house-
hold car became a key technology that would ensure survival if kept
with a full tank. This was, again, an individual responsibility decoupled
from organised civil defence services. Television shows such as If the
War Comes (SWE, Om kriget kommer, 1961) emphasised the house-
wife’s role in processing instructions into practical pre-packed suitcases
and evacuation routines.36 At some points, the instructions communi-
cated through these examples produced dissonance and paradox. Indeed,
some strategies of survival appeared to be remnants of the ‘atomic age’,
if not outright inadequate, in the face of thermonuclear war: run, hide,
close the door, wash yourself, and clean your cupboard. Yet, they could
be justified within the parameters of official scenario planning. Still, the
overall point—that citizens were to a large extent responsible for their
own survival—appealed directly to social norms about responsibility in the
family and the workplace. This is unlikely to have been lost on audiences.
Similarly, when every citizen became a civil defender, the collective
dimension of civil defence took on a new guise. On screen, uniformed
personnel still played a crucial role in defending the homeland and the
population, but they increasingly appeared as a (bunkered) elite of cool
experts that provided an early warning, directed or assisted evacuation
efforts (if time permitted) or monitored levels of radioactivity. The siren
was central and used to dramatic effect as both audio background and
as a visual symbol of danger. Many sequences are rich with artefacts
of organised civil defence; uniforms, trucks, firefighting equipment and
communications technology are amply on display. Tactical considera-
tions and decisions took on a prominent role; radar detection of enemy
airplanes and telephone conversations appeared as central nodes in a
network of activity that would ensure survival. Civil defence was still
emblematic of the well-prepared society. In contrast to the earlier films,
however, we now encounter visible signs of strain and exhaustion. As
scenarios of catastrophe unfolded and as they were extended into an imag-
ined future, life underground was depicted as manageable but also taxing
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and bleak.37 So while the distance between civil defence authorities and
citizens increased and the balance of responsibility was reconfigured, the
later films included an admission of the enormity of the challenge and
its likely impact on both citizens and authorities. This increasing ‘real-
ism’, however, was combined with a dogged insistence on the rationale
of civil defence in the event of atomic and thermonuclear war. The signif-
icant leap between these two components of the imaginary was overcome
by the use of highly specific scenarios. In conjuring up an entirely new
form of warfare, assumptions were made about the nature and yield of
weapons, the target, the weather, the resulting contamination and, even,
the nature of the unforeseen circumstances that would occur.
It was at this point especially that these later productions—viewed as
embedding efforts—came most closely to resemble fantasy documents. In
a context of public scepticism and (assumed) apathy and faced with a new,
formidable military technology, the problem was rationalised and brought
under control through scenario building and simulation, often in specific,
localised settings. This was not an entirely new strategy. Earlier films also
operated with idealistic assumptions about an unfolding war, and there
was still a premium on control in demonstrating efficiency and the neces-
sity of the system. Crucially, however, the war depicted in the earlier films
was a war that audiences understood through experience and collective
memory. In contrast, the nature of thermonuclear war lay outside the
realm of experience even as the fear of it could be very real. This was a
premise of the later films that was reflected in their darker tone: personnel
in underground structures, for example, continue to perform their duties
despite the eradication of their entire hometown and its surroundings.38
Here, we encounter another dissonance: the later films are in a sense less
fictional and achieve a quasi-realist effect by zooming in on hardship,
unpredictability and the hazard of invisible, radioactive contamination,
yet this effect was a product of an elaborate use of rationalisation through
scenarios that, eventually, insisted on the possibility of survival. In the
process, pressing questions about the nature of life in a postwar world
were ignored. It was as if the crisis was over once measurements of
radioactivity had returned to safe levels. In that sense, the films are not
merely fantasy documents but also fantasy monuments.
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Conclusion
Our study has shown that Swedish and Danish filmmaking during 1949–
1965 reflected a transition in both the imagination of future warfare and
the rationale of civil defence. Following the thermonuclear disruption of
the mid-1950s, the central imaginary of civil defence in both Sweden and
Denmark underwent significant change in an effort to retain credibility.
Although several mantras of civil defence persisted—including a dogged
insistence on the value of preparedness and preparation—during the late
1950s and early 1960s, the national, collectively oriented legacy of aerial
defence was transformed in both countries. A shift towards individualisa-
tion can effectively be read through film and television, which constitutes
a rich source for studying imaginaries of civil defence and their embed-
ding. Films produced towards the end of the period placed more emphasis
on instruction and detailed information, while seeking to embed this new
set of responsibilities in modernising societies and through shifting media
cultures. They did so at least in part as a response to mounting political
pressure for more information arising from national, transnational and
international anti-nuclear movements.
The theoretical approach lodged in the concept of sociotechnical imag-
inaries has been productive especially in attuning us to the nature and
dynamics of films as a form of psychosocial embedding. Moreover, it has
allowed us to bring out just how closely technology and social norms
were imbricated in visions of the next war. Still, important analytical
and theoretical questions remain, and we are not absolved of grappling
with thorny issues about the demarcation of imaginaries, the inescapable
overlap between embedding and extension, or the precise influence,
reception or effect of a particular imaginary. It is very hard to say some-
thing definite about such matters, and most empirical studies will be faced
with questions about the representativeness of the source material and the
reach of conclusions. In the context of empirical studies, these kinds of
theoretical debates will persist and are to be welcomed. Yet, there are
also more glaring pitfalls to avoid. In particular, the risk of producing
a teleological narrative that reduces change to technological ‘progress’
appears especially pertinent. Staying true to the underlying logic of co-
production in the analysis of sociotechnical imaginaries is demanding, not
least because it is a common inclination to identify social effects of specific
5 EMBEDDING PREPAREDNESS, ASSIGNING RESPONSIBILITY … 121
technologies. The reverse dynamic—how social practices, norms, identi-
ties and institutions shape specific understandings of or responses to a
technology—appears less habitual.
In our analysis, the process of (visual) individualisation of responsibility
and its resulting changes in imaginaries of civil defence were not simply
epiphenomena of technological change. Indeed, civil defence communi-
cation also shaped the public imagination of nuclear war and survival.
The extent to which the films influenced the behaviour of the ‘ordinary
citizen’ is impossible to determine, yet we should perhaps be wary of
thinking too much along such lines that sustain a positivist approach to
(visual) propaganda, information campaigns, or really any form of public
narration by state representatives. In contrast, it may be more produc-
tive to approach these films as attempts at embedding. We are reasonably
confident about the contours of the imaginary that civil defence author-
ities sought to advance, but less so about its subsequent fate. Here, we
may lack a critical edge. To the extent that the approach and especially the
sequential logic of the four phases in the life cycles of imaginaries appear
infused with a logic of direction, progress, and perhaps even success, we
ought to question it.
Indeed, the late 1950s and early 1960s can be read as the first phase
of a long period of crisis that coincided with a growing criticism in
Western Europe (and the USA) towards the self-proclaimed omnipotence
of tradition and authority vested in state apparatuses. From this perspec-
tive, visualisations of the dominant imaginary of civil defence were rife
with dissonances that, gradually, undermined its credibility. Individualisa-
tion was not a set trajectory, but perhaps rather a slow withdrawal from
responsibility that pointed to a deeper crisis of faith inside and outside the
ranks of civil defence organisations. Public criticism, declining member-
ship numbers (Sweden had 660,000 volunteer members in 1945, and
only 10,000 members in 198939), decreasing state funding, rhetorical
retreat in the face of Mutually Assured Destruction, and an orientation
towards new peacetime activities point not to a mature and institution-
alised imaginary of civil defence but rather to a lacklustre organisation
of all-hazards risk management that could be openly defied and ridiculed.
When civil defence organisations faced public scrutiny again in the 1980s,
they certainly encountered such attitudes. While the emphasis on tech-
nology and the future that feature so prominently in the concept of
sociotechnical imaginaries is clearly productive, there is also a need here
to disturb ‘the tidy timelines of progress’ (Edgerton 2006: xii) that are
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associated with technology and stories of invention and adjustment. We
are likely to gain more analytical power by approaching imaginaries of
civil defence not as cyclical processes of successful adjustments and refine-
ment but as a combination of ingrained reflexes and controversial political
imperatives. From this angle, the imaginary of civil defence repeatedly
encountered dissonance and crisis when it created images that reconciled
life in the modern world with the dreaded future of nuclear war.
Notes
1. Sweden had already merged all civil defence activities into one
organisation in 1944, whereas Denmark established its civil defence
by law in 1949.
2. See also Bjørnsson (ch. 2) in this volume. See also Oakes and
Grossman (1992: 394–395) and Collier and Lakoff’s discussion on
the birth and evolution of ‘Emergency federalism’ (2008: 13–14).
In relation to Sweden, Cronqvist (2012: 205–206) makes the case
that civil defence did not experience ‘privatisation’, but perhaps
‘state individualisation’.
3. We leave aside the difficulties of separating the dynamics of
embedding and extension that emerge from Jasanoff’s discussion
(2015b). We appreciate the attempt to specify these dynamics,
though they are often intertwined in (historical) practice.
4. Historians must pay attention to both aspects, or what Platinga
(2005) terms the ‘saying’ and ‘showing’ parts of documentaries.
5. The relevant state agencies included The Film Committee of
Danish Ministries (Ministeriernes Filmudvalg), Danish Cultural
Films (Dansk Kulturfilm) and The Danish Government Film
Office (Statens Filmcentral).
6. Swedish films are available through the Swedish Media Database,
www.smdb.se [accessed 1 April 2020]. Most Danish productions
are available through the Danish Film Institute: https://www.dfi.
dk/en/english/danish-film-history [accessed 1 April 2020].
7. For Denmark, see DCDL to The Film Committee of Danish
Ministries, 15 December 1950, in Old film records, ‘Civil-
forsvaret’, The Danish Government Film Office, Danish National
Archives (DNA)/The Danish Film Institute (DFI); for Sweden,
see Norén (2012: 43–45).
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8. See Bennesved (2020). This ‘conventionalisation’ of the atomic
bomb and its reception into an existing set of practices comes out
in several chapters in this volume. See especially Bjørnsson (ch. 2)
and Farbøl (ch. 7).
9. Danish films were specifically produced for either cinema distri-
bution or local associations. DCDD, Status for civilforsvaret,
September 1953, 27–28. DNA, Schultz Memoranda 185. For the
film plans of Swedish civil defence, see Norén (2012).
10. Indeed, from the mid-1950s, the annual reports of the DCDL
contained information about the most popular films, and film
catalogues were printed to service local associations.
11. See, for example, the following Swedish report from 1953: ‘Civil-
försvarsupplysning genom utomhusbio’, Tidskrift för Svenskt civil-
försvar (1953), 75–76. For an analysis of similar trends in the
USA and the UK, see Matthews (2012) and Hogg (ch. 4) in this
volume.
12. See also the chapters by Bjørnsson (ch. 2) and Hogg (ch. 4) in this
volume.
13. ‘Från arbetsfältet’, Tidskrift för Svenskt civilförsvar (1950), 22; See
also letter to Arthur Dahl 1 October 1949, Vol. B VII: 14 ‘Brev
från Danmark’ Civilförsvarsstyrelsens öppna arkiv, Krigsarkivet,
Swedish National Archives, Stockholm, Sweden.
14. However, on overly political matters, like the risk of Sweden main-
taining a neutral and alliance-free stance in the postwar period,
Bombed Town is silent.
15. Protecting the Population (DEN 1953), 10:05–10:15.
16. For more on the connection between Swedish civil defence and
welfare politics, see Cronqvist (2008, 2012).
17. Bombed Town (SWE 1949), 18:00–18:40.
18. In 1951, the goal was to make 600,000 Danes ‘civil defence
conscious’ (DCDL to The Film Committee of Danish Ministries,
25/6–1951. Old film records, ‘Mit navn er Christensen’, The
Danish Government Film Office, DNA/DFI).
19. ‘Draft of propaganda film for Civil Defence’, Old film records,
‘Civilforsvaret’, The Danish Government Film Office, DNA/DFI.
20. See for example Women in Civil Defence (DEN, Kvinder i Civil-
forsvaret, 1952) and in My Name is Christensen (DEN, Mit navn
er Christensen, 1953).
21. Bombed Home (SWE 1950), 15:50–17:11.
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22. Bombed Home (SWE 1950), 29:00–29:05.
23. See for example We Move Underground (Vi går underjord, 1959),
Also a City Problem (Också ett storstadsproblem, 1960) and Radiak
(1961). The CDA also produced a series of evacuation films aimed
at audiences in dense urban areas.
24. See especially Civil Defence (Civilforsvaret, 1959), Air Attack
(Luftangreb, 1959) and Radioactive Fallout (1961) – the three
most significant films of the time.
25. ‘Nytt från Civilförsvarsstyrelsen, Kasserade filmer’, Tidskrift för
Svenskt Civilförsvar, (1958), 26.
26. See especially Air Attack (1959). On US advice, see Titus (1983:
6).
27. In this period, civil defence authorities in both countries also began
producing and participating in television debates. In Sweden,
following the successful show Our Need for Security (Vårt behov
av trygghet ) in 1958, the CDA decided to work with television to
launch a new self-protection campaign in 1961. Similarly, the previ-
ously mentioned film Radiak (1962) was from the start intended
as a television broadcast: ‘Radiak – tre nya filmer’, Tidskrift för
Svenskt Civilförsvar (1962), 85. Radioactive Fallout , the most
ambitious and well-crafted Danish production, was broadcast on
Danish Television on 6 December 1961, a month before the
national distribution of the Danish leaflet.
28. In Sweden, criticism against civil defence was spearheaded by
Aktion mot Svenskt Atomvapen, (AMSA), see Andersson (2001).
Two veteran officers also criticised the then civil defence organisa-
tion as hopelessly inadequate causing much debate in public. See
also Bennesved and Norén (2020).
29. See, for instance, reviews (‘Rystende Realisme’) in Jyllands-Posten,
8 December 1961 and (‘Fra vort kælderdyb’) in Frit Danmark,
1962, 20: 10, 14–15.
30. The film marked the 25-year anniversary of Danish civil defence.
It followed an exercise based on a scenario in which a provin-
cial town was attacked by a ‘small atomic bomb’. Although there
were clearly grounds for scepticism, the director sought to ‘con-
vince the viewer’ of the effectiveness of civil defence in part
through ‘emotional appeal’. Carl Otto Petersen, ‘Preface to civil
defence film synopsis’, 27 September 1958, Old film records,
‘Civilforsvaret’, The Danish Government Film Office, DNA/DFI.
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The film contained a much-ridiculed sentence from a failed infor-
mation campaign of 1958; namely ‘that the best protection is
naturally to not be where the damage occurs’ (4:10–4:16).
31. Also a City Problem, 1960, 12:50–13:10.
32. See Bjørnsson (ch. 2) in this volume.
33. Radioactive Fallout (DEN 1961) was commended for its
animated, technical explanation of radioactive fallout.
34. Self-protection (‘Självskydd’) was officially endorsed in 1960 by
the Swedish civil defence services, in preference to the older
‘Hemskydd’ model.
35. Civil Defence (DEN 1959), 3:15–3:23.
36. Broadcast on Swedish television on 10 October 1961.
37. See, for example, Radioactive Fallout and Evacuation of Västerås
(SWE, Utrymning av Västerås, 1960).
38. For example, Our Need for Security (SWE 1958), 12:00–16:00.
39. Hans C. Pettersson, in Sjölin (2014: 207).
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CHAPTER 6
‘The World is Her Home’: The Role
of Women Volunteers in Dutch Civil
Defence in the 1950s and 1960s
Dick van Lente
The Dutch civil defence organisation Bescherming Bevolking (Protection
of the Population), or BB, was launched, with great reluctance, by the
Dutch government in 1952.1 The first postwar governments estimated
that the Soviet Union had been damaged too much during the Second
World War to risk an attack on Western Europe. Communism was seen
as mainly a domestic threat, which had to be countered by investing
in a strong economy and comfortable living conditions for the whole
population rather than wasting money on weapons. The Czech coup of
1948, the Berlin crisis of 1948–1949, the announcement in September
1949 that the Soviets had a nuclear weapon and the Korean War in
1950 changed the situation. The American government expected Soviet
aggression in Western Europe, sent over more troops and demanded that
the Europeans increase their military budgets. The Dutch government
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complied. The new civil defence organisation was considered part of that
defensive effort: it had to demonstrate the population’s readiness to face
an attack from the East. That, at least, was the theory. In practice, the BB
elicited very little enthusiasm among politicians, officials and the wider
public.
Like civil defence organisations elsewhere, the BB relied largely on
volunteers, in addition to a small professional staff. Recruiting efforts
were directed mainly at men, who would be trained in firefighting and
rescue operations, while women were welcomed in the Division for Care
and Comfort, which would help victims. As the number of volunteers
remained far below expectations, the recruiting campaign was extended
in 1955. The slogan of this campaign, ‘the third man’, testified to the
male orientation of the BB. It indicated that one-third of the vacancies
still had to be filled, but also, and more strikingly, that the organisation
had simply by-passed the female half of the population.
When recruitments remained low, the BB realised its mistake, and in
1956, it began to target Dutch women. For this purpose, it sought the
help of Nederlandse Federatie voor Vrouwelijke Vrijwillige Hulpverlening
(the Dutch Federation of Women’s Voluntary Organisations, FVVH).
The FVVH agreed to organise courses on individual self-protection, but
insisted on doing this independently of, although in coordination with,
the BB. It quickly recruited and trained a large group of women instruc-
tors, and in the next decade organised hundreds of instruction meetings
throughout the country. In the meantime, the BB languished: it had
difficulty recruiting volunteers and keeping them involved. In the late
1960s, it practically faded from public view. This steady decline contrasted
markedly with the gusto with which women volunteers undertook their
job, and their relative success.
This contrast between a stumbling men’s organisation and a thriving
women’s organisation, both working to prepare the Dutch population
for nuclear war, is the topic of this chapter. Why did the women succeed
where the men failed? The answer to this question, this chapter contends,
is to be found in the way the women volunteers understood their role in
society, and how they put this into practice. They were at the forefront
of a feminist wave that rose after the Second World War, a movement
that was situated between the more well-known first and second feminist
waves of the fin-de-siècle and the late 1960s, respectively (Schwegman
and Withuis 1993: 570). They were inspired by the early feminists, who
considered the right to vote, acquired in 1919, as their entrance ticket
6 ‘THE WORLD IS HER HOME’ … 131
to public debate, which would finally allow women to contribute to the
improvement of society. The new realities of warfare, which since the First
World War included aerial bombardment, gave women a new and urgent
task. Military violence would no longer be limited to the frontlines, where
men did the fighting, but would include homes, women and children.
Therefore, in addition to feeding and clothing their families, women now
had to protect them, a role which could extend from creating improvised
air-raid shelters to getting involved in the peace movement and inter-
national politics. During the Second World War, many women played a
crucial role in protecting and feeding their families, as well as providing
shelter to people hiding from the occupying forces. This created a sense of
collective strength and pride, and the conviction that they had an impor-
tant role to play in postwar Dutch society. But postwar society turned out
to be at least as patriarchal as it had been before the war, and the BB
was an eminent example of a male-dominated institution. While needing
the help of the women volunteers, the BB resented their independence
and success. This conflict between the official imaginary of civil defence,
incorporated in the patriarchal BB and the women volunteers enacting a
new vision of the role of women in the nuclear age is the topic of this
chapter (Jasanoff 2015a: 4).
The next section sketches the rise and decline of the BB. Section three
discusses the debate about the role of women in society during the 1950s
and 1960s. These two sections set the stage for the story of the voluntary
organisations’ efforts to teach women how to deal with the effects of
nuclear war. The final section will evaluate to what extent and in which
ways the women’s voluntary organisations succeeded in enacting a new
imaginary of gender roles for the nuclear age, and how these activities
were received.
Rise and Decline of the Bescherming Bevolking
The Dutch civil defence organisation Bescherming Bevolking was created
during a period of widespread fear of nuclear war. Anxiety levels rose after
crises such as the Prague coup (February 1948) and the Berlin blockade
(1948–1949), then lessened during the 1950s (Table 6.1).
The polls did not ask about the fear of nuclear war and its conse-
quences, but judging by contemporaneous articles in newspapers and
popular magazines, this was clearly implied. A popular illustrated maga-
zine, Panorama, wrote in November 1946 that the next war would likely
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Table 6.1 Polling on the perceived likelihood of war
Percentage of people polled who say yes to the questions below





























Sources Nederlands Instituut voor de Publieke Opinie (NIPO), report nos. 444–447 (13 September
1950); report no. 624 (26 June 1953); and report no. 915 (5 November 1962); Van der Boom
(2000: 26–28)2
be one without armies, fought by remotely controlled weapons, including
atom bombs, assuming the Americans would not be able to keep their
nuclear monopoly. Once started, the conflict would automatically esca-
late, destroying all American and European cities within 24 hours.3 Dutch
newspapers paid a lot of attention to the book No place to hide by the
American army doctor David Bradley, which was published in the autumn
of 1948. Bradley had attended the tests at Bikini Atoll in 1946 and
concluded that protection against ionising radiation released by atomic
bombs was practically impossible.4 Widespread fear of nuclear war, in
addition to pressure from the USA as mentioned above, also helps to
explain the creation of the BB. One MP spoke of an ‘SOS of the Dutch
people’. The budget, 8 million guilders, to be spent over the next four
years, was widely criticised as being much too limited—an ‘ostrich policy’
as another MP described it (Van der Boom 2000: 36, 115).
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During the 1950s, as the nuclear confrontation became an estab-
lished fact of life, fears were offset by increasing standards of living,
and they seem to have abated somewhat. But recurring crises (over the
Suez Canal and Berlin, for example) reminded people that nuclear war
might break out any time. In 1955, NATO held a large exercise in West
Germany, called Carte Blanche, which simulated a nuclear surprise attack
on Western Europe and tested the response of NATO forces. It involved
mock attacks with 335 atom bombs from both sides, mainly on West
Germany, but also on a few Dutch targets. Dutch newspapers reported
the horrors of this imagined war: West Germany would be devastated,
and at least half of its population would be instantly killed. It would be
a short and horrible war, a ‘mutual suicide’, as even the chief of staff of
the NATO air forces, Peter Wykeham-Barnes, said. He added: ‘Talk of
winning such a war is madness’, and there would be ‘[n]o victors, only
a few survivors’.5 It is therefore not surprising that in 1958 the govern-
ment spoke of a ‘latent mood of panic’ in the Dutch population (Van der
Boom 2000: 150, 221). Another survey, in 1959, showed that people
associated nuclear war with ‘everything broken, dead, or lost’ (Leenders
2001: 150).6
The basic mission of the BB was to convince the Dutch population that
such pessimism was unwarranted, and that it could, and should, protect
itself against aerial attack. This was presented as a civilian task. The name
Bescherming Bevolking (BB) or ‘protection of the population’ avoided the
word ‘defence’ because of its military connotation, which planners and
PR people knew the Dutch population disliked. For the same reason, the
BB was the responsibility of the Minister of Domestic Affairs, not the
Minister of Defence. The basic elements of the organisation were local
units of volunteers, a scheme called ‘organised self-protection’. Citizens
were to create shelters in their own homes (see Fig. 6.1).
Those who lived in high-rise apartment buildings should construct a
shelter together, preferably in the basement, with some subsidy from the
government. In peacetime, these shelters could be used for storage or as
parking for bikes. For those caught in a public space at the time of an
attack, public shelters would be built at busy junctures in cities. None
of these shelters would be able to withstand the heat and shock of a
close nuclear explosion, but several miles away from ground zero they
would be able to save lives. This basic structure remained in place until
the dissolution of the BB in 1986.
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Fig. 6.1 Civil defence: The patriarchal view of the BB
Notice how the husband, as helpless as his wife and children, seems to protect
them with his left arm, which extends to the stairways. No hint here of
the mother as the protector, the idea behind the women’swomen voluntary
efforts. The image is strikingly similar to the advertisements featuring families
analysed in Goffman (1976: 37–39) and the description of the American situ-
ation in McEnaney (2010) (From the booklet Toelichting op de wenken voor
de bescherming van uw gezin en uzelf [s.l., September 1961], p. 5. Source
National Archives, The Hague. Archive of Organisatie Bescherming Bevolking,
bloc 1960–1969, box 73)
No serious protection against air raids had existed in the Nether-
lands up to this point. During the 1930s, the government had made
a half-hearted attempt to create a mostly voluntary organisation that
would fight fires and dig trenches where the population could take shelter
during an aerial attack, but people had never taken this seriously, and the
government’s advice to citizens for individual self-protection was largely
ignored—a response that would later be repeated with the BB (Van der
Boom 2000: 31–32; Bosma 2012: 76–91).
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The BB estimated it would need 200,000 volunteers.7 The govern-
ment started a big propaganda campaign in the spring of 1952, with short
films, radio talks and pamphlets. It was aimed mainly at men, although
women were eligible for the Social Care Service, that was to provide
victims with food and comfort, ‘work for which a woman’s hand was
created’ (Van der Boom 2000: 51). BB recruiters reported that it was
often women who persuaded their husbands to join the organisation. It
was also much easier to find women to join the Social Care Service than
it was to find men for the other units (Hueting 1995: 104, 107–108; Van
der Boom 2000: 51, 63, 67, 69, 134). The overall result of the campaign
was disappointing: only 123,000 people signed up. Recruitment therefore
continued after 1953, with similar, if not worse results: volunteers had
already begun leaving the organisation. This led to the attempt to recruit
more women, which will be discussed below. Another way to solve the
volunteer problem was to enlist young conscripts. This met with fierce
opposition, but at least from the mid-1960s, the ranks were almost filled.
In 1955, the Minister of Domestic Affairs announced what experts
had known for years and the population had feared for almost a decade:
in the case of a war, the Netherlands would suffer several nuclear attacks,
on Rotterdam, Amsterdam, The Hague (seat of the government) and
several other strategic spots. The BB was reorganised to deal with this
not-so-new threat. Regularly, the government announced that more shel-
ters would be built, but actual building was often postponed or silently
called off.8 In 1968, the Minister of Domestic Affairs reported to Parlia-
ment that at that time shelters with fallout protection were available, or
under construction, for 66,200 persons; the total population at that time
amounted to 12 million.9 From the late 1950s, an increasing number of
experts and politicians expressed their scepticism about the organisation
(Van der Boom 2000: 261–270). Prominent Dutch scientists argued that
the government grossly underrated the effects of a nuclear attack. The
BB’s pretence of protection only served to prepare the Dutch population
for a nuclear war, they said. The only sensible way to prevent such a war
was to completely abolish nuclear weapons.10
In the summer of 1961, tensions around Berlin increased, and a
nuclear war scare gripped the Western world. The Dutch government,
like governments in other West European countries, responded by having
a pamphlet delivered to each home, entitled ‘Suggestions for protecting
your family and yourself’.11 It explained what to do in the event of a
nuclear attack. The main advice was to seek shelter at home or the nearest
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place available. Suggestions were given for creating a home shelter, what
to keep in stock there and how to provide first aid. Three weeks later, an
illustrated, 30-page brochure with further explanations was distributed.
It emphasised protection against fallout, perhaps because that was more
attainable than protection against the shock, heat and immediate radiation
of a nuclear explosion (Weart 1988: 258). The overarching theme of this
campaign and the booklet was to counter the widespread ‘defeatism’, the
deep pessimism, that had taken root during the 1950s, and to convince
the population that self-protection made sense: fatalism, the BB argued,
allowed panic to take over and opportunities for survival to be wasted
(Van der Boom 2000: 208; on ‘panic management’, see also the chapter
by Bjørnsson in this volume).
The pamphlet and the brochure were not well received. According to
a survey held shortly after the campaign, a little over half of the respon-
dents said they had read them, but of those who had, only half could
say what fallout was, and an even larger proportion had no idea what
to do to protect themselves. A survey held in 1968 showed that hardly
anyone had created a shelter at home—not even BB people and politicians
(Van der Boom 2000: 232; Valkenburgh 1964: 231)—and municipalities
had almost completely neglected their duties in this respect. One example
is the small town of Barendregt, close to Rotterdam. The civil servant
answering the questionnaire reported that the new municipal office had a
shelter facility for the local government. He did not know how many
people had a shelter at home, but he supposed there were very few.
He announced that Barendregt was preparing further measures. But in
1972, the town reported that for about 12,000 of the 13,000 inhabitants
there was no shelter. In short, Barendregt’s citizens were not interested in
the topic at all, and neither was their municipal government.12 This was
typical of the Netherlands. The mayor of Amsterdam at first even declined
to carry out the survey, because he found it meaningless (Van der Boom
2000: 248; Leenders 2001: 227–235).
Some people were angry. They said the BB suggested that a nuclear
war could be fought and survived.13 A well-known young writer, Harry
Mulisch, wrote a savage satire, which was published a few weeks after
the BB’s brochure: ‘Suggestions for protecting your family and yourself
on Judgment Day’. It alternated horror scenes from the biblical Book
of Revelations with suggestions from the BB, including sandbags and
ice cubes (Mulisch 1961). Most other reactions published in newspapers
were scathing or angry. After this PR disaster, the BB kept a low profile,
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and in the 1970s, many people wondered if it still existed at all. Opinion
polls showed that the number of people expecting nuclear war decreased
rapidly during the second half of the 1960s.14
Why was the organisation so unpopular? First, neither the central
government nor municipal governments believed in civil defence. The
budget was kept low and the organisation was set up half-heartedly.
During the first few years, BB volunteers had to wear unimpressive
overalls as a uniform, local leadership was often weak, courses were unin-
spiring, and exercises were not taken seriously. Leading figures were often
retired army officers who regarded their job as a kind of sinecure. Mayors
and councillors commonly showed a complete lack of interest. The BB
increasingly became a laughingstock, and its volunteers were ashamed
to be seen by their neighbours wearing their uniforms or doing their
exercises (see Fig. 6.2).15
One result of this lack of funding and leadership was continuous under-
performance. The delays in shelter building illustrate this. Most people
were unaware of the location of shelters (Van der Boom 2000: 158–159).
In practical tasks, the BB also cut a bad figure. When the organisation was
called on to assist during emergencies—at a railroad disaster in 1962, at
an accident at a chemical plant in 1972 and on a few other occasions—its
performance was considered worthless (Leenders 2001: 230–231).
Dutch Women in the Cold War: Social
Position, Ideals and Voluntary Work
While the BB became increasingly unpopular, women volunteers set up
their own, vigorous campaign to instruct women in self-protection. What
motivated them? And how did they deal with the BB? In order to under-
stand this, we have to consider the postwar debate about the role of
women in society.
The Second World War shook Dutch society to its roots, including
the relations between men and women (De Liagre Böhl 1987; Van
Liempt 2009: 265–314, 366–416; Schwegman and Withuis 1993: 568–
570). The illegitimacy of the occupying German authorities during the
war encouraged illegal activity. This included hiding, and feeding, some
25,000 Jews, and 300,000 non-Jews, a very risky business in which
women played a key role. Towards the end of the war, when food and
fuel became scarce, pilfering and prostitution spread. After liberation,
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Fig. 6.2 BB ridiculed
Self-mockery in the BB magazine De Paladijn 1964, no. 10. Notice how
marginal women are
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300,000 men who had been deported to Germany to work in the facto-
ries returned home. Many others had escaped deportation by going into
hiding. Women therefore had taken up the task of feeding and holding
together their families. When liberation came, many young women had
brief affairs with Canadian soldiers, which led to a spike in illegitimate
births, divorces and cases of venereal disease a year later. The public
humiliation of young women who had been too friendly with German
men (moffenmeiden) can easily be interpreted as revenge for this afront
to Dutch male pride (Judt 2005: 42–43). In other words, the war had
not only made women heroines but also put them morally at risk. It
had inspired a collective self-confidence in women while diminishing the
standing of men.
Small wonder that genuine moral panic broke out among politicians
and church leaders after the euphoria of liberation had waned. They
believed the country had to restore not only its buildings, harbours and
bridges, but even more so its decency and orderly habits. As a journal
for mental health put it: ‘The sense of mine and thine, and respect for
the authority of the government have been severely weakened, pent up
aggression has not yet found constructive outlets, and the absence of
fathers and the sexual misbehaviour of mothers have created unacceptable
situations’ (Mol and Van Lieshout 1987: 80). The response to this state of
moral emergency was the creation of a range of institutions for social work
and therapy which focused on re-establishing traditional family relations.
The motto was: ‘Restoring the family will restore the nation’ (Gezinsher-
stel brengt Volksherstel) (De Liagre Böhl 1987: 28). This was not difficult:
it entailed the restoration of the organisational networks created before
the war that were dominated by the protestant and Roman Catholic
churches which embraced a patriarchal view of society.
This restoration clearly succeeded.16 Throughout the 1950s and
1960s, most young women married and had children. Divorce was
unusual until the late 1960s. Very few women, a much lower percentage
than elsewhere in Europe, worked outside the home, in spite of the
shortage of labour. Even in 1965, 83% of the respondents in a survey
rejected the idea of mothers of schoolchildren working away from home.
But there were changes too. The legal position of women began to
improve from the late 1940s. For example, both parents acquired equal
authority over their children (1947), married women were given the same
rights as their husbands to their common possessions (1957), women no
longer automatically lost their job upon marriage, and equal pay for equal
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work was introduced (1957). Many of these rules were routinely evaded,
but clearly, the position of women was no longer fixed—it was debated,
changes were proposed and sometimes adopted, and even if not fully
implemented, they were ‘in the air’ (Brinkgreve and Korzec 1978: 97–
99; Schwegman and Withuis 1993: 575). And many women believed the
war had proven that their role in society was essential.
Profound and lasting changes in attitudes started only in the late
1960s, brought about by economic growth, the introduction of the
contraceptive pill, and the second feminist wave (Brinkgreve and
Korzec 1978: 115, 126–127; Pott-Buter and Tijdens 1998: 139–141;
Schwegman and Withuis 1993: 579–581). Women became more highly
educated and more eager to pursue a career. Motherhood was no longer
idealised; women were now expected to ‘develop themselves’ beyond the
family. The number of children per family started to decline and divorces
increased (Van Setten 1987: 25–26; Brinkgreve and Korzec 1978: 114).
The high tide of women’s participation in civil defence therefore
occurred during the period before the second feminist wave, when a
restored patriarchal order collided with a new sense of responsibility and
competence among many women. Although feminism is often thought to
have almost disappeared during this period, the role of women in society
was actually a big topic of debate. Simone de Beauvoir’s Le deuxième
sexe (1949) and Margaret Mead’s Male and female (1950) were only the
most famous of several books on this topic that appeared during these
years.17 In this section, I will sketch the ideas of four widely read Dutch
authors and one lesser known one. While different in many ways, they
shared key assumptions and concepts about women in society, ideas that
also informed the activities of the volunteer organisations and which we
can compare with the imaginary of the BB.
My first witness is Martina Tjeenk Willink (1905–1992), a lawyer and
the only female member (for the Social Democratic Party) of the senate.
At a meeting of the Union of Women’s Volunteers in 1948, she gave a
speech on ‘Woman in leading positions’.18 The recent war and the current
nuclear threat, she says, show that our culture is in deep trouble. This
is caused by three potentially valuable tendencies which have run amok:
individualism has isolated humans from their deep connections with the
world, rationalism has blocked from view the spiritual values hidden in the
mysteries of life, and technology, developed to serve us, has enslaved us
(she mentions the atom bomb and the assembly line to illustrate this).
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All three, according to her, are products of ‘centuries of male domi-
nance’. To prevent disaster, we should foster qualities that are ‘generally
human’, but that are more strongly developed in women: connectedness
with life, which seeks to bind rather than divide, and which is engendered
by our motherhood—whether or not we become mothers ourselves—and
a balance of thought and feeling: ‘the mind should respect the wisdom
of the heart, as the heart should learn the discipline of the mind’. In her
reasoning, that is why women should serve ‘the human family’, the world
in which they want to see their children grow up. In her assessment,
the recent war has widened women’s sense of social responsibility and
given them confidence in their capabilities. These are gains that have to
be developed further, both for our personal development and for society.
A few years later, the physician-philosopher Frederik Buytendijk
(1887–1974) published his influential study De vrouw (Woman, 1951),
framed as a reply to De Beauvoir’s book, which he called the most
important work on the subject (his emphasis) (Buytendijk 1969: 25).
De vrouw was reprinted 16 times until the late 1960s. Like De Beau-
voir, Buytendijk argued within an existentialist framework, but he differed
from De Beauvoir and Sartre in emphasising the meaningful relationship
of human beings to their world.19 His core argument was that being
human meant being physically in the world. From birth, a person’s body
was the ‘preliminary sketch of his existence’, and being male or female
invited a certain relationship with the world, without being determin-
istic. A woman’s body invited her to develop her caring qualities, which
culminated in motherhood. However, a woman could cultivate all human
capacities, including those that were usually associated with men, as had
become evident during the war and on many other occasions (Buytendijk
1969: 9). And the gift of caring for life was human, rather than exclusively
female. Buytendijk’s learned treatise did not differ basically from Tjeenk
Willink’s short speech: he too spoke of the need for qualities that women
can develop more naturally, and he also liked to speak of the ‘mysteries’
of human existence that could not be grasped by scientific analysis.
Two years before Buytendijk’s book came out, in 1949, a stage play,
De wereld heeft geen wachtkamer (The world has no waiting room),
written by Maurits Dekker, caused a small sensation in the Netherlands
(Van Lente 2012: 155–156). It portrayed a group of researchers working
on a military-funded project to develop a more powerful explosive than
plutonium. When a young researcher becomes fatally ill after exposure
to radiation, the elderly housemaid of the professor who leads the project
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observes how the militarisation of research has changed the atmosphere in
the team. No longer do the students come and visit the professor, making
jokes, she says, but ‘bigwigs in uniform who have secrets and suddenly
shut up when you enter the room’. The professor, she has noticed, has
become tense and sleepless. ‘What for?’ she exclaims, ‘Why don’t people
just live?’ She expressed what Tjeenk Willink and Buytendijk had formu-
lated as a typically female rejection of the destructive, male pursuit of
nuclear weapons research. No doubt, the author was on her side and
wanted the audience to feel the same.20
Perhaps the most profound (and beautifully written) exploration of
the role of women in the atomic age was the well-known novelist Hella
Haasse’s (1918–2011) long essay Een kom water en een test vuur (A vessel
of water and bowl of fire, 1959). The ‘vessel of water and bowl of fire’
of the title were the gifts that, in Roman times, the bridegroom offered
to his bride as she entered the home of which she was to be the domina
dressed in an orange and saffron robe, as if she were a flame. The fire
stood for erotic passion (the origin of all culture, said Haasse), but also
for the oven that magically transformed dough into wholesome food, and
of course for her womb, which would produce new life. And water was the
symbol of life itself. According to Haasse, the modern age, in which water
comes from a tap and light from an electric lightbulb, has lost contact
with these elementary phenomena. The awareness of women’s deep and
mysterious connection with the basics of life is gone. Brides now wear a
white dress, symbolising their untouched delivery to the closed-off space
of the home where the man rules. This state of affairs is deeply troubling
now that water and fire have entered into a monstrous contract in the
hydrogen bomb. As humanity is going through its most drastic transfor-
mation ever, women should reconnect to this ‘cosmic space’, symbolised
by water and fire. For ‘[t]he whole world is the home of woman’ (Haasse
1959: 17, 77). Their special mission was to help others to reconnect to
the larger whole, both in a mystical and in a practical sense: to devote
‘all our attention, love, and energy to what is given to us, ‘earthy reality’,
things, human beings, nature’ (Haasse 1959: 34–36, 150). This would
serve as a counterforce to the male tendency to dominate nature, which
had led to the frightening, soulless world of modern machinery.
My final witness, much less well known, is Jo Le Rütte (1888–1972),
a retired secondary school teacher, who in 1962 published a pamphlet
called De vrouw en het Atoomtijdperk (Woman and the atomic age). She
was a pacifist, Esperantist and an early member of the Dutch pacifist
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party, which was founded in 1957.21 Like Haasse, Le Rütte characterised
her time in terms of technology: on the one hand, spectacular material
improvement after the war, and on the other hand, the coming of the
atomic age, bringing constant fear of utter destruction (Le Rütte 1962:
6). She identified technology with male power: certainly not bad in itself,
but potentially deadly. ‘If we walk the same road as we do now, humanity
will be destroyed by technological violence’ (Le Rütte 1962: 29, 31).
This can be prevented only by placing international affairs in the hands
of men and women together, just as children are brought up by a father
and a mother. Like the other authors, she regarded the family as the core
of society, and motherhood the core quality of women, endowing them
with a caring disposition. This care should be extended to the world at
large. She proposed, among other things, giving women prominent posi-
tions in economic and financial policy—which were similar to managing
the family budget—general disarmament and the spread of Esperanto, so
that people around the world could get to know each other (Le Rütte
1962: 42).
Le Rütte’s pamphlet reminds us that the maternal drive could lead to
pacifist activity as well as to supporting civil defence. Lawrence Wittner
has documented the prominent role of women in antinuclear movements
in several countries from the mid-1950s onward (Wittner 2000). I have
not found much evidence for this in the Netherlands, although members
of the pacifist party to which Le Rütte belonged sometimes explained
their convictions in these terms. One of them wrote later, during the
‘second feminist wave’: ‘Even if you reject the mother role, you don’t
have to discard your caring and emotional capacities. After all, we have to
teach men to also become more caring and “maternal”’ (Denekamp et al.
1987: 68).
These women shared the notion that they had a special, caring task in
society. This idea had originated in the first feminist wave, but the war and
the threat of nuclear war had increased its urgency: women’s participation
in public affairs was necessary to stymie destructive male tendencies.
This idea found practical expression in the rise of voluntary move-
ments, especially in the 1930s. In 1938, when international relations were
tense and war loomed, a group of ladies (most were from wealthy fami-
lies and many held academic degrees) established the Korps Vrouwelijke
Vrijwilligers (Women’s Volunteers Corps), which trained its members to
help protect the population against the consequences of air raids. The
Korps presented itself as ‘an instrument for the government when it needs
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the population to provide help’. This might be in the event of war, a flood
or some other disaster (Hueting 1995: 10, 16). Hundreds of women
joined the Korps, and very soon there were 30 local chapters all over the
country (Hueting 1995: 28).
In May 1940, three days before the German invasion, the Korps
offered its services to the National Inspection for Protection against Air
Attacks. The government officials rejected the offer. The women, baffled,
decided to continue work on their own (Hueting 1995: 37). When the
inner city of Rotterdam was destroyed by German bombs a few days later,
the Korps provided shelter and food to hundreds of refugees. At the end
of the war, girls and women from the Southern part of the country, which
had been liberated first, went to help exhausted housewives in the North
to clean up and repair their homes. And in 1953, when the South-Western
part of the country was inundated during a storm, women volunteers
again provided essential help.
In the early postwar years, a conflict arose between the Unie van
Vrouwelijke Vrijwilligers (Union of Women Volunteers, or UVV), the
successor organisation of the Korps, and several local women’s volun-
tary organisations that did not want to be part this organisation. A new
umbrella organisation was created in 1951, the Nederlandse Federatie voor
Vrouwelijke Vrijwillige Hulpverlening (FVVH) (Hueting 1995: 71–86).
The UVV declined to join the new federation. The English Women’s
Voluntary Society, the UVV’s admired example, declared that it would
only deal with the UVV. This complicated conflict, although not impor-
tant to our topic in itself, does explain the strange way in which women’s
voluntary organisations became involved in civil defence a few years later.
Women volunteers and the BB
When the government began recruiting volunteers for the BB in 1953,
the UVV and other women’s organisations encouraged their members,
except mothers of small children, to join. As we saw, many women volun-
teered for the Social Care Service and prompted their husbands to join
the organisation too. Later that year, the Department of the Interior
sent three women, including the president of the UVV, to England to
learn about civil defence from the Women’s Voluntary Service. As the BB
struggled to get started, the UVV decided to follow the example of the
WVS, which had initiated a campaign in 1955 to educate small groups
of women in ‘self-protection’. The campaign was called ‘One-in-Five’,
6 ‘THE WORLD IS HER HOME’ … 145
indicating that it aimed to reach one fifth of all adult British women,
a goal that seemed more realistic than attempting to reach all women
(Hunt 2012). Women were invited in groups of ten to twelve persons,
who would meet three times to be instructed on how to minimise the
impact of fire, radiation and blast caused by a nuclear explosion, and how
to care for the injured. Instruction was provided by a volunteer who had
followed a short course.
When the BB began its campaign to recruit more women in 1956,
it used the rhetoric of women’s natural caring talents.22 A recruitment
folder said that although the BB was not usually associated with women
and girls, their female qualities made them perfectly suited to this kind of
work. ‘All women share the quality of self-sacrificing love’, the pamphlet
said, and every woman’s heart was inclined ‘to help, to serve’ people in
need, as had been demonstrated so well during the flood of 1953. While
some tasks were obviously suitable for women (first aid, providing food
and shelter, administration, communication), no position in the BB was
unattainable for them—including higher staff functions.
As it turned out that new women volunteers were recruited mainly
in areas where the BB had hardly campaigned (Van der Boom 2000:
71–72), the organisation asked the FVVH, in February 1958, for help
educating Dutch women in ‘Individuele Zelfbescherming ’ (individual self-
protection).23 The BB official responsible for recruitment explained that
while there were now 166,000 volunteers, including 30,000 women,
250,000 volunteers were needed. He calculated that about two million
Dutch women would be eligible for the BB—not counting elderly women
and young mothers. Because men would have to do military service or be
at their jobs in the event of war, women would have to take responsi-
bility for protecting their homes. And ‘obviously’, he said, the FVVH was
needed to recruit these women. He then repeated the formula of women’s
fitness for all positions in the BB, their natural caring qualities and their
sense of responsibility, which had been proven during the Second World
War and the flood of 1953. Their participation would also help give the
BB a stronger position in society. In this way, they could contribute to
defending the West, which was one of the BB’s purposes.24
The FVVH agreed to help the BB, but then discovered that two
women from the UVV were already taking a course on the One-in-Five
campaign conducted by the British WVS, and that these ladies were deter-
mined to set up a similar programme in the Netherlands. As the UVV
ladies’ trip was financed by the Department of the Interior, which was also
146 D. VAN LENTE
responsible for the BB, this was a curious mistake for the BB to make—
and not the last one. The minister, by the way, had approved both the
UVV’s plan and that of the FVVH.
The UVV’s One-in-Five programme was at first directed towards
the four large cities in the West: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague
and Utrecht. The mayors of those cities were to determine when and
where the instruction meetings would be held. The three-part course was
devoted entirely to protection in the case of nuclear war, and all women
in these cities would be invited. The FVVH set up a rather different
programme. It consisted of a much more loosely structured course about
all kinds of accidents that could happen in and around the house (‘Safety
in the home’). Protection against radiation was only one part of the
programme. The course was meant for members of the organisations that
belonged to FVVH.
When the board of the FVVH discussed its plans with the two UVV
ladies, the latter criticised the looseness of the FVVH course and said that
they had already been invited by mayors of other cities, besides those of
the four large ones. They were very displeased that the FVVH was setting
up a programme of its own. But when the FVVH consulted its member
organisations, several of them showed strong resistance against the UVV’s
approach. They rejected being at the beck and call of the mayors, or of
the BB. One woman argued that having completed a course to become
an instructor, no mayor could keep her from teaching the members of
her organisation. Another said that the members of her organisation did
not want to deal with emergencies relating to nuclear war only.25 And the
secretary of the Liberal Protestant Women’s Federation wrote to the BB
that several women in her organisation were anti-militarist, and therefore
rejected cooperation with the BB.26
Clearly, One-in-Five was much more in line with the BB’s purposes
than the FVVH’s plan. Like the BB (and like its British example, the
WVS), the UVV tried to convince women that a nuclear war was not
likely to destroy the whole country, and that preparing for an attack
strengthened the defensive stance of the country. It also argued that the
population’s attitude towards the BB should be bent in a more positive
direction.27 The Minister of the Interior supported the UVV. He wrote
to the FVVH that instruction meetings should be organised only upon
the request of the mayor, and that the FVVH did not hold a monopoly
on this activity.28
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Both the UVV and the FVVH seem to have realised that in order to
be successful, they should keep their distance from the BB, as that organ-
isation was unpopular with the wider population. For example, when
the BB proposed providing the FVVH with pre-printed meeting invi-
tations which also contained BB slogans, the FVVH replied that they
preferred other means of reaching their members. Aversion to the BB
was expressed frequently in meetings. It must have been aggravated when
BB made another tactical mistake: it distributed its brochure ‘Sugges-
tions for protecting your family and yourself’ (September 1961) without
consulting, or even informing, the women’s organisations.
In 1960, the two organisations managed to reach a compromise and
created one programme, which was rather similar to the One-in-Five plan.
The FVVH would coordinate the project. Two years later, the FVVH
had managed to recruit and train 1,600 volunteer instructors.29 The
campaign proceeded smoothly and was rather successful. The wives of
mayors played an important role in propagating the meetings. Instructors
often reported the lively interest of their audiences and requests from
several organisations to organise courses for their employees.30 The ‘Sug-
gestions’ brochure led to a short boom in requests for meetings, but
the ridicule of the BB that followed must have harmed the demand for
courses too. There was another brief increase of interest in 1965, when
the FVVH organised meetings following a course on television about acci-
dents at home (not specifically nuclear war). 4,577 women participated.
But in January 1966, fatigue set in. One of the main organisers said that
most people did not want to hear about war, and that she had become
averse to giving courses. Many women said they felt the same way.31 By
that time, 43 municipalities had attained the target of reaching one-in-
five women. Most of these were in the countryside. In the cities, interest
was much lower (for variations in the urban–rural divide in Britain and
Sweden, see the chapter by Cronqvist and Grant in this volume). Overall,
only 12% of the number aimed for was reached. Still, 88,594 women had
taken the FVVH’s course.32
In 1965, the government learned from a preliminary survey that, for
many people, creating a shelter in their homes was more difficult than had
been assumed. It was decided to investigate precisely how many shelters
actually existed (Van der Boom 2000: 157–167). The FVVH was asked
in 1966 to suspend its courses until the results were known. This took
several years. The Minister of the Interior asked the FVVH to maintain
its corps of volunteers in the meantime, so that they could pick up their
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activities as soon as the government knew more about the shelter situ-
ation in the Netherlands. The FVVH responded by organising regular
meetings for its instructors, with invited speakers who discussed the latest
developments in international politics.33 When the survey was finally
completed in 1971, the minister informed the FVVH that its courses were
no longer needed, but that he would appreciate the organisation staying
on standby.34
Conclusions
It is evident that the FVVH worked much more effectively towards
preparing the population for nuclear attack than the BB. Hundreds of
women volunteered to become instructors; they often reported successful
and well-attended meetings, and were invited to give presentations by
several organisations. Although they did not meet the ‘one-in-five’ target,
they did reach a large number of Dutch women. That the FVVH and
the UVV managed to overcome fundamental differences in approach and
worked out an effective programme together was another indication of
their creativity and tenacity. Even when the BB decided to discontinue
the courses in 1966, the FVVH kept its corps of instructors up to date
on international affairs and the risks of nuclear war, so that they would
be well prepared in case the government requested their assistance again.
All of this scores very favourably when compared to the failed recruit-
ment efforts of the BB, the sluggish participation of members in their
exercises and the public relations disaster of the ‘Suggestions’ folder. The
FVVH could probably have been even more successful if the BB had
not operated so clumsily, first overlooking the government-supported
initiative of another organisation, and then publishing and distributing
a brochure without consulting the women’s organisations first. Its bad
reputation must have made the work of the women more difficult, which
is why they kept their distance from the BB.
The relative success of the FVVH can be attributed partly to its solid
philosophy, as expounded by Tjeenk Willink, Haasse and Le Rütte, that
fostered a conviction that the BB lacked. It was an elaboration of the
‘maternalist ideology’ of the first feminist wave, made more urgent by
the threat of nuclear war. It received broad recognition, for example
through professor Buytendijk’s widely read book, and it inspired women
to provide crucial services at the beginning and the end of the war and
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during the 1953 flood. Another factor was that the FVVH was a grass-
roots organisation. A sociological survey carried out in 1962 showed
that most Dutch people felt they had no influence on political deci-
sion making, and that in international affairs, the Netherlands was simply
powerless. The debacle with the ‘Suggestions’ brochure in 1961 must
have reinforced this scepticism towards the state (Valkenburgh 1964: 208,
229–231, 239).35 Given such a lack of confidence in state authorities, an
organisation such as the FVVH, run by women throughout the country,
which had proven its competence and organisational power, could much
more easily recruit volunteers and keep them engaged. The same survey
showed that women tended to be more nationalistic than men and more
supportive of military defence, which can be interpreted as indicating their
willingness to serve their compatriots in times of a national emergency
(Valkenburgh 1964: 239).36 And finally, as was the case in West Germany
(see the chapter by Molitor in this volume), including preparations for a
nuclear war in a range of first-aid activities around the house made it
much less controversial than, say, shelter building.
Several features of Jasanoff’s description of sociotechnical imaginaries
clarify this analysis. First, contestation was a conspicuous aspect of the
development of civil defence imaginaries (Jasanoff 2015b: 323). All
conceptions of civil defence had to be articulated in the face of fierce crit-
icism and scorn, which was basically similar, though not equally intense,
in all countries examined in this book. We can add that very different
practices could be legitimated with the same maternalist imaginary: not
only participation in civil defence, but antinuclear activism and rejection
of civil defence as well. Second, the women’s organisations performed
and enacted this imaginary, rather than proclaiming and expounding it
in articles, books or other documents. Theirs was ‘a continually rearticu-
lated awareness of order in social life and a resulting commitment to that
order’s coherence and continuity’ (Jasanoff 2015a: 26). To be sure, this
awareness was conceptually well-grounded, and expounded in the work
of well-known authors such as Haasse and Buytendijk. It had also proven
its practical efficacy. But in spite of all this, the women volunteers failed
to undermine the dominant paternalist imaginary embodied in the BB.
Jasanoff writes that a new imaginary can only assert itself if ‘an imagined
new order draws on deeper notions of how societies ought to fit together’,
or when they ‘fall in line with the way things are remembered as being’
(Jasanoff 2015b: 339). Neither was the case in the Netherlands until in
the late 1960s. Only then did the so-called second feminist wave launch
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its attack against the paternalism that was so deeply ingrained in society.
This illustrates how entrenched ‘infrastructures’ of thought and feeling—
in this case gender conceptions and (dis)trust of government—profoundly
co-determine sociotechnical imaginaries.
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Notes
1. My description of the Dutch civil defence organisation relies
heavily on Van der Boom (2000).
2. After 1962, the NIPO stopped regularly asking this question,
which indicates a degree of relaxation. But fears could flare up.
After the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, about
half the population believed that war had become more likely, while
about 30% said this likelihood had not changed (NIPO report, no.
1229, 12 September 1968). The exact date of the polls matters a
lot, as is clear from the data on 1950 (shortly after the start of the
Korean war) and 1962: the first poll was taken during tensions
around Berlin, but before the Cuban missile crisis started, the
second when the crisis was resolved. The date for 1953 is diffi-
cult to read. Additional data and analysis in Van Lente (2012). My
findings contradict those of Van der Boom (2000: 27, 56, 105)
and others who state that the Dutch population only really began
to worry about nuclear war from about 1955.
3. Panorama 8, November 1946. Based on Life magazine, 20 August
1945 and 19 November 1945.
4. E.g. Volkskrant, 5 October 1948, Overijssels Dagblad, 9 October
1948, Gooi-en Eemlander, 13 December 1948, Volkskrant, 24
September 1949. Bradley criticised: Volkskrant 14 May 1949.
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5. A sample: De Tijd, 19 July 1955, Volkskrant, 9 July 1955,
Leeuwarder Courant, 30 June 1955, Trouw, 29 June 1955, Vrije
Volk, 29 June 1955. Wykeham-Barnes quoted in Het Vrije Volk,
29 June 1955. ‘Atom bombs’ on the Netherlands: Trouw, 25 June
1955.
6. That this was the opinion of most Dutch people was often stated in
newspapers, without empirical support: it was an ‘everyone knows’
type of statement, e.g. Algemeen Handelsblad, 31 July 1965.
7. Internationaal Archief voor de Vrouwenbeweging (IAV) in Atria
(hereafter: Atria), Archief FVVH, inv. no. 129, L. Tielenius
Kruythoff, responsible for recruitment of volunteers, in an explana-
tion about ‘More women in the B.B.’ (‘Meer vrouwen in de B.B.’),
November 1957.
8. E.g. Het Vrije Volk, 16 February 1962.
9. Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, 28 May 1968.
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CHAPTER 7
Ruins of Resilience: Imaginaries
and Materiality Imagineered and Embedded
in Civil Defence Architecture
Rosanna Farbøl
In April 1951, Director General of the Danish Civil Defence Directorate
(DCDD) Arthur Dahl went on a study trip to the UK. During the
course of his stay, he visited the British Civil Defence technical school
at Eastwood Park, near Bristol, where he was particularly thrilled by a
unique feature: a village that looked like it had been destroyed by atomic
bombs. There were bombed-out houses, streets blocked by debris, a
crashed airplane and an overturned truck. In these authentic surround-
ings, civil defenders were trained in basic rescue, firefighting, debris
clearance, handling of gases and first aid.1 The debris and rubble of this
ruined village gave ‘mass and solidity’ (Jasanoff 2015b: 322) to the imag-
inary and dystopian war civil defence prepared for. Upon his return to
Denmark, Dahl declared that a similar facility, a town of and in ruins, was
‘absolutely necessary’ in Denmark, at least in the capital, Copenhagen, to
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improve the education of civil defence instructors.2 Realistic ruins were
needed to make the instructors capable of performing their vital skills
under the direst circumstances, a nuclear war. In this Cold War vision,
ruins were key to resilience and national survival.
From the outset of the Cold War, it was generally recognised that in
the next war civilians and not just military installations would be targets of
atomic bombs. Cities were considered particularly vulnerable. In conse-
quence, the Danish welfare state sought to protect its citizens through a
system of civil defence and emergency planning—in return, of course, for
the loyal collaboration of the citizens and on the assumption that the
citizens themselves contributed to basic civil defence (Bjørnsson et al.
2020). Undoubtedly, the nuclear condition placed this social contract
under stress; particularly with the advent of the H bomb, the state was,
in fact, unable to offer total protection from total nuclear war. Still, the
ruins could demonstrate to civil defenders and ordinary citizens alike how
plans for protecting the population in the imagined aftermath of a war
were real: they were based on the material realities of built structures of
everyday environments.
Drawing on ruinology literature3 and on scholarship associated with
New Materialism, this chapter focuses on the ruin as both physical
form and representation in the analysis of the Danish civil defence’s
preparation, performance and imagination of a Third World War. The
chapter contends that the ruin ‘imagineered’ (Monteyne 2011) a stage for
enacting and performing a future war, whereby the merely imagined was
given a concrete, tangible expression. The ruin town added materiality,
spatiality, realism and presence to what was largely speculative, discursive
and imaginary.
This chapter sketches the transnational extension of the British model
ruin to Denmark and examines how the ruin town travelled to a new
national context and was appropriated to local needs (and restraints).
In Denmark, the ruin town embedded a sociotechnical imaginary that
emphasised resilience, survival and regeneration, where welfare triumphed
over warfare. Then, disrupting the ostensible linearity in the ‘life cycles’ of
sociotechnical imaginaries (see the Introduction to this book), the chapter
demonstrates that the ruin town was re-extended all over the country
through a standardisation of ruins that fostered homogeneity and unifor-
mity to become part of the common Danish civil defence landscape, while
simultaneously serving to re-embed the imaginary in local contexts. The
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chapter, finally, discusses whether these ruin towns contributed to an affir-
mation of social norms and values, arguing that they, in fact, caused a
‘taming’ (Clark 1999) of the nuclear catastrophe, as well as reflecting and
reinforcing a specific political and historically situated understanding of
social order and the ‘good society’.
Ruins and Catastrophe Imagineered
The ruin is an ambiguous structure that can signal both the loss and the
endurance of the past. As physical structure and representational form,
the ruin complicates intellectual dialectics between absence and presence,
fragment and whole, universal and specific, utopia and dystopia. Gazing
at ruins, we not only see the actual structure but also draw on a trans-
historical iconography of decay and catastrophe, a ‘vast visual archive of
ruination’ (Hell and Schörle 2010: 1). Though ruins are usually seen as
tokens of darkness, death and degeneration, they are also associated with
romanticism, gothic tales and the sublime, and taken as heralds of hope,
new beginnings and the ability of humans to shape the future (Edensor
2005; Eshel 2010). The Cold War ruin town must be understood as
embodying both: it represents abyss and redemption, obliteration and
resilience. It offered a spectacular stage for the ‘performative dimensions
of society’s self-reproduction’ (Jasanoff 2015a: 5), a stage for enacting,
or, we might say, pre-enacting (Sylvest 2021), the ability of society to
overcome the war and extend existing ways of life into a postwar future.
In 1984, Derrida famously stated that nuclear war was ‘fabulously
textual’ (Derrida 1984: 23): it depended on structures of information
and communication because a nuclear war had not taken place. It was,
and still is, a non-event (the atomic bombs over Japan in August 1945
ended a conventional war, but they did not spark a nuclear one). The ruin
town, however, gave the fiction of war a materiality, a presence beyond
discourse. Architectural historian David Monteyne has coined the phrase
‘imagineering’ to describe the merging of concrete, tangible engineering
and architecture with fantasy and imagination (Monteyne 2004, 2011).
The ruin town is an often overlooked yet striking example of the apoca-
lyptic city imagineered. It represented the ordinary, everyday townscape
rendered into a violent, catastrophic urban battlefield. These civil defence
environments made it possible to rehearse and enact the imaginary war
in realistic, palpable settings and provided immediate physical as well as
sensual access to experiences that seemed to defy representation.
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The construction of ruins was a way of mitigating disaster. The ruin
town signalled a belief that material structures, the built environment
and technical skills could offer protection (Deville et al. 2014), while it
also in itself constituted a materialisation of the conception of risk. It
is important to keep in mind that it is not just the material structure
as such that matters but the co-production (Jasanoff 2015a, b) of the
ruin and the ideas, fears and ambitions that turn imaginaries into prac-
tice and comes to constitute a social reality. The townscapes were, on
the one hand, a result of the imagination of civil defence officials and
technicians: they literally set in stone the official civil defence sociotech-
nical imaginary of what a future war would look like and how it could be
prepared for based on the capabilities of the organisation. On the other
hand, it in turn came to define and structure the imagination, fostering a
certain inertia and immutability.
In highlighting the material powers of the ruin towns, I am inspired by
approaches of New Materialism that attempt to overcome ‘the enduring
separation between thing and meaning, concrete and abstract, physical
and mental’ (Ireland and Lydon 2016: 2) by shifting analytical focus
from what things mean to what they do. These insights are useful to
substantiate and operationalise Jasanoff’s notion of materiality, which
often appears simply to mean technology (Jasanoff 2015a: 8, 20, 22;
2015b: 324). The concept of ‘the material’ in this chapter refers in
an intentionally ambiguous manner to both the material substances
(the built structures and infrastructures of the ruin town) and ‘the
palpable power effects flowing from the strategic arrangement of mate-
rial objects’ (Frohman 2011). Like shelters or scale models, ruin towns
not only reflected risk but also produced, performed and transformed
risk and preparedness by materialising statements of the plausibility of
war and concretising the idea of state-led preparedness and protection
(Deville et al. 2014; Puff 2010). The buildings not only framed but also
structured the anticipated event. Ironically (but following the logic of
co-production), in the attempt to provide technological solutions for an
attack feared likely or even inevitable, the architects of the ruin town
contributed (psychologically) to the very construction of the probability
or inevitability of this event.
The architect Eyal Weizman suggests that ‘the ruin has an ‘architec-
ture’ in which controversial events and political processes are reflected and
from which they might be reconstructed and analysed’ (Weizman 2011:
111). While Weizman is concerned with the authentic ruins of Gaza, his
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approach of ‘forensic architecture’ (Weizman 2012) can be employed in
the study of the artificial ruin town because it is not just an illustration of
(anticipated) violence but a source of knowledge about historical tensions,
social norms, expectations and fears. As an embedding of a sociotech-
nical imaginary, it is not innocent but must be understood in a specific
historical, social and political context that simultaneously shaped and was
shaped by rationalities, behaviours and imaginations of future (and past)
war(s).
I have combined these theoretical approaches with original field inves-
tigations in a selection of ruin towns still in existence (and use) in
Denmark. I have analysed and compared the ruins, interiors and exteriors,
as well as the spaces between the ruins, the infrastructures and general
townscapes. I have consulted the Danish National Archives, local archives
and municipal building construction archives to track down blueprints,
situation plans, and technical and statistical calculations, as well as corre-
spondence between the DCDD, local civil defence, contractors, architects
and engineers. Finally, I have employed a wide array of national and
regional newspapers in order to examine the impact of the ruins on
national and local communities and identities.
Getting to Denmark
A couple of months after Arthur Dahl had returned home from his visit
to the UK, he sent the DCDD’s preferred architect F. Grut and Brigadier
Chief O. P. Petersen to inspect the technical school at Eastwood Park
with the aim of establishing a similar structure in Denmark. They were
received by architect Lewis E. Trevers, Home Office Consultant for tech-
nical schools. Trevers suggested that a Danish training ground be initially
constructed as a set of few buildings with multiple purposes instead of
multiple, single-purpose buildings like Eastwood Park. This would reduce
the estimated costs to around DKK 300,000–400,000. According to
Trevers, the total construction costs of Eastwood Park had been approxi-
mately DKK 1,200,000.4 A gradual expansion could then take place every
year with financial allocations on the national budget.
Both Grut and Petersen made reports following their visit, which make
it possible to trace their journey and impressions. Clearly amazed by the
facility, Petersen described how training was conducted in the village and
specified which civil defence functions (including rescue, work in confined
spaces, reinforcing buildings) each of the buildings served.5 Grut’s report
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was more technical in nature. Focused on the professional construction
of realistic ruins, he detailed how the more or less undamaged part of a
building was constructed in an ordinary fashion. Then, debris was added
based on a combination of empirical knowledge and technical calcu-
lations. Grut made an apt observation when he remarked that ‘[t]he
planning of the construction as a whole, moreover, demands a not incon-
siderable display of imagination in order to obtain as realistic an effect
as possible’.6 Back in Denmark, architect Grut set to work designing a
training ground based on his notes, photographs and sketches. However,
a lack of funding meant that Dahl and Grut’s ambitious plans for a ruin
town near Copenhagen were shelved. The idea, nevertheless, was realised
elsewhere, where there were fewer bureaucratic restraints on the display
of creativity.
At the civil defence barracks in Tinglev, a village in the countryside
of Southern Jutland (about as far from Copenhagen as possible), section
leader K. M. Nielsen set about acquiring a bombed-out village—or ruin
town as it became quickly known—for the training of his detachment
of the South Jutland mobile column.7 With assistance from platoon
leader (and architect by training) L. Weisdorf, a blueprint was drawn up
(Fig. 7.1).
The ruins were built between 1952 and 1955 by conscript personnel
in their spare time using only free materials from houses designated for
demolition in the vicinity.8 Initially, the ruin town contained four blocks
of houses consisting of six one- to two-storey houses, including a shop
and a church-like tower, as well as some wooden sheds. The houses
were located around a main street (Storegade), a parallel street called Fire
Avenue (Brandallé) and two smaller streets across. As a whole, it repre-
sented a fragment of an urban environment. More buildings were soon
built, including a three-storey factory, and a short stretch of railway tracks
was added as well. As it turned out, the approach was not unlike the one
Trevers had originally suggested. The streets were blocked by rubble and
debris, as well as crashed cars, buses and trams.9 Telephone poles, sewers,
electricity and gas were installed, so personnel would also have to take
this utility infrastructure (or, rather, broken infrastructure) into account
during the exercises. The recruits would face burning houses, smoke or
gas-filled basements, and there would be live casualties to be rescued from
the buildings. A loudspeaker installation was used to make sound effects,
such as of air raids.10 The exercises often took place after sunset, and the
scene was set for an inferno: a town ravaged by firestorms and reduced to
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Fig. 7.1 Plan of Tinglev
(Original plan of Tinglev as envisioned by K. M. Nielsen and L. Weisdorf. The
factory looks out over Main Street (Storegade), which is outlined by houses in
various stages of ruination. To the North-East is an area of concrete debris that
were used for practising how to run with stretchers and victims across impassable
terrain. Printed with permission from S. Weisdorf)
ruins, the screams of victims filling the night. Training in the ruin town
was a corporeal and sensory experience as well as a practical one.
According to Arthur Dahl’s successor as director of the DCDD, Erik
Schultz, Tinglev ruin town was not perfect from an educational perspec-
tive because it was constructed on an ad hoc basis instead of according
to Grut’s original master plan. Still, it was functional and, significantly,
cheap. Schultz estimated the costs at a few thousand DKK, though he
stressed that, in effect, it was worth far more.11 The cost efficiency was
also noted smugly in a newspaper article in Horsens Social-Demokrat,
which compared Tinglev to the British prototype. Exaggerating a good
deal, the paper asserted that they were ‘similar in size and construction’.12
Tinglev ruin town quickly became a national source of pride. An article in
the national newspaper Jyllands-Posten described it as ‘an outdoor school
room, where it is possible to create all the situations that will arise if
the destruction of a war hits the civilian population in an urban area’,13
revealing an expectation that due to the ruin town, the future had become
knowable and possible to prepare for: this was what war would look like
in Denmark.
Danish newspapers celebrated Tinglev as unique (on the European
continent) and revelled in the fact that visitors came from all over the
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country and abroad on civil defence study trips. The guests were most
often from Scandinavia, but also from the other Nordic countries, as
well as Germany and the UK. More exotic visitors included Saudi and
Thai delegations.14 The ruin town quickly grew to be the largest training
ground in Northern Europe—and, at the time of writing, it still is—and
the narrative changed from Tinglev being modelled on Eastwood Park to
Tinglev being a template for others.
The success of the ruin town must account for the fact that Tinglev
was chosen to become the (only Danish) Civil Defence Technical School
in 1956. Instead of being a training ground for the local mobile section,
Tinglev was now a national school where conscripts and volunteers from
all over Denmark came for technical education and practical training. That
meant considerable development and extension of the main building as
well as the ruin town. Though initially sidelined, the DCDD now took
charge. Architect Grut was called upon to do the work, and it appears
likely that some of his original drawings may have been put to use.15
Building the Perfect Ruins
During the 1960s, ruin towns mushroomed all over the country. A
revision of the Danish Civil Defence Act in 1962 introduced conscript
personnel to local civil defence in provincial towns, something local
authorities had long called for due to problems attracting sufficient
numbers of volunteers. With the sudden influx of large numbers of
conscripts, a need arose for better educational facilities locally. In 1962,
the DCDD decided to spend initially DKK 1.9 million on building ruin
towns. Six larger provincial towns were selected as the first to receive
funding for ruin building: Aalborg, Randers, Holstebro, Esbjerg, Århus
and Odense.16 Just a decade later, there were 26 ruin towns spread across
the seven Danish civil defence regions.17 It is not without irony that at
the same time as geopolitical détente thawed the Cold War climate inter-
nationally, the imaginary war materialised in earnest as an urban reality in
Denmark.18
Local authorities perceived ruin towns as vital to civil defence training
and were eager to start building their own. The four towns of Kolding,
Vejle, Fredericia and Middelfart decided as early as 1961/62 to join forces
to build a common ruin town despite receiving no financial assistance
from the DCDD (CF-samvirket Gudsø 1987). The importance and value
of ruin towns seem to have been shared more generally by the local
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communities. When a town started building their own ruins, local news-
papers celebrated the event. It was clearly a matter of great prestige and
identity, as if the risk of becoming a target of the enemy’s assault marked
the town as particularly important. On 22 May 1966, the local paper
Vendsyssel Tidende proudly reported that the ruin town that was being
built in Hvims, Northern Jutland, ‘can already demonstrate significant
achievements even though it is only half-finished’, and that local civil
defence had ‘already benefited greatly’ from it.19
The ruin towns were all centred on the so-called standard ruin
(Fig. 7.2). It was the perfect ruin. First, it was realistic in two ways: it
Fig. 7.2 DCDD blueprint of standard ruin, 1.16 Structures B and C,
perspective
(Structure B imitated a relatively unharmed building with an intact ground floor,
partly damaged first floor and attic. C was a heavily damaged building, where it
was just possible to discern the structure of walls at ground floor; the above floors
were completely damaged. In addition, there was an undamaged basement. In
order to protect the interior from bad weather, a flat roof construction covered
the building. The pile of rubble in front of the houses was the “remains” of
a completely ruined building A. Source Aalborg Kommune Byggesagsarkiv C-
18316 1965)
166 R. FARBØL
looked like a real ruin, and it resembled common Danish townhouses.
Second, it was safe: the training would not become too realistic as a result
of actual collapse. Third, it was created with the essential civil defence
tasks in mind. The standard ruin consisted of five buildings, named A–E,
which represented the remains of five originally neighbouring houses in
various stages of ruination.20 (Figs. 7.3 and 7.4).
The buildings embodied different types of collapse as described in the
Basic rescue textbook (Civilforsvarsstyrelsen 1965), fitting them for use
in civil defence exercises for different types of rescue operations. The
textbook did not differentiate between damage caused by conventional
or nuclear bombs (Civilforsvarsstyrelsen 1965: 58). The rationale was
that the main difference between the two concerned the extent of the
damage and only to some degree the character of rescue tasks. The latter
mainly referred to the location of potential victims, as they would not
primarily be located in basements but on all storeys, because modern
weapons technology (rockets and short warning times) meant that people
would have little time to seek shelter (Civilforsvarsstyrelsen 1965: 58).
The corresponding textbook about firefighting likewise operated with
few distinctions between a conventional and a nuclear attack and drew
heavily on the experiences of the Second World War (particularly the fire
storms in German cities). The book noted that the nuclear attacks on
Japan caused similar fire phenomena, and therefore, conflagrations would
likely occur no matter what kinds of weapons were used in a future war
(Civilforsvarsstyrelsen 1971: 71).
The standard ruin was built according to a fixed set of architectural
blueprints developed by the DCDD. This made it possible to re-create
the ruins almost identically everywhere, and the ruins became in a sense
trans-spatial. In order to receive financial assistance for the construction
of a ruin town, local civil defence had to use the official blueprints for
the standard ruin. This ensured a standardisation of ruin building and a
uniformity and homogeneity of ruins across Denmark. To make a proper
ruin town, however, the standard ruin would be supplemented with other
ruined buildings.
The Danish ruin towns were emulating ‘X-town’ (X-købing), a fictive
but generic and conventional market town that regularly suffered attack
in civil defence war games, films and planning material. Built structures
typical of Danish provincial towns and common street names made the
townscapes familiar and recognisable, yet not specific enough to be iden-
tifiable as one particular town. The exercises in the ruin towns were meant
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Fig. 7.3 DCDD blueprint of the standard ruin, 1.3, structures A-E, main
façade and section
(The brick work was made with cracks to create an authentic look, but only
on the surface as the buildings were of course not meant to actually break
down. Live or mock victims would be placed in the basements and upper storeys
beneath piles of debris, rubbles and crashed ceilings, from where they could be
rescued, either lowered or hoisted on stretchers. Walls had to be penetrated,
tunnels dug through debris, crashed floors removed and unstable walls braced
to locate and rescue victims. In addition, the ruin could also serve as training
ground for work in confined spaces, as well as practising the use of gas masks
and cutting off gas, water and electricity. Zinc gutters were placed at windowsills
in order to light fires or create smoke in the buildings (in a similar way to
how it was done in Eastwood Park), but only specially designated houses, called
fire houses, were actually set on fire. The standard ruin was even furnished in
to make it more authentic. Chandeliers and wardrobes moreover also served as
markers for orientation in dark or smoke-filled rooms. Source Aarhus Kommune
Byggesagsarkiv Byggesag 65–79)
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Fig. 7.4 DCDD blueprint of the standard ruin details from structures C
and D
(Details from structures C and D. Detail drawings meticulously noted where and
how debris, crashed ceilings and floors as well as furniture should be placed in
order to ensure safety as well as facilitating different training tasks. Source Aarhus
Kommune Byggesagsarkiv Byggesag 65–79)
to hit close to home for all civil defenders and encourage a sense of
responsibility: this could be their hometown… in ruins. Leader of Hvims
ruin town, J. C. Kristensen, told a local newspaper in 1966 that the
ruin town had given his men a better understanding of the necessity of
the training and made them more enthusiastic.21 It confirmed the value
of their work, reinforced the credibility of civil defence and strength-
ened the personnel’s collective identity as humanitarians. In this way,
the ruin towns contributed to processes of embedding the civil defence
sociotechnical imaginary in local communities.
The scale and extent of ruin towns varied across the country, which
may reflect different local attitudes towards civil defence, as well as
different financial situations. Some ruin towns were small and modest.
In Odense on the island of Funen, the standard ruin remained solitary
until supplemented during the 1970s by two other buildings.22 Other
ruin towns quickly outgrew their humble origins. At Kirstinesminde, just
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north of Aarhus in Eastern Jutland, several streets and a dozen groups of
buildings, including two fire houses and two fire ruins, were constructed.
In 1976, a so-called ‘corner building’ was planned and built.23 It was
based on blueprints from similar buildings in Esbjerg and Aalborg, which
testifies to a translocal circulation of ideas and materialities.
The corner building was a modern type of multistorey housing block
built in aerated concrete. In the 1970s, this kind of built structure had
begun to replace the traditional Danish brick house as the preferred
building type, and it collapsed in entirely different ways, hence creating a
need for updated ruins. Though this development occasioned the inclu-
sion of a new building design, the scenarios and the training changed
little.
Performing and Taming Nuclear Catastrophe
According to the instigator of Tinglev, K. M. Nielsen, the ruin town was
‘a training ground where the personnel could receive education in basic
rescue in as realistic conditions as possible so that no task in actual condi-
tions would appear unfamiliar to them’.24 The quote reveals a utopian
belief that all scenarios could be predicted, planned, prepared for and
performed. War, whether nuclear or conventional, could be pre-enacted—
not re-enacted, as it had not yet occurred—and rehearsed in authentic
environments.
The ruin town was not meant to simulate ground zero, zone A, of a
bombed town, but rather zones B and C further out. Not a metropolis,
nor a village, the ruin town represented an intersection between the
doom of the urban ground zeros and rural safety. The building structures
had suffered heavy damage, but they were not completely obliterated.
There were casualties but also many survivors to be rescued. In short:
catastrophic but not apocalyptic.
The tasks that were practised in the ruin towns were mainly basic rescue
and first aid, firefighting and debris clearance: tasks that would be diffi-
cult—if not impossible—to carry out if an area had been contaminated
by radioactivity.25 In 1966, Tinglev started to offer tactical courses on
protection against weapons of mass destruction (in Denmark called ABC
weapons: atomic, biological and chemical), and in the 1970s, simulated
nuclear bombs were exploded as part of the course.26 Yet practical civil
defence exercises in the ruin towns seem to have been mainly based on
scenarios of conventional attacks.27 Horrifying as these may have been,
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the lack of explicitly nuclear conditions is remarkable, not least given
the increasing public attention to the dangers of radioactivity, particularly
after the US H-bomb tests on the Bikini Atoll in 1954.
During the 1980s, there was a renewed focus on nuclear and chemical
weapons in both Danish public debate and the civil defence organ-
isation. A special Atomic Chemical Officer course was established in
1983, and the practical courses at Tinglev included instruction in how
to wear protective clothing, use dosimeters and other measuring equip-
ment, and how to cleanse after exposure to radioactivity.28 The exercises
also include scenarios of radioactive contamination.29 However, the main
focus continued to be firefighting and rescue, and the textbooks from the
1960s were still in use. The pragmatic reasoning within the organisation
was that close to an urban ground zero in a thermonuclear attack, there
would be nothing they could do, and thus no point in training for it.
Furthermore, such an attack would leave few survivors and thus, para-
doxically, less work for the civil defence (mass burials of the dead were
not a civil defence task). In contrast, the conventional scenarios would
demand a huge effort on the part of the civil defenders.
Following this line of reasoning, the original core activities of putting
out fires and rescuing people from buildings and shelters would be similar
after either a nuclear or a conventional attack, even if the circumstances
were not.30 Training for nuclear war simply added the extra dimension
of being attentive to levels of radiation and getting out when these levels
constituted a lethal danger to personnel, a challenge each individual civil
defender was thought capable of dealing with. Whether a pragmatic and
rational approach or a form of nuclear ‘psychic numbing’ (Lifton 1982),
the attitude attuned the perception of personnel to the threat and how
to live with it. Nuclear war was effectively normalised as just another war
scenario that could be prepared for in the same way as non-nuclear war,
and civil defence work was rationalised as functional, useful and important
no matter the circumstances (see also Hogg this volume). By defining and
explicating the threat, the materiality of the ruins rendered alternative
scenarios invisible or insignificant, and the effect was the construction of
a consensus about danger, preparedness and resilience.
The ruin town can be seen as a stage for ‘performative occasions’
(Jasanoff 2015a:11): training and exercises were carefully planned and
orchestrated actions resulting—ideally—in familiarisation with the danger,
as expressed by Nielsen. After the Cold War, international historical
research often used theatre metaphors to describe civil defence (Davies
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2007). This comparison was not unfamiliar to the historical actors them-
selves, however. Architect Grut remarked in his report following the
study trip to Eastwood Park that the ruin town ‘to some degree resem-
bles a stage setting that must be constructed with a thorough sense of
realism’.31 By pre-enacting the future war in highly detailed and often
publicised spectacles of theatrically rehearsed destruction in the ruin
towns, the personnel were trained bodily, emotionally and mentally to
instil in them experiences and habits that could be mobilised in times
of crisis. Enacting the routines in the ruin town again and again can be
interpreted as transforming or ‘taming’ (Clark 1999) an unknown, incom-
prehensible and incalculable catastrophe, nuclear war, into a familiar and
manageable urban calamity, collapsed buildings and fires.
The ruin town offered a possibility of confronting the unknown and
unfathomable catastrophe, naming it, articulating it and thus disarming
it. Though scary and disturbing, the ruin towns were manageable places
of destruction. They were not spaces of despair or hopelessness. Rather,
they promised victory, hope and a new beginning in the postwar future.
Training and exercises among the ruins demonstrated that knowledge,
experience, strength and willpower (and the right technical equipment)
were all that was needed to sort out chaos and re-establish the prewar
social order. Far from being a radical utopian desire for a tabula rasa and
an urban renewal following a nuclear apocalypse (Monteyne 2011), the
ruin town can be seen as the (willed) triumph of everyday life in the
provincial town, and the desire to extend existing norms and ways of life
into the postwar situation.
The technoscientific imagineering of disaster potentially had social
effects beyond civil defence circles. The ruin towns were used as the
setting for civil defence propaganda films for a broader audience, and
they featured frequently in local and national newspapers. Through these
mediations, the ruin town subjected the war to public admiration (rather
than scrutiny).32 Without fail, the newspapers stressed the realism and
authenticity of ruin towns and took pride in how these environments
were (allegedly) capable of imitating the abysmal reality of nuclear war.33
The notion that local civil defence forces always managed to combat the
danger and rescue the (fictive) inhabitants was celebrated, for instance
by the local paper Vestkysten, which in 1962 ran the headline: ‘The effi-
ciency of Esbjerg Civil Defence proven by realistic exercise in Tinglev’.34
Even when a civil defence exercises actually demonstrated weaknesses or
172 R. FARBØL
flaws, the papers often managed to turn the narrative around to some-
thing positive. In 1975, the national paper Jyllands-Posten reported on
an exercise conducted by the national Civil Defence Corps. The paper
stressed that despite severe budget cuts for years, civil defence was still
capable of carrying out their tasks. There had been challenges for the
exercise, however, the paper lamented, specifically the conscripts’ lack of
enthusiasm, which was caused by their disapproval of the war scenario.
The conservative paper gave a thinly veiled critique of the indolence of
the youth and their lack of understanding the seriousness of the Commu-
nist threat, which caused them to rebel. Still, the paper reassured the
readers; in the end, the exercise was successful due to the untiring efforts
of the officers.35 The population could rest assured that rescue was indeed
possible, even likely—if, of course, they acted rationally and behaved
according to the instructions of the authorities.
The ruin town was ‘politics in matter’ (Weizman 2007); it staged
public rituals and technoscientific practices, repetitive performances of
statehood and democratic participation that formed an act of gover-
nance. The average Danish main street was cast as the target of the
enemy’s assault, but through rehearsing and pre-enacting, the state
demonstrated, embodied and manifested its promise to take care of its
citizens and re-establish social order. That particular social order was the
modernistic, functional welfare state. Welfare and civil defence ideologies
were alike in promoting the ideal of the rational, well-prepared citizen
of modern society (in this case, the educated civil defence personnel)
who contributed to the common good and survival of society by fighting
and controlling the threat posed by global and total war. Performing the
work in the ruin towns depended on everyone fulfilling their specific
and vital task in solidarity with and for the benefit of the larger whole,
which reflected a general understanding of society in Danish civil defence
in stressing the social norms of conscientiousness and community spirit
(Bjørnsson, Farbøl and Sylvest 2020). Acquainting civil defenders and
civilians alike with the mass death that loomed in the shadow of the mush-
room cloud, the ruin towns educated them in the right behaviour to avoid
panic (see also Bjørnsson 2020; Sylvest 2018).
Conclusions
This chapter has attempted to demonstrate how a study of ruin towns can
develop existing civil defence history by bringing an appreciation of the
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textured and spatialised, experiential and embodied nature of sociotech-
nical imaginaries. The framework of sociotechnical imaginaries attunes
us to both the central role of technology in civil defence and the co-
production of ideas and materialities, which is clearly exemplified by
the imagineering of the ruin town. However, this chapter also demon-
strates, first, an embedding-extension fuzziness and, second, that a deeper
understanding of materiality is necessary to understand the multiple and
complex ways that matter matters. Economic restraints impeded the real-
isation of the British-inspired grand design for a ruin town, yet the
idea and inspiration extended easily across borders. Danish civil defence
authorities were eager to import and replicate the British imaginary and
the technical know-how to materialise it. Whereas extension in Jasanoff’s
version seems to be a result of an assertion of power by the hegemonic
actor over the less powerful, whether this is desirable or not, here we
are clearly dealing with what we can call ‘extension by invitation’ (with
a rephrasing of Geir Lundestad’s famous title ‘Empire by invitation’
[1986]).
Instead of a British village, the ruin town took the shape of a Danish
provincial town; it was extended into a new national context and a
new architectural tradition. Here, however, the linearity of the phases
is broken, because this extension cannot be understood separately from
the simultaneous embedding of a particular civil defence sociotech-
nical imaginary that emphasised resilience, survival and regeneration,
where welfare triumphed over warfare. Through the trans-spatial struc-
ture of the standard ruin, the imaginary was then re-extended across the
Danish civil defence landscape as more than 20 provincial towns all over
Denmark built their own ruins of resilience during the 1960s and 1970s.
Centralised state planning and design resulted in nearly identical sites and
built structures with only minor variations created by local landscape,
finances and devotion to the cause of civil defence. Because of the recog-
nisability of the standard ruin and X-town, the re-extension was at the
same time a re-embedding of the imaginary in local contexts, settings,
minds and emotions. It was, then, no straightforward or linear process;
rather, the chapter shows embedding-extension to be a two-way process
that might be analysed separately but, in reality, was complex, messy and
impossible to disentangle.
To substantiate Jasanoff’s notions of materiality, I have sought inspira-
tion in ruinology and New Materialism, as well as employing methods of
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architectural analysis in addition to traditional historical methods. Archi-
tecture for civil defence was a medium for the imagination, design and
construction of spaces in preparation for a moment of ultimate crisis:
nuclear war (Monteyne 2011: xv), and the ruin town telescoped the
anticipated global nuclear war into the local environment, entwining
materiality and imaginaries. The standard ruin in particular and the ruin
town in general expose the threat perceptions of the imaginary war that
shaped the organisation of Danish civil defence. While the ruins reflected
civil defence’s preparation for what they were capable of acting on, the
material structures themselves also became agents of continuity. The war-
torn town in brick and concrete fostered a form of path dependency that
contributed to an inertia and sturdiness in the perception of the future
war and how it could be mitigated.
The ruin town’s main raison d’être was the (imitation of) realism
and authenticity, which made it possible to rehearse and pre-enact the
imagined future war. The civil defence exercises that took place among
the ruins attempted to foster a special—and spatial—idea of a Third
World War balancing between utopian salvation and dystopian oblitera-
tion. Unlike real ruins in war-torn cities, the ruin towns were predictable,
predesigned and predetermined, and they standardised an unknow-
able future. They made it possible to assert control over the thought
and behaviour of the users and spectators by conforming to coercive
programmes of use and preestablished ideologies to enforce a unity of
meaning and materiality (Wood 1993), but they also structured and set
the limits of imagination, which testifies to the solidity as well as agency
of things.
In effect, the ruin town contributed to a taming of the unknown and
unknowable catastrophe. It demonstrates the ‘blurred the lines between
real and imagined realities’ (Jasanoff 2015a: 5); the ‘real’ reality of insur-
mountable destruction by thermonuclear warfare was tamed through a
collective desire for logic and order to produce an imagined reality of a
manageable urban calamity and an authoritative but normative represen-
tation of how the war ought to and would play out—and namely, how it
was eventually managed and overcome.
The ruin town gave shape, mass and solidity to the imagined nuclear
catastrophe, to the horror, danger, darkness, agony and fatalities asso-
ciated with it. Yet it did not present the end of the world as it was
known. Far from an ‘architecture of disillusion’ (Vidler 2010), the ruins,
rather, suggested the resilience and eventual triumph of the welfare state
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and existing social order and norms in a postwar world. It thus reflected
and reinforced a specific, historically situated sociotechnical imaginary in
which the ‘good society’ was protected from the ultimate social, political
and environmental chaos, the nuclear war.
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undertegnede og arkitekt Gruts rejse til England…’, 1951.
2. Vestjyden ‘“Civilforsvarets leder hjem fra England efter at have
studeret instruktørskole’, 21 April 1951, 6.
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BRS Tinglev, files ‘Ruinanlæg’, Notes about the ruin town ‘Ruin-
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Tinglev, files ‘Diverse’ M. Hedges, ‘Denmark’s system of mobile
columns’, The Municipal Journal, 25 September 1959; Vestkysten
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7; Ekstra-Bladet, 21 December 1961 ‘Han byggede en ruinby’.
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described by the later director general of the DCDD as basically
a ‘one man job’, Rigsarkivet (henceforth RA), Beredskabsstyrelsen
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(henceforth BS), Landsarkivet for Sønderjylland (henceforth LS)
ME/-879 Teknisk skole, Skolebefalinger, April 1961.
8. BRS Tinglev, ‘Ruinbyen i Tinglev’, 1955.
9. See blueprint in BRS Tinglev, files ‘Ruinanlæg’ as well as descrip-
tion in ‘Ruinbyen i Tinglev’, 1955.
10. BRS Tinglev’Ruinbyen i Tinglev’, 1955; Horsens Social-Demokrat,
13 January 1959 ‘En uhyggelig ruinby, der ‘kun’ kostede 20.000
kr.’, 3.
11. RA ES Breve 62/Breve 1957–1958 Letter from Schultz to Abelin
dated 11 February 1958. Interestingly, Schultz sent Grut’s original
blueprints to his Swedish counterpart, but whether the plans were
realised in Sweden is not clear.
12. 13 January 1959, p. 3. Falfield had 22 buildings according to
Petersen’s report, compared to Tinglev’s six. The article also
exaggerated in claiming the price of Falfield was DKK 2 million
and Tinglev just DKK 10,000. See also Jydske Tidende (JT) 19
November 1955 ‘Ruinby i København efter tegninger fra Tinglev’,
9.
13. JP 9 March 1957 ‘Civilforsvaret får nu en teknisk skole i Tinglev’,
6.
14. Berlingske Tidende, 29 January 1962 ‘De lærer civilforsvar i sønder-
jysk ruinby’, 8; Herning Folkeblad (HF ), 2 October 1961 ‘Fra
Hamborg til Tinglev for at studere – ruiner’, 3; Horsens Social-
Demokrat, 13 January 1959; JP, 9 March 1957; JT , 19November
1955; Vestkysten, 9 February 1962 ‘Hele Esbjergs civilforsvar til
stor øvelse i ‘Ruinbyen’, 14; Vestkysten, 16 September 1969 ‘Tin-
glevs store ruinby giver inspiration til tre norske CF-ledere’,17;
Vestkysten, 21 January 1975 ‘Arabisk CF-general på besøg i
Tinglev’, 2; JT , 25 May 1968 ‘Nordisk kontakt i civilforsvaret’; JT ,
31 January 1975 ‘Saudi-arabere lærer civilforsvar’; JT , 28 October
1966 ‘Thailændere på CF-skolen’.
15. BRS Tinglev, file Ruinanlæg, blueprint and map from 1958;
Rigsarkivet (henceforth RA), Beredskabsstyrelsen (henceforth BS),
Landsarkivet for Sønderjylland (henceforth LS) ME/-879 Teknisk
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16. Civilforsvarsbladet 1963:10. Seks øvelsesanlæg sættes i gang, 15.
17. There were four facilities in CD region I (Northern Jutland),
including Rørdal, Hobro and Hvims (a cooperation between
the towns Skagen, Frederikshavn, Sæby, Hjørring and Hirtshals);
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Århus, Viborg, Herning; four in region III (Southern Jutland),
incl. Gudsø (cooperation between Vejle, Fredericia, Kolding and
Middelfart), Horsens, Esbjerg; three in region IV (Funen and
islands), Assens, Odense, Svendborg; four in region V (South-
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VI (Northern Sealand and Copenhagen), Helsingør, Køge and
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18. Molitor notes how West German civil defence thrived in détente
periods, not during crises, see Chapter 3 this volume.
19. Vendsyssel Tidende, 22 May 1966 ‘Byen i Hvims, hvor man bygger
vakkelvorne huse’, 15.
20. This description of the standard ruin and the blueprints are
all located at Aarhus Municipality’s online archive of construc-
tion projects, ‘Min ejendom’ https://minejendom.aarhus.dk/Byg
gesag/Liste?adresseId=58345 [accessed 10 February 2020], see
specifically Byggesag 65–79 ‘Entreprisebeskrivelser’ and ‘Etage-
planer’.
21. Vendsyssel Tidende, 22 May 1966 ‘Byen i Hvims, hvor man bygger
vakkelvorne huse’, 15.
22. Odense, Åsumvej 55, Ejby, Odense Jorder, 1h, journalsag 577
Standardøvelsesanlæg, 1159 ‘Flyt. Undervisningsb.’, 1055 ‘Til-
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2020].
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24. BRS Tinglev ‘Ruinbyen i Tinglev’, 1955.
25. A similar bypassing of the dangers of radioactivity is noted by Hogg
in his chapter on civil defence exercises in Britain, see Hogg this
volume.
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CHAPTER 8
Framing Civil Defence Critique: Swiss
Physicians’ Resistance to the Coordinated
Medical Services in the 1980s
Sibylle Marti
The threat of a future nuclear war bothered Switzerland’s national defence
planners from the time of the early Cold War. Military, civil defence and
administrative officials alike reckoned that the use of nuclear weapons
would cause far more civilian than military casualties, and the results
of a large national defence exercise in 1963 confirmed that the existing
measures to protect and rescue the civilian population from weapons of
mass destruction were not sufficient at all (Marti 2015: 252–254). That
is why from the mid-1960s, Swiss federal authorities not only worked
on an ambitious and world-leading shelter programme (Berger Ziauddin
2017), but also set about establishing various alarm organisations and
protective services as essential pillars of Switzerland’s national defence.
Among these evolving national defence organisations were the so-called
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Coordinated Medical Services as a joint venture of military, civil defence
and private organisations. Based on an all-encompassing system of under-
ground hospitals and first-aid stations, the Coordinated Medical Services
were intended to ‘improve the chances of survival of the entire Swiss
people (Schweizervolk)’ in a future nuclear war (see also Chapter 3 on
disaster medicine in West Germany by Jochen Molitor in this volume).1
It took almost two decades to complete the basic conceptual, organ-
isational and legal work in order to establish the Coordinated Medical
Services (Marti 2020: 399–408). Hence, the process of finally embedding
the Coordinated Medical Services into Switzerland’s national defence
system coincided with renewed Cold War tensions and nuclear rearma-
ment on both sides of the ‘Iron Curtain’ at the beginning of the 1980s.
On the one hand, this era of the Cold War, often referred to as the
‘Second Cold War’, was dominated by re-emerging nuclear threats and
nuclear fear (Conze et al. 2017; Becker-Schaum et al. 2016). On the
other hand, a transnational peace movement (Zieman 2009; Wittner
2003) and global organisations of concerned scientists like the Interna-
tional Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) (Kemper
2016) voiced disarmament and peace demands resonating more than
ever in the public sphere. Furthermore, both international and national
aftermath studies showed that no healthcare system would be able to
cope with all the injured and burned people after a nuclear war (Berger
Ziauddin and Marti 2020).
In Switzerland, as well as in many other countries, manifold forms
of protest against the danger of nuclear war took place. In the early
1980s, tens of thousands protested for peace and against nuclear arma-
ment (Bein and Epple 1986; Epple 1986). Besides transnationally voiced
calls for nuclear disarmament and peace, the Swiss people, as part of the
protest, also raised their voices against the dominance and ubiquity of
the militia army and the system of civil defence, with its countless protec-
tive bunkers. Above all, criticism was directed against the national defence
officials’ optimistic assumption that a nuclear war was survivable, despite
its absolutely devastating short- and long-term effects (Meier and Meier
2010: 224–226). Moreover, during the course of the 1980s, a number
of popular referendums directed against the armed forces and national
defence, respectively, took place. This opposition culminated in a national
referendum on the abolishment of Switzerland’s militia army in 1989
(Degen 2017). Due to these protests in the realm of civil society, in
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the last decade of the Cold War, the belief in a strong national defence
showed clear signs of erosion.
With regard to growing civil defence criticism, the Swiss branch
of the Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) and the IPPNW—
PSR/IPPNW Switzerland, founded in 1981—played a major role.
PSR/IPPNW Switzerland also became a key actor in protest against
the Coordinated Medical Services. The cases of physicians and members
of PSR/IPPNW Switzerland who acted as conscientious objectors by
refusing to serve in the Coordinated Medical Services as part of their
mandatory civil defence service gained broad public attention. In fact,
conscientious objection of service in both the armed and the civil defence
forces formed a vital part of Swiss Cold War history of the 1970s and
1980s that so far has only received little attention (Schweizer 2017;
Koller 2008; Möcklin 1998; Winet 1991). Another form of protest by
PSR/IPPNW Switzerland was a public campaign against the newly intro-
duced and highly contested conscription of, in particular, female health
workers into the Coordinated Medical Services. PSR/IPPNW Switzer-
land’s resistance bothered the authorities and brought Swiss state security,
among others, onto the scene.
The Coordinated Medical Services were an essential organisation in
Cold War Switzerland’s national defence system, usually referred to as
total national defence. Its main pillars were the military and the civil
national defence, the latter including civil defence, state security, wartime
economy and foreign policy (Degen 2009). The ideological base rested
on the so-called Geistige Landesverteidigung, roughly translatable as spir-
itual or intellectual defence. It was meant to serve as an integrative
and identity-forming belief system which summoned national symbols
and myths like Switzerland’s militia-style army and the centuries-long
determination to defend home ground (Tanner 1999).
In this chapter, I will argue that Swiss authorities propagated a
sociotechnical imaginary (see Chapter 1, this volume) through the Coor-
dinated Medical Services and other total national defence organisations.
The core of this total national defence imaginary was that Switzerland
would be able to survive a nuclear war through a huge collective effort.
In Cold War Switzerland, this vision of total national defence was quite
strong, and it could exert normative authority, as it was borne and insti-
tutionalised by various state and private organisations on all federal levels.
What measures and institutions were the Coordinated Medical Services
built on, and which material and social resources did they try to mobilise?
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How should the Swiss total national defence imaginary wield its power?
By contrast, under these circumstances, how was PSR/IPPNW Switzer-
land able to carry out protest actions against the Coordinated Medical
Services? Which discursive strategies and practices did PSR/IPPNW
Switzerland use to articulate resistive behaviour, and which alternative
vision was thereby disseminated?
In what follows, in the first part of my chapter, I will elucidate the
system of the Coordinated Medical Services as an emblematic manifes-
tation of the sociotechnical imaginary of Swiss total national defence. By
focusing on PSR/IPPNW Switzerland, the second part of my chapter will
examine the resistance against the Coordinated Medical Services. In the
broader context of a newly evolving, transnational civil defence criticism
in the last decade of the Cold War, PSR/IPPNW Switzerland’s protest
actions brought up novel, subjectivised forms of resistance to Swiss total
national defence that played a vital role in contributing to the dissolu-
tion of the respective imaginary. In the third part of my chapter, I will
show how Swiss authorities addressed and handled the criticism of nuclear
civil defence spread by PSR/IPPNW Switzerland. I will also point out
how the latter’s protest actions, as well as its counter-vision to the total
national defence imaginary, resonated with the Swiss public. The conclu-
sion will highlight that PSR/IPPNW Switzerland’s subjectivised forms of
resistance were a strategic reaction to the contested vision of Swiss total
national defence in the 1980s.
Mobilising the Nation to Save the ‘Swiss People’
The Coordinated Medical Services relied on an extensive infrastructure,
most of it built underground. In its final expansion, the system would be
equipped with almost 2,000 first-aid stations and 30 emergency hospitals
maintained by civil defence staff. Another 150 protected operating rooms
would be operated by public health organisations. Finally, there would be
40 military hospitals run by army personnel. In sum, these facilities were
to provide protected patient spaces for two per cent of the population
spread all over Switzerland.2 At the beginning of the 1980s, about half
of these facilities were ready to work. Until all of them were built, the
Coordinated Medical Services also had to use above-ground first-aid and
hospital rooms (Senn 1983: 84–85).
For this ambitious system to be implemented, the Coordinated
Medical Services needed the support of state and private actors from
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all federal levels. On the national level among others, the Federal Mili-
tary Department, the Federal Office for Civil Protection and the Federal
Office of Public Health were involved. Furthermore, representatives of
the Swiss cantons and of several private organisations like the Swiss Red
Cross, the Swiss Samaritan Foundation, the Swiss Medical Association and
the Swiss Hospital Association formed part of the establishment of the
Coordinated Medical Services.3 In order to guarantee the smooth coop-
eration of these different actors, coordination bodies on both the national
and cantonal levels were installed (Senn 1983: 85).
The leading threat for the creation of the Coordinated Medical Services
was the danger of a nuclear war. Right from the beginning, however,
the authorities planned the Coordinated Medical Services to also be
deployed in the case of a civil (nuclear) catastrophe.4 Within the Coordi-
nated Medical Services, the civil authorities, the civil defence organisation
and the armed forces were responsible for running and maintaining their
own sanitary facilities (Senn 1983: 85). Thus, the Coordinated Medical
Services were an emblematic Swiss total national defence organisation for
which it was characteristic that neither military nor civil institutions took
the lead. Prevailing military and civil tasks and structures were kept, and
the organisation was to be used in mass catastrophes taking place in war
as well as in peacetime. That is why one cannot speak of a centralisation
of the Coordinated Medical Services nor, as some critics have argued, of
a militarisation of Switzerland’s public health system (Lauterburg 1988:
215). Rather, the Coordinated Medical Services should be understood as
a hybrid organisation which blurred the boundaries between the states of
war and peace. Exactly because of this hybrid structure, Switzerland’s total
national defence organisations were able to permeate all parts of society
(Marti 2020: 417–418).
The Coordinated Medical Services’ all-encompassing system required
not only considerable infrastructural equipment and material supply but
also a huge number of human resources. Besides the members of the
army and civil defence medical services, the Coordinated Medical Services
needed a great number of voluntary staff. Because this voluntary recruit-
ment could not fill the ranks, Swiss authorities also started to conscript
health workers (such as physicians, nurses, physiotherapists). With these
efforts to introduce conscription for the Coordinated Medical Services,
the authorities tried to install mandatory service for women in partic-
ular. Unlike Swiss men, Swiss women were not obligated under the Swiss
federal constitution to serve (Bondolfi 2012; Schindler 1997), but they
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represented the majority of employees in Switzerland’s health system
(Brändli 2012). With the general conscription for men, it was fairly easy
to involve male medical and nursing staff in the Coordinated Medical
Services, whereas women had to volunteer for the Swiss Red Cross or the
civil defence medical services.
Thus, on the federal level, there was no legal basis to make women
serve in Switzerland’s total national defence system. Furthermore, in
the realm of public health, the cantons and not the federal govern-
ment had the legal power. That is why the concept of the Coordinated
Medical Services envisaged the cantons as issuing legal regulations in
order to conscript women (Lauterburg 1988: 208–211). To that end,
the concept of the Coordinated Medical Services provided a template for
the cantons to use.5 At the end of the 1980s, most cantons had imple-
mented such regulations or were just about to do so. With this approach,
the cantons operated in a legal grey zone. That is why a contempo-
rary critic called it a ‘women’s compulsory service in a roundabout way’
(Lauterburg 1988: 208). But the Federal Office of Justice also acknowl-
edged that this legal opinion must be sanctioned by the Federal Supreme
Court of Switzerland (Lauterburg 1988: 208–211). In the decision in
a leading case, the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland in May 1989
sustained the cantonal authorities’ legal measures. In their grounds for
the judgement, it specifically pointed out that the civil defence organi-
sation, the Red Cross service and the women’s military service suffered
from staffing shortages of tens of thousands of women (Bundesgericht-
sentscheid 1989). Thus, the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland ruled
that the questionable conscription of female nursing and medical staff for
the Coordinated Medical Services which the cantons had installed was
constitutional. It is telling that this legal practice was sanctioned with
reference to the requirements of Switzerland’s total national defence.
Apart from these legal options, the authorities undertook a variety
of information, training and advertising efforts to recruit more staff.
These efforts aimed at reaching retired health workers and, first and
foremost again, women. At the very beginning, when the Coordinated
Medical Services were yet to be established, the surgeon general of the
Swiss armed forces, who was the coordinating leader of the Coordinated
Medical Services at the federal level, did much of the public relations
work. He held lectures for civil defence units and officers’ societies, as well
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as at congresses and training courses, in which he pointed out the neces-
sity and urgency of creating the Coordinated Medical Services. In addi-
tion, he wrote a great number of articles for military and other journals.6
Later on, standardised lectures and an official information concept were
formulated.7 The information concept was intended help to promote a
‘common line of thought, a Unité de doctrine’ between the different
actors involved in the Coordinated Medical Services, and, through image
advertising and the fostering of community spirit, ‘enhance the “Good
Will”’ for this total national defence organisation.8
With regard to training efforts, the Coordinated Medical Services
worked together with several state and private organisations such as
medical schools and organisations engaged in the education of healthcare
personnel. Upon an initiative of the surgeon general of the Swiss armed
forces, the medical schools integrated the discipline of disaster medicine
into their curricula.9 The healthcare personnel also received training in
the field of disaster and war medicine. The students at the Swiss Red Cross
nursing schools, for example, had to take lessons about ‘nursing in disaster
situations’.10 Other Red Cross courses designed for lay people likewise
included teaching units to serve in the Coordinated Medical Services
(Lauterburg 1988: 209). The link between training and public rela-
tions efforts that was pushed with these courses was deliberately planned.
Training and promotion for the Coordinated Medical Services were to
go hand in hand and be designed, in particular, to recruit women. The
surgeon general of the Swiss armed forces, for example, urged members of
the Swiss Federation for Civil Protection and the Swiss Officers Society to
‘win over our women for service for the community everywhere where you
have influence’.11 At the same time, advertising campaigns promoted ‘the
woman in service of society as a whole’.12 Accordingly, as a counterpart to
the mandatory military or civil defence service of Swiss men, Swiss women
were called upon to carry out their patriotic duty for the nation by serving
in the Coordinated Medical Services. Playing on a socially embedded asso-
ciation between women and social care, it was thought they would take
on nursing and auxiliary tasks, which were construed as being female in
nature. Thus, Swiss total national defence measures and institutions were
deeply shaped by traditional gender roles.
All in all, the Coordinated Medical Services’ massive infrastructure
reflected the vision and the social order of Switzerland’s total national
defence system, which both, in turn, were expected to facilitate the Coor-
dinated Medical Services’ required material supply and human resources.
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In fact, many different societal groups and institutions, such as members
of the armed and the civil defence forces, cantonal and communal
authorities, organisations like the Swiss Red Cross or the Swiss Medical
Association and public and private hospitals, worked together in order to
establish the Coordinated Medical Services. In doing this, they all helped
to promote the sociotechnical imaginary of total national defence and its
core conviction that Switzerland as a collective was capable of surviving
nuclear war. This imaginary materialised in the Coordinated Medical
Services’ all-encompassing infrastructure and was institutionalised in the
organisation’s hybrid structure. At the same time, state and private, mili-
tary and civil actors of all federal levels alike were called to contribute
to and participate in the organisation. An identical call was directed
towards Swiss women. Thus, the Swiss total national defence imaginary
that was propagated through the Coordinated Medical Services relied
constitutively on the mobilisation of society as a whole.
But the numerous efforts to mobilise the nation in order to save the
nation were only partly successful. Above all, the number of the much-
needed women could not close the estimated staffing gaps. That is why
the chief of general staff of the Swiss armed forces was still complaining
about a staffing shortage of 75,000 female volunteers in 1983 (Senn
1983: 85). The reason for this, on the one hand, was that it proved to be
fairly complicated to record all the (female) medical and nursing staff and
trained lay people that could have been forced to serve by law (Lauter-
burg 1988: 210). On the other hand, as the next section of my paper will
outline, the growing criticism directed against the Swiss armed and civil
defence forces in the 1980s further hindered the recruitment of (female)
volunteers.
Practices of Resistance: Claiming
That Individual Action Matters
In the course of the 1980s, despite being prosecuted, more and more
Swiss men refused to serve in the civil defence forces. Although the actual
number was officially unknown, politicians and civil defence officials alike
stated in the media that the number of conscientious objectors seemed
to be increasing steadily. Sometimes, a group of people collectively exhib-
ited their refusal to serve. In August 1984, in Bern, for example, 17 men
jointly returned their documents to the city’s civil defence office. Like-
wise, in November 1984, in Zurich, 38 men collectively embedded their
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service books (Dienstbüchlein) for the civil defence service in concrete and
dumped them all in a river.13 Against this backdrop, the cases of members
of PSR/IPPNW Switzerland who did not want to serve in the Coor-
dinated Medical Services as trained physicians gained widespread public
attention. This all the more so as their refusal led to official charges and,
as a result, to media-effective trials (Albrecht et al. 1988: 12).
A textbook case, in this respect, was Thomas Schnyder, a child psychi-
atrist and board member of PSR/IPPNW Switzerland, who during the
1980s faced several official charges due to his refusal to serve in the civil
defence forces. Before 1979, Schnyder had served in the Swiss armed
forces and from March 1979 to February 1983 in the civil defence
forces.14 From November 1983 onwards, however, he no longer attended
mandatory civil defence courses and exercises. In May 1984, he asked
the civil defence office of the canton of Zurich to only assign him to
services related to natural or civil disasters, like providing surgical assis-
tance in a hospital, and to release him from any services related to
nuclear war and nuclear civil defence.15 The civil defence office of the
canton of Zurich denied this demand.16 In April 1985, Schnyder sent
the same request to the municipal civil defence office in his residen-
tial community.17 This request remained without reply.18 Two months
later, he denounced himself to the cantonal police of Zurich because
in 1985 he had yet again failed to enrol himself in a number of civil
defence exercises and courses.19 In January 1986, the district attorney of
Zurich filed charges against Schnyder, calling for seven days of imprison-
ment.20 After that, in February 1986, Schnyder once more demanded of
the civil defence office of the canton of Zurich that it not assign him to
tasks related to what he called ‘war civil defence (Kriegszivilschutz)’ and
emphasised again his willingness to serve in disaster relief.21 In its written
reply, the civil defence office of the canton of Zurich denied the request
once again but still ‘did not want to give up the hope’ that Schnyder ‘as
a physician would find the way to realise that the categorical rejection of
Swiss civil defence was based on knee-jerk thinking (Kurzschlussdenken)
arising from an all-encompassing fear’.22
The prosecution, however, ran its course. On 11 March 1986, the
trial against Schnyder at the district court of Zurich took place. Schnyder
invited friends, sympathisers and reporters to the trial. He also organ-
ised a press conference and a lunch they could attend and sent them
documentation about his case when requested.23 The editor of the
newsletter of the West German section of the IPPNW regretted that
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he was not able to attend the trial in Zurich but wished Schnyder ‘big
media attention’. Moreover, he planned on using Schnyder’s documen-
tation about conscientious objection in Switzerland for an article.24 This
shows that the national sections of the IPPNW could rely on a transna-
tional network in order to exchange ideas and experiences. At the trial,
Schnyder was morally supported by well-known Swiss intellectual Max
Frisch.25 Swiss newspapers published various articles about the trial.26
They provoked controversial reactions, as several letters to the editor
illustrate.27 Schnyder himself pleaded either for a verdict of acquittal or
for a prison sentence of 30 days, the latter leading automatically to his
exclusion from civil defence service.28 In sentencing, however, the court
imposed a financial penalty on Schnyder, as in an earlier conviction.29 But
this was not the end of Schnyder’s attempt to escape nuclear civil defence.
Another refusal to serve in 1987 was finally sanctioned with 30 days
of imprisonment and, with this, the exclusion criterion was achieved.30
Schnyder could serve his time in quasi-detention.31 Finally, in June 1987,
the local council of his residential community excluded Schnyder officially
from civil defence service.32
Schnyder was not the only person who tried to use his trial to get
public attention for his political cause. In 1988, for example, ‘Crazy is
normal’ was published, which was the complete documentation of a trial
at the cantonal court of Schaffhausen of seven men who refused to serve
in the civil defence forces. The publication contained the defence argu-
ments that had been submitted during the trail, including statements
by Thomas Schnyder; the social democratic politician and co-founder
of the ‘Group Switzerland without Army (Gruppe Schweiz ohne Armee)’
Andreas Gross; the renowned psychoanalyst Paul Parin; and the filmmaker
and publicist Alexander J. Seiler, who himself also refused to do civil
defence service.33 Another case that gained widespread attention was that
of the journalist Daniel Glass, who himself had also demanded a harsher
penalty at a police court in order to be excluded from civil defence service
more quickly. While in other cases, the judges had denied these demands
or the state attorneys had appealed similar convictions, Glass’s case in
March 1986 was the first one in which a judge had ruled in favour of
such a request. In order to gain publicity for this precedent, Glass sent
the opinion of the court to fellow journalists and other conscientious
objectors.34
Thus, members of PSR/IPPNW Switzerland as well as other conscien-
tious objectors of civil defence used their trials to win the public and the
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media for their political cause. By promoting and publicising their trials
and inviting the press, sympathisers and well-known public figures, they
wanted to create sympathy for the idea of conscientious objection in the
public sphere. In order to gain media attention, they staged their resis-
tance in court as well as in happenings, showcase events and publications
in new ways. These unconventional forms of protest took inspiration from
forms of political action developed by new social movements (Albrecht
et al. 1988: 12) emerging since the mid-1960s and especially in the wake
of ‘1968’ (Schaufelbuehl 2009; Skenderovic and Späti 2012).
Another form of resistance to the Coordinated Medical Services initi-
ated by members of PSR Switzerland was the launching of a public
campaign entitled ‘Health services call for peace’. Apart from physicians,
also nurses, physiotherapists and other health workers supported the call,
which was popularised at a press conference in May 1984 in Bern. At that
moment in time, 800 people had already signed the call, 500 of them
people working in health services.35 People signing the call did not want
to be part of any preparations for nuclear war in health care and did not
want to attend any training in war medicine, and they demanded that the
courses and exercises in disaster medicine were limited to civil accidents
and catastrophes. Furthermore, the signatories of the call stated their soli-
darity and support for everyone who refused to attend such events. They
also refused to accept the newly introduced mandatory registration and
conscription of health workers into the Coordinated Medical Services.36
As already mentioned, this conscription was the authorities’ attempt to
install a mandatory service for women in particular, who were not obli-
gated to serve under the Swiss federal constitution. The protest call was
supported by the Swiss Society for Social Healthcare, the Zurich branch
of the Association of Independent Physicians and the Swiss Syndicate of
Public Services, a trade union.37 The protest call reached and mobilised a
great number of working medical and nursing staff who themselves were
not members of PSR/IPPNW Switzerland. Therefore, it provided a good
opportunity for the organisation to reach out to the broader public and
gave it a chance to demonstrate how Swiss total national defence directly
affected people’s everyday lives.
It is noteworthy that, in their argumentation, members of
PSR/IPPNW Switzerland always made recourse to their individual morals
and ethics. An example of this is the fundamental criticism of the disaster
and war medicine approach that was to be employed in the Coordinated
Medical Services in the event of a nuclear war.38 The physician and board
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member of PSR/IPPNW Switzerland Wolfgang Lauterburg, co-initiator
of the abovementioned protest call, prominently criticised the Coordi-
nated Medical Services’ inherent militarist logic and its undifferentiated
equation of civil emergency with war medicine, and, to that end, the
constant conflation of civil and military structures and of the states of
peace and war (Lauterburg 1988). He held that the principles of disaster
or war medicine were incompatible with his ethics as a physician, as these
principles relied on the concept of triage, that is, the sorting of injured
people according to the severity of their injuries. Whereas medical ethics
would usually require the provision of help to those people who are most
injured first, the concept of triage necessitated that so-called hopeless
cases be sorted out in order to concentrate resources on those people
who had good chances of survival. Thus, triage decisions required a prob-
lematic reversal of common medical ethics, as the principles of individual
medicine would not apply. Lauterburg and other critics of the Coordi-
nated Medical Services felt that it was against their individual conscience
as physicians to work in nuclear civil defence and make such decisions.
The recourse to individual morals and ethics was also at the heart
of the new physician’s oath that well-known international members of
IPPNW signed and that started with the phrase: ‘As a matter of individual
conscience, […]’.39 Likewise, the so-called Frankfurt Declaration (Frank-
furter Erklärung) of the West German section of the IPPNW, issued
in May 1982, referred to conscientious reasons as physicians (Kemper
2014: 327–328). The Frankfurt Declaration functioned as a transnational
element, as physicians from Switzerland like Thomas Schnyder also signed
it and used it as an argument to explain why they refused to serve.40 By
claiming that they were undergoing a ‘crisis of conscience (Gewissensnot-
stand)’, members of PSR/IPPNW Switzerland and other conscientious
objectors on trial were invoking the conscience of the individual as a legal
argument.41 In these cases, as well as in cases where men refused to serve
in the militia army, the crisis of conscience served as grounds for justifica-
tion beyond the law to explain why someone refused to serve (Schweizer
2017: 24–28).
In sum, in both their plea statements and their public statements,
the members of PSR/IPPNW Switzerland often referred to their indi-
vidual conscience and their ethics as physicians in order to explain why
they refused to serve in nuclear civil defence and why they rejected
the methods and principles of disaster and war medicine. Their personal
commitment and dedication, as well as their willingness to accept severe
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personal consequences such as imprisonment, gave the physicians’ protest
a high credibility. By invoking their social authority as physicians, the
members of PSR/IPPNW Switzerland made recourse to the traditional
subject of the conscientious physician who acts to the best of his knowl-
edge and belief. This form of subjectivisation was an effective discursive
strategy, the aim of which was twofold: to gain the normative clout and
moral authority needed to bolster resistance within the population on the
one hand, and to circumvent being branded as a communist or subversive
on the other hand.
Hence, on a discursive level, PSR/IPPNW Switzerland’s criticism
of the Coordinated Medical Services was based on what the historian
Susanne Schregel (2009) with regard to the West German Peace Move-
ment has called ‘politics of subjectivity’, which enabled the peace activists
to express their individual emotions of fear. PSR/IPPNW Switzer-
land’s resistance to the Coordinated Medical Services, however, was less
emotionally grounded. Rather, with its ‘politics of subjectivity’, it propa-
gated a moral stance that claimed that individual moral action mattered
and might change politics. To state that the actions of each and every
person could make a difference was an extremely empowering vision in
an era of the Cold War, which seemed to be dominated by feelings of
helplessness and hopelessness (Kemper 2012; Marti 2017). In short, the
alternative vision publicly promoted by PSR/IPPNW Switzerland was
that a world without nuclear war was possible if people took individual
moral decisions to listen to their own conscience.
In contrast to the sociotechnical imaginary of total national defence,
which referred to the collective of the ‘Swiss people’, the collective in
PSR/IPPNW Switzerland’s counter-vision was the sum of acting individ-
uals with a strong moral compass. And whereas individuals had to bow
to the norms and requirements of the Cold War within the sociotechnical
imaginary of total national defence, individuals in PSR/IPPNW Switzer-
land’s alternative vision were right to oppose these norms and to take
ethical decisions based on individual moral grounds. In the subject of the
conscientious physician, this vision found its leading figure.
Civil Defence Critics: Between
Public Enemies and Public Support
PSR/IPPNW Switzerland’s resistance to the Coordinated Medical
Services was effective as publicity, and therefore, was a thorn in the
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authorities’ eye. They responded with hard accusations and legally
dubious measures. In the autumn of 1983, the surgeon general of the
Swiss armed forces and coordinating leader of the Coordinated Medical
Services at the federal level, for example, deliberately dispatched military
surgeons to attend a meeting organised by PSR/IPPNW Switzerland and
fight their views. In the official minutes, the surgeon general’s opinion
of PSR/IPPNW Switzerland is recorded as follows: ‘This organisation
basically calls for an abolition of civil defence, the Coordinated Medical
Services, and total national defence. This would be […] the destruction
of the nation’.42 Thus, members of the armed forces were instructed to
infiltrate PSR/IPPNW Switzerland’s events because its view was officially
regarded as being dangerous and subversive. Likewise, a military surgeon
and member of the Federal Commission for Radiation Protection wrote
an article ‘against defeatism in disaster medicine’ in the influential liberal
newspaper Neue Zürcher Zeitung in September 1982, rejecting the criti-
cism that the maxims of disaster medicine as envisioned in the event of a
nuclear war contradicted the Hippocratic oath.43
With that said, it is not surprising that PSR/IPPNW Switzerland
was under surveillance by Switzerland’s state security. In their files,
state security declared PSR/IPPNW Switzerland to be a pro-Soviet
‘front organisation’.44 Swiss state security’s secret observations of tens
of thousands of innocent people and organisations only came to light in
November 1989 and resulted in one of the biggest scandals in Switzer-
land’s recent history (Liehr 2014). But in the first half of the 1980s,
Swiss authorities still stubbornly kept to their Cold War enemy stereo-
types and total national defence feasibility fantasies. Anyone who like
the members of PSR/IPPNW Switzerland publicly questioned Swiss total
national defence organisations was basically seen and treated as an enemy
of the state. Thus, PSR/IPPNW Switzerland is an example of how, in
Cold War Switzerland, state security targeted groups and organisations
from civil society that operated democratically but were opposed to the
total national defence imaginary.
Besides the authorities’ suspicion and surveillance, PSR/IPPNW
Switzerland’s protest actions against nuclear civil defence and the Coor-
dinated Medical Services, respectively, also provoked reactions from the
public. Apart from the already mentioned letters to the editor, people
occasionally wrote personal letters to public figures who represented
PSR/IPPNW Switzerland. Some of these correspondents uttered mixed
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or critical feelings about PSR/IPPNW Switzerland’s resistance. A physi-
cian and colleague of Thomas Schnyder, for example, responded to an
article Schnyder had published in the journal Social Medicine with regard
to his decision to refuse to serve in the Coordinated Medical Services.45
This correspondent held that the ‘head-in-the-sand politics’ of physicians
was not productive. In his opinion, it was better to have civil defence than
no prevention measures at all. For him, civil defence did not downplay the
danger of war. Rather, confrontation with it, for instance, through the
civil defence leaflet in the phone book, might make people think about
how such a war could be prevented.46
In most of these letters, however, people expressed their support and
described how PSR/IPPNW Switzerland’s actions had strengthened their
own political commitment to stand up and fight for peace. Several men
wrote that, after they had read articles about PSR/IPPNW Switzerland’s
protest actions, they now felt ready to act themselves and would refuse to
serve or refuse to attend special training in civil defence.47 Another man
thanked them for their help, as he planned to refuse to accept a manage-
rial post in the civil defence service.48 One man wrote that he would like
to act in a similar way but lacked the courage because he worked as an
official for a cantonal authority.49 Yet another man wrote that he now felt
encouraged to publish a leaflet criticising a nearby planned civil defence
building.50 Not only men but also women wrote to tell how similar their
own mindset was, and congratulated the courage and the responsible,
consistent and brave attitude they demonstrated.51 Even people from
abroad wrote letters. A man from the West German city of Nuremberg,
for example, expressed his sympathy and support for Thomas Schnyder’s
decision not to serve.52 This once again illustrates that civil defence criti-
cism in the last decade of the Cold War was a transnational phenomenon,
and that there was an active exchange of information and ideas.
To be sure, these letters are far from being a representative sample of
what Swiss men and women thought about civil defence in the 1980s,
and it is likely that many letters came from people that stood close
to the peace movement and thus shared the rather negative attitude
towards Switzerland’s total national defence system. Still, they are rare and
insightful sources for studying how the total national defence imaginary
and alternative visions articulated by civil defence critics like PSR/IPPNW
Switzerland resonated in Cold War Switzerland of the 1980s.
In general, in the course of the 1980s, criticism against the armed and
the civil defence forces enjoyed more and more popularity. At the end of
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the decade, a referendum demanding the abolishment of the Swiss army
launched by the ‘Group Switzerland without Army’ unexpectedly received
a third of all the votes, clearly showing that identification with the key
symbol of Switzerland’s ability to defend its home ground was eroding
(Degen 2017). Likewise, in a population survey in 1989, less than twenty
per cent of the respondents thought that Swiss civil defence would be
able to safeguard the population in the event of a nuclear war.53 But
the authorities’ optimistic belief in the feasibility of survival underlying
Switzerland’s total national defence also began to crumble slightly after
a scientific study commissioned by the Central Office for Defence had
clearly shown how extremely disastrous a nuclear war really would be
(Berger Ziauddin and Marti 2020).
In sum, the reactions to PSR/IPPNW Switzerland’s resistance against
nuclear civil defence illustrate how divided Swiss society was at the end of
the Cold War. On the one hand, there were still many hard-nosed ‘Cold
Warriors’ in powerful positions and institutions, and, on the other hand,
there were younger people, in particular, who no longer believed in the
imaginary of Switzerland’s total national defence. While Swiss authori-
ties still tried to denounce PSR/IPPNW Switzerland’s counter-vision as
defeatism, this accusation could not muster the same authority as in earlier
decades of the Cold War. In fact, the movement of conscientious objec-
tion in the 1970s and the 1980s which PSR/IPPNW Switzerland was part
of paved the way for the introduction of an alternative service based on
conscientious reasons shortly after the end of Cold War (Koller 2008).
Thus, in Cold War Switzerland of the 1980s, there was no homoge-
nous sentiment towards PSR/IPPNW Switzerland’s criticism of nuclear
civil defence (Kemper 2016: 280). But this does not mean that the crit-
icism of the sociotechnical imaginary of total national defence made by
PSR/IPPNW Switzerland and other protest groups did not resonate with
the Swiss public. Rather, this resistance was fiercely contested within Swiss
society and, therefore, gained widespread public and media attention.
Conclusion
In Switzerland, Cold War perceptions and dichotomies developed a
remarkable normative power. The threat of a nuclear war between the
East and the West resulted in the building of a strong total national
defence. The Coordinated Medical Services, which had been set up in the
mid-1960s and were operational at the beginning of the 1980s, were an
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emblematic total national defence organisation created as one of Switzer-
land’s prevention measures against a nuclear war. It operated with a
hybrid organisational structure involving military and civil tasks and struc-
tures that blurred the boundaries between the states of war and peace. For
the Coordinated Medical Services to function, they relied on the mobil-
isation of institutions of federal levels and of the nation as a whole, with
private organisations playing a vital role. Women, who did not have the
obligation to serve under the Swiss federal constitution, were urged to
volunteer or forced to serve by newly introduced cantonal laws. Within
the Coordinated Medical Services, they were expected to take on their
traditional gender roles in nursing and caregiving.
Through organisations like the Coordinated Medical Services, Swiss
authorities propagated an imaginary that, with a massive collective effort,
Switzerland could survive a nuclear war. But during the 1980s, civil
society protest and criticism of total national defence gained strength,
leading to the erosion of core components of this imaginary towards the
end of the decade. This resistance was at once part of transnational polit-
ical actions for nuclear disarmament and peace as well as part of Cold
War Switzerland’s domestic conflicts about the armed and civil defence
forces and their dominant role in Swiss society. The Coordinated Medical
Services, too, had to face resistance, the core of which was PSR/IPPNW
Switzerland. The members of PSR/IPPNW Switzerland refused to be
part of all measures and institutions concerned with nuclear civil defence,
and they effectively fought against it. Their trials as a result of their consci-
entious objection, as well as their political campaigns, were staged as a
public protest theatre.
In the authorities’ perception, PSR/IPPNW Switzerland was fostering
collective resistance, as its members refused to bow to the sociotechnical
imaginary of Swiss total national defence. State security surveillance shows
that PSR/IPPNW Switzerland was regarded as a subversive organisa-
tion opposed to democracy and the rule of law. Therefore, PSR/IPPNW
Switzerland’s resistance to the Coordinated Medical Services and nuclear
civil defence, respectively, sheds light on how strong the role played by
Cold War norms and requisites of security still was in Switzerland of the
1980s, and it demonstrates how difficult it was to build up democratic
opposition against the prevailing imaginary of total national defence.
Under these circumstances, PSR/IPPNW Switzerland had to find
a way for its resistance to gain legitimacy among the Swiss public.
Subjectivisation was an effective discursive strategy that its members
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used to justify their protest and criticism. Centred around the figure of
the conscientious physician, the members of PSR/IPPNW Switzerland
promoted political actions as individual moral decisions. By openly prop-
agating these subjectivised forms of resistance, they wanted to encourage
more people do what they did, that is to follow their own conscience
and to resist nuclear civil defence. The personal letters that several
publicly known members received illustrate that some people actually felt
more encouraged to take on resistive behaviour themselves after they
had learned about PSR/IPPNW Switzerland’s actions. In this way, the
strategy of subjectivisation enabled PSR/IPPNW Switzerland to depict
its criticism and protest not as subversive resistance but as the result of
conscientiously acting individuals taking similar moral decisions to stand
up for peace.
Contrary to what Swiss authorities and Swiss state security insinuated,
the members of PSR/IPPNW Switzerland did not fundamentally oppose
the state or state institutions. Rather, their subjectivised forms of resis-
tance were a strategic reaction to Switzerland’s imaginary of total national
defence: whereas this imaginary urged the ‘Swiss people’ to adhere to
imposed Cold War roles and norms, PSR/IPPNW Switzerland called on
the Swiss population to act as conscientious subjects who had the right to
make individual ethical decisions. Thus, PSR/IPPNW Switzerland’s alter-
native vision that a world without nuclear war was possible relied more
on the moral strength of human beings than on the instigated pressures
of Cold War politics.
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CHAPTER 9
Remembering Desirable Futures? Civil
Defence Memories and Everyday Life
in Sweden and the UK
Marie Cronqvist and Matthew Grant
How do you write the history of people trying to remember how
they imagined desirable or undesirable futures? Analysing civil defence
as an imaginary involves conceptualising civil defence as a technology,
but it also reminds us of the fact that civil defence was above all a
way of mapping out a future for states, societies and individuals. As a
future-oriented activity—mapping out and rehearsing the future in the
present—it was at the same time abstract and firmly rooted in space and
time. When people are looking back at their own experiences of Cold War
civil defence from the vantage point of the 2000s, a layer of complexity
is added because the act of remembering the future is removed, at least
in part, from its anchorage in material experience. We now know that the
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undesirable future of nuclear war never happened—at least not within the
time frame that in the history books is called ‘the Cold War’.
The aim of this chapter is to explore how the concept of sociotechnical
imaginaries (Jasanoff and Kim 2015) can be used to examine civil defence
as remembered. The main focus will not be the memory work of civil
defence museums or monuments, but instead oral histories testifying to
the entanglement of civil defence in everyday life. Is civil defence viewed
as having continued validity, or as essentially defunct as a technology? Can
we identify major shifts between how civil defence was experienced during
the Cold War and how it is remembered afterwards, and can we use the
concepts of extension, embedding or resistance to unpack these possible
shifts?
The chapter employs a historical ethnography approach, using
primarily oral history sources such as interviews and questionnaires
collected between 2006 and 2012 with examples from Sweden and
the UK. We will use three lenses or themes in order to discuss the
memory work of civil defence: localities , temporalities and mediations.
Our approach, contrasted with much scholarship on sociotechnical imag-
inaries, thus attempts a more ‘bottom-up’ perspective. We aim to provide
a refined understanding of how civil defence enters memory as a ‘collec-
tively held, institutionally stabilized, and publicly performed’ vision of a
desirable future ‘animated by shared understandings of forms of social life
and social order attainable through, and supportive of, advances in science
and technology’ (Jasanoff and Kim 2015: 4).
Sociotechnical Imaginaries
and Civil Defence Memories
We believe the sociotechnical imaginaries framework could also be
employed when exploring civil defence and everyday life, but any attempt
to do this needs to address two potential problems. First, it seems to
conceptualise cultural and social change teleologically: technologies are
first imagined and then become material. It is a framework, after all, which
seeks to explain how technology is understood and circulated by societies
and cultures. Secondly, there seems to be a reliance on top-down readings
of how technologies are created, circulated and understood: technologies
are imagined and circulated by experts and taken up by others within ‘cul-
ture’. These two potential problems may, however, best be described as
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a tendency in scholarly works that have so far engaged with the frame-
work. As an overarching theory, we argue that the framework does leave
space for deeper, less clearly defined ways of understanding the cultural
and social uptake of the imaginaries discussed. In particular, the phases of
embedding, extension and resistance (see Introduction, this volume) can
all be seen as contestable spaces in which meanings are made and remade
from below.
A focus on memory allows us to explore how sociotechnical imagi-
naries can be usefully deployed to interpret everyday understandings of
civil defence in ways which nuance the two problems discussed above.
As Sheila Jasanoff herself puts it, ‘memory work’ allows ‘novel technosci-
entific constructs to be most readily naturalised when they fall into line
with the way things are remembered as being’ (Jasanoff and Kim 2015:
339). At a basic level, people’s memories always tend to diverge from
any attempt to create neat paths or narratives within the civil defence
sociotechnical imaginary. Everyday understandings of civil defence were
confused, partial and often idiosyncratic—and so are the memories. This
reflects the central, inescapably imaginary nature of civil defence. Civil
defence as a technology relied on a sense that an imaginable future could be
tackled, (hopefully) mastered or (at worst) ameliorated. The nature of the
disaster to be tackled, the assumptions about destruction, about human
behaviour in the post-attack period, all had to be imagined and were so
using historical assumptions, culturally informed ideas and insights from
the social and psychological sciences.
In rethinking and challenging the problematic teleologies of civil
defence sociotechnical imaginaries, we must stress that imaginary
scenarios were inflicted by, and mapped onto, the material world—the
physical geography and built environment—and the materiality of the
concrete civil defence technologies that were often only partly visible
(physical preparations, bunkers and so on). Jasanoff argues that the
proposed framework helps resolve the binary of ‘ideas’ and the ‘mate-
rial’, but examining civil defence memory highlights that this is not a
binary at all, that within memory work the imaginary and material are
always linked, and are indeed mutually constitutive to the process of
making meaning. It is particularly important to nuance the framework
in this way because it allows us to understand the circular, symbiotic
nature of the imaginary and the material. Jasanoff herself makes it clear
that the very idea of sociotechnical imaginaries was to examine how ideas
became a reality within ‘cultures, institutions, and materialities’. At times,
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however, the process can appear rather lineal (Jasanoff and Kim 2015:
322–323). The imaginary nature of civil defence, and the nature of
memory work, means that any linear understanding of the process by
which the imaginary is translated into ‘cultures, institutions, and mate-
rialities’ is highly problematic. That work of imagination was continual,
embedded in memory work and formed alongside interactions with and
understandings of the material. It was ‘always already at work in the
work’, as Jacques Derrida reminds us in a much-cited quote (Derrida
1986: 71).
One way to think about civil defence and to problematise processes laid
out in the sociotechnical imaginaries framework is thus to keep in mind
the essential ‘fuzziness’ of everyday life. Real-life situations are always
ambiguous, and people make meaning from their different situations in a
variety of different ways depending on identity, social position and cultural
experience. In this chapter, we have therefore chosen to highlight this
complexity by comparing different national, regional and local contexts.
The differences arising out of the empirical material are differences both
between and within Sweden and the UK. Memory work has the tendency
to sort out and (re)narrativise fuzziness, and the process of recounting
memory serves to make order out of chaos, creating new (or alternative)
frames of interpretation and creating whole new areas of ambiguity.
Historians have long argued that the circulation of dominant cultural
discourses within popular culture in the years between the events remem-
bered and the act of remembering shapes individual memory (Abrams
2010; Assman 2011; Confino 1997). Individual memory, therefore,
cannot be entirely separated from the narratives circulating within popular
culture either at the time of the events experienced or in the time sepa-
rating those events and the interview encounter in which they are recalled.
Scholars working on ‘popular memory’ have long argued that individual
memory is indelibly shaped by intervening cultural narratives (Dawson
1994), arguing that for memory to be formed, retained and recalled, the
‘conditions for its expression’ need to exist (Passerini 2003: 238). ‘Pop-
ular memory’ can be defined as an attempt to understand how cultural
discourses shape the content and form of what is recalled by individuals,
the meanings individuals attach to their own memories and the emotions
these memories provoke in them (Dawson 1994). As Penny Summerfield
puts it, individuals make sense of their experiences by drawing on:
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generalized, public versions of the aspects of the lives that they are talking
about to construct their own particular, personal accounts. This process
of life-story telling is crucial to the construction of the subject – in
reproducing the self as a social identity, we necessarily draw upon public
renderings. (Summerfield 2004: 68)
If no relevant cultural framework is readily available, individual
memory breaks down into narrative incoherence or a lack of remem-
bering. Summerfield’s popular memory approach is particularly important
for understanding the interrelationship between cultural narratives and
individual life circumstances (Summerfield 1998).
Our work maintains the position that people remain agents and are
not empty vessels awaiting cultural discourse to pour meaning into their
minds. Our comparative analysis illustrates different levels of ‘fuzziness’
of civil defence memory, and of course the intensely political nature of
civil defence merely added to this complexity. Our case studies highlight
that civil defence memory work perhaps reveals more about acts of defi-
ance or forgetting, conflicts and contradictions than it does about any
‘collectively held, institutionally stabilized, and publicly performed’ vision
(Jasanoff and Kim 2015: 4). Perhaps one way of thinking about the
fuzziness of everyday civil defence, and the difficulty in reconstructing
the meaning civil defence had during the Cold War, is to examine the
emotional dimensions of the topic. Civil defence could be seen as a tech-
nology aimed at emotional regulation, an attempt to contain and manage
fear and to encourage a more intellectual acceptance of security. The use
of civil defence as a regulatory, or governmental, technology aligns with
what William Reddy discussed as the ‘emotional regime’, the prevailing
norm about how to ‘feel’. Reddy defined the emotional regime as ‘[t]he
set of normative emotions and the official rituals, practices, and ‘emotives’
that express and inculcate them; a necessary underpinning of any stable
political regime’ (Reddy 2001: 129). As such, the concept of emotional
regime reminds us of a sociotechnical imaginary, meaning a largely top-
down structure. It also reminds us of the approach in some previous
influential studies on civil defence, such as Guy Oakes’ study on what he
calls the ‘emotional management’ of American civil defence drills (Oakes
2004).
More fruitful for the perspective in this chapter, then, is perhaps
Reddy’s idea of ‘emotional navigation’, signifying the process whereby
people navigate and negotiate their everyday lives (Reddy 2001). The
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multiple experiences of civil defence can be seen as processes not only of
collective emotional navigation through the attempt made by national
civil defence cultures to impose an ‘emotional regime’ on people but
also of individual emotional navigation through the complex emotions
that confronting civil defence would have thrown up. Concepts such as
Reddy’s ‘emotional navigation’ might then be more in line with the sort
of bottom-up approach that is needed to fully round out the sociotech-
nical imaginaries framework. Moreover, emotion, like memory and civil
defence, was not a purely individual matter, and within groups involved
in civil defence, Barbara H. Rosenwein’s idea of ‘emotional communi-
ties’ is equally useful for this reason, as it reminds us not only of the
social role of civil defence but also of the possible co-existence of various
emotional communities encompassing the whole scale of reactions to
civil defence, from enthusiasm, acceptance and obedience to criticism and
active resistance (Rosenwein 2006).
Civil Defence Memories in Sweden and the UK
In what follows, we will try to anchor this theoretical discussion in civil
defence memories from two different national contexts, Sweden and the
UK. The Swedish material consists of written responses to a question-
naire on memories of the Cold War, collected in 2006 by the Folklife
Archives with the Scania Music Collections at Lund University in collab-
oration with Marie Cronqvist. The questionnaire generated approximately
80 responses evenly distributed over generation, gender, social class and
geography (though mostly from southern Sweden). Since everyday civil
defence culture was at the core of the underlying research project, the
questionnaire had a special section devoted to memories of civil defence.1
The British material emanates from an oral history project conducted
by Matthew Grant and Lindsey Dodd between 2010 and 2012 with
people who had served in the Civil Defence Services in various capac-
ities during the 1950s and 1960s (Grant 2019). In-depth interviews
with eleven participants, either on their own or in small groups, were
conducted. There were seven men and four women who had been mainly
younger recruits who served in the late 1950s and 1960s. As members
of the Civil Defence Corps, the Auxiliary Fire Service and administrative
staff employed by a local council, they provided a mixture of experiences
from within civil defence. The semi-structured interview schedule asked
them to reflect on their reasons for joining civil defence, their experiences
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within the organisation, their thoughts about the role of civil defence in
a war and why they left the service. A central part of the interview was
about the ability of civil defence to save lives in a nuclear war. Therefore,
we get a sense of how they imagined civil defence as a technology even
though they did not use the term.
Using these two studies, we examine the memories of civil defence in
order to better address the relationship between the imaginary nature of
civil defence and the ‘cultures, institutions and materiality’ that made up
civil defence as a political and administrative project. In what follows, we
focus on three cross-cutting themes that usefully highlight not only the
interplay between imaginary and material and between representation and
experience but also the highly differentiated ways the ‘technology’ of civil
defence can be viewed when looked at from different perspectives. These
themes are localities, temporalities and mediations.
Localities
Much work on sociotechnical imaginaries takes on an explicitly national-
historical framework. Ulrike Felt argues that the concept:
sensitizes us to how profoundly technologies are entangled with national
technopolitical cultures […] and how the (non-)development of specific
technoscientific projects, on the one hand, and imagined preferred ways
of living, value structures, and social order, on the other, are mutually
constitutive. (Felt 2015: 104)
Felt focused on the peculiarly national response of Austria to new
technology, but we can extend her insight both to a comparative dimen-
sion and to the wide range of various local contexts within nations.
Civil defence, we can see, was understood differently within these local
contexts, and our comparative national dimension makes this distinction
all the sharper.
A clear pattern emerging from the answers in the Swedish question-
naire is the radically different experiences in rural areas compared to
urban ones. Living in the sparsely populated countryside was still the
reality for the absolute majority of Swedes in the 1950s and 1960s. ‘You
have to remember I lived in the countryside and I had no part in those
things’, says one woman, born on the Swedish west coast in the 1930s.2
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Other informants also specifically address the lack of civil defence memo-
ries and experiences, referring explicitly to their rural upbringing. Nor
did the much-discussed civil defence leaflet Om kriget kommer: Vägled-
ning för Sveriges medborgare (‘If the war comes: Instructions for Swedish
citizens’), distributed to all households in Sweden in 1943, 1952 and
1961 (Cronqvist 2012), leave a trace. ‘I have no recollections of total
defence, shelters or evacuation rehearsals, and no memories of a civil
defence leaflet’, the same woman writes. The leaflet seems to have disap-
peared in the daily recycling of paper at the farm, as toilet paper in the
outhouse or as material for lightning the fire. In fact, even the Cold War
as a time period and concept seems to be quite vague with these infor-
mants. These rural postwar experiences indicate that maybe even the Cold
War itself was considered an urban phenomenon.
In Sweden’s more densely populated areas, the situation seems to have
been very different. A typical answer here is the very detailed informa-
tion from Gertrud, born in the city of Gothenburg, Sweden’s second
largest city: ‘We had public shelters in the apartment complex where I
lived, and I was a member of the civil defence and had to go through
exercises in how you take care of injured people or the mentally chal-
lenged’.3 Recollections from informants from later generations indicate
similar experiences as parts of their everyday life. School evacuation drills
were a common feature of being a child in Stockholm, Gothenburg or
Malmö in the 1950s and 1960s, and the world’s largest peacetime mass
evacuation exercise involving a quarter of a million people was held in
Stockholm in 1961. The construction of a series of mass public shelters
for up to 10,000 people also defined the everyday cityscape in postwar
urban Sweden (Cronqvist 2012, 2015).
The urban–rural divide was experienced very differently in the UK,
mainly because civil defence was remarkably absent in urban centres for
much of the Cold War (Grant 2011). There were no mass public shelters,
and as the country was a central Cold War antagonist, it was perceived
that, if war did come, British cities would simply be obliterated. This is
perhaps the reason why voluntary civil defence struggled in British cities: a
sense that it was fruitless. Real experiences of bombing during the Second
World War could be one explanation, experiences that separate the UK
from a country like neutral Sweden, which experienced no bombing at
all. We can certainly see that urban civil defence became the focus of
resistance to the idea that civil defence could work (the idea of civil
defence as a technology, as it were). Opposition to civil defence focused
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on the idea that it was worthless, and Nicholas Barnett has written about
a tense encounter between civil defence volunteers and local protesters in
Coventry in 1954 (Barnett 2015). The fact that British cities would be
targeted, and that civil defence could not protect people, helped entrench
resistance to civil defence and promote the idea that it was a somewhat
ridiculous endeavour.
In rural areas, however, voluntary civil defence was in a much healthier
state. We can see three reasons for this. First, the volunteers were not
in immediate target areas and therefore would be more receptive to
the argument that although volunteers would have no impact in urban
centres, much would be possible at the perimeter of the zone of destruc-
tion. Second, it could be argued that people in rural areas had different
ideas of community and neighbourliness, which made them more likely to
volunteer. Or, conversely, there was less competition for the leisure time
of these people than there was in cities. Third, rural areas were also more
conservative and contained more people who would seek leisure satis-
faction within a uniformed, quasi-military government-sponsored service.
And they were governed by elected local politicians who were much more
pro-civil defence than their left-wing counterparts in the city.
One interview story neatly illustrates this divide. Robert volunteered
for the Auxiliary Fire Service (AFS) in Cardiff, the major urban centre of
Wales and, with its docks and industry, an obvious target. When asked
about the usefulness of civil defence, he replied:
People were talking about cities being obliterated and enormous fire storms
and so on. And really, thinking back to it, the AFS wouldn’t have been
able to do very much. Not really. You could’ve contained the fire around
the edge but there’s no way you could’ve –4
At this point, Robert abruptly changed the subject, unwilling or unable
to let his sentence reach this logical conclusion and admit the redundancy
of civil defence. Instead, he went on to deliver a long and detailed anec-
dote about his AFS unit extinguishing a fire in Ludlow on the unit’s way
back from a training exercise. The story of defeating a barn fire allowed
Robert to regain the composure lost when explaining the difficulties that
the AFS would have faced in a nuclear war. It was a well-told story that
had clearly been aired regularly. It also helped explain that the AFS was
an effective organisation. After he had cast doubt on the usefulness of
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the AFS in the context of nuclear war, Robert’s story highlighted circum-
stances where it, and his own service within it, had been effective and
worthwhile. Later in the interview, Robert was able to return to the issue
of usefulness with more confidence, arguing that ‘I think we felt, yes, that
we would be able to help, maybe perhaps only on the periphery of some-
thing, but we did have the equipment’.5 Robert’s Ludlow story might
not be enough to convince critics of urban civil defence of its utility,
but it allowed him to articulate that the voluntary services would have
been of ‘some’ use by presenting a ‘real-life’ example of usefulness. This
memory was a part of Robert’s very positive experiences of civil defence.
He concluded: ‘[W]e had a wonderful time. We were very late getting
back to Cardiff but we, it was a great, a great Sunday’. In essence, civil
defence in its rural setting was remembered positively as being active and
manageable in a way urban civil defence could never be.
Temporalities
There are three interlinked aspects in the discussion of temporalities of
civil defence memory in relation to the sociotechnical imaginaries frame-
work: periodisation within the Cold War, a direct sense of being of a
‘generation’, and the unique impact the threat of nuclear war had on
temporalities and the experience of time. Understandings of civil defence
shifted over the course of the Cold War, as is to be expected. The interre-
lationship between the technology of civil defence and the political-military
nature of the Cold War is vital to understanding the history of civil
defence. Civil defence was viewed differently at different points in time,
but it was also viewed differently depending on social class, gender and
not least generation.
From the point of view of political history, whether the early fears
were of a war fought with conventional weapons, atomic bombs or ther-
monuclear bombs, the civil defence imaginary had to adjust. Even in the
thermonuclear era, civil defence was viewed differently in the 1960s, when
‘mutually assured destruction’ (MAD) was assumed, compared to the
1980s, when there were various debates about nuclear issues, including
the possibilities of a ‘limited war’ and the prospect of a ‘nuclear winter’.
This changing political nature of the Cold War is key to understanding
‘resistance’ to civil defence. To put it simply, in the UK at least, there
was increasing distance between what civil defence experts claimed the
‘technology’ could achieve (in terms of survival and protection) and what
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people believed would be the case (Grant 2010; Stafford 2012), to the
extent that the state largely retreated from engaging in public education
initiatives after the early 1980s (Preston 2015).
Resistance to the civil defence imaginary, then, could come in multiple
forms and must be viewed differently across different periods within the
Cold War. At its most basic, it could come in the form of denial—
conscious or unconscious. One informant answering the Swedish ques-
tionnaire misunderstood the entire question about the Cold War, and
instead answered by talking about the Second World War, explaining that
‘[a] big part of my childhood was marked by the Second World War’.6 For
him, the war was the important event, and what followed was less impor-
tant. Another informant declared her standpoint by sending a very short
reply to the questionnaire stating that she refused to answer any ques-
tions here because in her home as a child, one was not supposed to talk
about ‘the war’. However, it is notable that she did bother to send that
short statement, as a way of ‘talking back’ to the questionnaire designer.
Wally, a man who actually served in Civil Defence in the UK, was unable
to recall any detail of his service, his motivations for joining or indeed the
wider purpose of civil defence. He did, however, talk at length about both
his experiences during the Second World War and his post-civil defence
work volunteering with Army veterans.7 Clearly for all these three voices,
in their minds, the Second World War was the big event, both in terms of
their own life course and emotional experiences and within wider cultural
memory.
For others, however, the link between Cold War civil defence and the
Second World War was a way of comprehending the subject, of making
it more knowable and less abstract. In this sense, such memory work
could be seen to form part of the process of embedding. One partici-
pant, Frank, served in the Auxiliary Fire Service arm of civil defence. He
was born in 1948 and remembered the wartime generation: ‘We were
fortunate enough to have guys who’d been firefighters. Our gaffer, uh,
John Reynard, he’d been a firefighter in the war anyway’. Central to this
was the sense of expertise of an experienced generation, ‘they carried on
in the Auxiliary Fire Service, so we had good people training us, you
know, they’d pass their knowledge on’.8 Considering all the fundamental
differences between Sweden and the UK in the experience of the Second
World War and not least of the bombing of civilian targets, the extent to
which the war constantly functions as a point of reference is as striking
in Sweden as it is in the UK. For a certain generation, it seems to be
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impossible to even talk about the Cold War as something other than a
prolongation of the Second World War.
To return to the subject of what in the sociotechnical imaginary frame-
work is named resistance, in our material, political opposition to civil
defence is also visible. But it could also take the form of objecting to
civil defence’s coercive nature in general and its place within govern-
mental state authority. A vital part of the civil defence ‘technology’ was
its position within the state, and states having the ability to control their
population were essential to the idea that civil defence could indeed
‘work’ and supply a (more) desirable future. Karin, a Swedish nurse born
in 1929, remembered: ‘When I was 15 or 16, me and my classmates
were called by the civil defence to a cottage filled with tear gas. You were
supposed to run through that cottage. One of my friends was pregnant
and refused to show up. She was collected by the police and was forced
to run through the cottage’.9 In the UK, much of the resistance to civil
defence was along similar lines: that it was a symbol of state power. It is
no surprise that many of the most memorable scenes from popular film
and television concentrated on this theme, including the police shooting
looters in The War Game (1965) and armed traffic wardens in Threads
(1984). In the same vein, ‘bunkers’ were the preserve of the authorities
and denied to the public.
One of the constants of Cold War historiography is the debate
about when it started, when it ended and whether it existed at all (see
Stephanson 2012; Nehring 2012; Romero 2014). In many ways, the
‘Cold War’ only becomes a coherent historical event or period in retro-
spect. Even then, the differences between considering it an event (a ‘war’)
and a period (in which all events and experiences are understood as occur-
ring within the ‘Cold War Age’, as it were) are elided when civil defence
is made the focus of study. Civil defence was both a clear part of the fabric
of the Cold War-as-war and part of the fabric of everyday life. This is why
civil defence is so important to study as the point at which the military
conflict enters the realm of ordinary experience. A good example of this
comes from a male informant, born in the south of Sweden, who said:
‘I was born in 1960 and am one of millions of people in what we can
call the “Cold War generation”’. However, as he goes on remembering
his childhood, he is in a paradoxical way reluctant to relate this gener-
ational experience to real Cold War fears. ‘I don’t think that, living in
Sweden, we thought very much about the world being on the brink of a
nuclear war’, he says.10 This is highly revealing of Cold War memory: a
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general sense of living though the ‘Cold War’, being part of that ‘gener-
ation’, but struggling to pin down any specific experiences or immediate
relevance. We could posit that this is typical of respondents who want to
‘forget’ the fear of the Cold War, or who are ‘unable’ to remember it,
but it could equally be suggested that this complex and difficult memory
work is shaped exactly by the effect of civil defence. Viewed in terms of
a sociotechnical imaginary, the memory of a Cold War generation high-
lights the ‘pastness’ of civil defence and its relative lack of purchase in
contemporary life.
Within memory work, however, those recalling civil defence and the
threat of nuclear war are re-encountering a past which, for many, had no
future. To put it starkly, the Cold War involved large numbers of people
imagining that there was no future, that historical time was not an open
horizon (Grant 2016). The social, cultural and psychological impact of
this imaginative labour has yet to be fully explored, yet the histories of
civil defence, the global peace movements, and political and diplomatic
notions of nuclear deterrence are scarcely possible without the funda-
mental notion that the end of humanity, of time, had to be confronted
(see Andersson 2012; Connelly et al. 2012). Of course, civil defence was
both an attempt to avoid such an apocalyptic catastrophe, instead imag-
ining a more desirable future, and a way of rationalising it. But the fact
that individuals struggle to adequately remember this process, to bridge
that temporal gap, highlights the need to understand the civil defence
imaginary in more nuanced, textured ways. In this sense, it is perhaps
useful to bear in mind that within Cold War generations, memory work
involves the participants attempting to reconstruct different ‘planes of
historicity’ (Koselleck 2004: 9–25), and one of the contributions a study
of civil defence can make to rethinking sociotechnical imaginaries as a field
of analysis is to provide a more nuanced questioning of how ‘the future’
part of ‘desirable futures’ was understood.
Central to this aspect of memory work is the remembering of ways
civil defence was rationalised and how people coped with the threat of
nuclear wars. A number of the Swedish informants, especially those born
in the 1920s and 1930s, remember their teenage years as a period of
non-engagement in politics and global issues. One aspect of this was
preoccupation with the ‘everyday’, with growing up, child-rearing and
other aspects of the intimate sphere, all of which kept people’s minds busy
and relegated foreign policy to the fringes of concern. But the comments
also reveal a form of critique of the Cold War mindset imposed from
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above. Commenting on the civil defence leaflet ‘If War Comes’, one
person remembers: ‘I kept [it] in a special place. But I guess it was mostly
to show my children the value of keeping things in order at home’.11
Memories of child experiences of evacuation drills are also visible in
the answers to the Swedish questionnaire, and often these memories are
narrativised precisely along the lines of what Jasanoff and Kim call resis-
tance or a form of distancing from the bizarre daily life of adults. One
woman, born in 1932, remembers watching the adults evacuating. ‘As
children we stood and giggled when the fat ladies ran. We found it hilar-
ious’, she remembers.12 Another informant, born in 1936, is even more
explicit in his criticism. He remembers civil defence in the 1950s as some-
thing he and his friends considered more as a joke than a serious matter.
‘“Wash yourselves in ordinary soap and water” seems to have been the
standard answer to any question’, he remembers, and he also recalls that
he read civil defence brochures ‘without any enthusiasm’. The Cold War
did not have much effect on his life or feelings at all, he concludes.13
In a similar way, three women were interviewed as a group about their
experiences working in Coventry’s Civil Defence Headquarters in the
1950s and 1960s. They had very different memories of the nuclear threat
and expressed very different emotional responses to questions, something
that threatened to disrupt the interview entirely. The emotional tenor of
the interview, and the inter-subjective encounter, was ‘saved’ by discussing
the small details of daily office life, especially its more domestic aspects:
the coffee breaks, the co-workers, even the large bath which was available
for them to use.14 The interview encounter asked them to place them-
selves at a certain moment of historical time, and to attempt to recover
their emotional responses. This is enormously difficult, not to say impos-
sible. The fact that it led to quotidian memories of the everyday is far from
meaningless in Cold War terms, however. It highlighted the role of such
memories in securing people in narratives of the past which were more
recoverable, and more comforting, than discussing the nuclear threat.
Mediations
Cold War civil defence memory work, it could be argued, is particularly
open to the entanglement of popular culture in people’s recollections.
As it was experienced largely as an imaginary, it naturally meant that
people relied on existing narratives and images to make sense of it at the
time, and to make sense of their memories of it subsequently. The lack of
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cultural value attributed to civil defence in the years following the Cold
War would have only deepened the sense that it was hard to remember.
Put simply, the mediated nature of memories highlights that the memory
of civil defence is at the same time creating and reflecting cultural expres-
sions. This means that any hard divide between ideas/materiality or even
structure/agency are impossible or perhaps even meaningless. We argue
that the attention to mediated memories problematises, or even dissolves,
potential hard binaries in the sociotechnical imaginaries framework—a
dissolution in fact also encouraged by Jasanoff herself in the introduction
to the book Dreamscapes of modernity (Jasanoff and Kim 2015: 29).
It is clear from our oral history sources both the answers to the
Swedish questionnaire and the UK interviews—that what people seem to
remember about civil defence is often deeply entangled in, supported by
and sometimes contradicted by media images, news articles and popular
culture. In this way, cultural memory is always already mediated—or even
remediated (Erll and Rigney 2009). Therefore, it is fruitless and ahis-
torical to attempt to completely disaggregate the social experience of
the Cold War from popular culture within individual memory; both are
indeed central to memory work. Again, this reminds us of the ‘fuzziness’
of both memory and everyday life, and that perhaps the extension–resis-
tance–embedding processes of the sociotechnical imaginaries framework
need to be seen as more fluid than the language of ‘turning imagination
into social practice’ suggests, perhaps even as anti-linear (Jasanoff and Kim
2015: 323).
Media images are constantly present on different levels in the Swedish
material. References to and memories of civil defence and the Cold
War in general are often surrounded by recollections of everyday media
practices and iconic historic events told by or channelled through the
media. One informant remembers sitting by the radio with his father
one night, listening to the first atom bomb test at Bikini atoll. Others
simply remember parents reading newspapers, listening to radio, watching
television and talking with low voices about Korea, Cuba or Vietnam.15
Margareta from Stockholm recalls evacuation exercises and civil defence
drills of the early 1960s; however, big Cold War events were mediated in
her everyday life in a completely different way. ‘[T]here was a hero from
the Soviet Union, Gagarin who was an astronaut [sic]’, she notes. ‘What
an exciting man he was, and handsome too. I put up his picture on the
wall in my room’.16 Another informant, Ingrid, remembers the imme-
diate postwar years as filled with exciting American experiences: chewing
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gum, Coca-Cola, nylon stockings, movie stars and ‘the new look’.17 The
generational aspect is also dominant here, as media images of the Cold
War as an everyday experience shift. Ida and Nils, both born about twenty
years later in the 1970s, mainly associate the Cold War with sport events
such as the 1980 and 1984 Olympic Games in Moscow and Los Angeles
or the iconic World Chess Championships in Reykjavik and elsewhere.
‘[I]t was easier to see the conflict as a hockey game’, Ida writes. She also
remembers a nuclear shelter at her school, but it was used as a rehearsal
studio for her rock band—enforcing perhaps the ‘underground’ feeling of
engaging with youth and subculture in a military space.18
Even among the UK volunteers who served in civil defence, mediated
images were central to their understanding of the nuclear threat and the
ability of the civil defence organisation to tackle it. Julian, a volunteer
from Cardiff, remembered ‘it was interesting and frightening […] when
you hear about the effect these things had. I mean, you had these films
which showed the effect of an atomic blast, where you can see the build-
ings and then the dust and then the wind and the buildings gone’.19
Crucially, the filmed images of the bomb were central to the imagina-
tive gameplay that typified civil defence. ‘And we did an exercise when
we were up at Easingwold [the civil defence training centre in the North
of England] and they dropped a five-kilotonne bomb on the centre of
Reading. How do you deal with it? Which is what we then did. And as I
say, there was one bloke who reckoned we should forget about the centre
because they’d be gone. And concentrate on the outer part. All the rest
of us weren’t willing to abandon the people in the middle you know, but
having said that, they were probably all dead anyway’.20
One of the interviews was a complex exchange involving three women
who worked in the civil defence headquarters of Coventry. They were not
volunteers, but paid employees of the local council. They remembered the
training films for atomic blasts. Pamela, who left the council to join the
police force, remembered:
the police cadets used to come up and borrow them for their training
didn’t they, before I joined the police force, and they used to take them
back to police headquarters and then bring them back; I can remember
they were in a filing cabinet at the end of the office […]. But then
when I was a cadet, I had to watch those films in the basement of police
headquarters. Police headquarters in Coventry has got um, a, supposedly,
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bomb-proof basement […]. Yeah, so we used to watch those films down
there. Absolutely terrifying.21
The discussion of the films led one participant to reveal the depths of
her anxiety about nuclear war. Doris said:
The thing I remember mostly about this was I used to get quite worried
about the atom bombing. I remember being quite concerned about my
parents, what would happen to them because we would go into the air
raid shelter, the control place, and my parents would be on their own.
And uh, I used to try and persuade people to [...] where I lived it was
sort of square houses with great long back gardens, and I used to try to
persuade people to build a shelter in the middle of this and fit it out with
food, all the things we were supposed to do […]. I used to try very hard
to get them to build a shelter so they could all go into it, but nobody
would listen to me.22
The third member of the group, Barbara, had very a very different
memory: ‘No, I never saw that training film you were on about, I can’t
ever really have been worried about anything’.23
At the level of everyday practice, the civil defence organisation relied
on imagination, providing a simulacrum of defence against nuclear war.
Images of nuclear war were just as central to civil defence activists as they
were for the mass of ‘ordinary’ people who confronted the Cold War. Lars
Nowak has written about the centrality of training films for civil defence
in the United States (Nowak 2016), and in the UK, representations
of nuclear war were central in ways that illustrate the interrelationship
between the imaginary and the material (see Chapter 5 by Bennesved and
Sylvest in this volume). Civil defence exercises remind us that civil defence
was performative, and that this performative element was intrinsically
material. Civil defence activities often involved physical reconstructions
of the post-attack city used to demonstrate how civil defence would save
lives (Grant 2010). Moreover, Cold War civil defence could be read onto
the materiality of urban space, as Coventry was still in the midst of a
slow process of reconstruction after the devastating attack suffered during
the Second World War. Memory (of a different war), imagination and
materiality could not be separated. Jessica Douthwaite, in an important
article on the complexity of the memory work undertaken by former
civil defence volunteers who attempted to reconstruct how training exer-
cises ‘rehearsed’ nuclear war, also argues that mediation and materiality
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were inseparable. As the rehearsal of a ‘deferred’ nuclear attack was
remembered, Douthwaite’s participants were able to reach ‘a historical
understanding of mediated consciousness’ (Douthwaite 2019: 199).
Conclusion
A key aspect of engaging with the sociotechnical imaginaries framework
is investigating the concept’s usability. What are the strengths and weak-
nesses of the concept when transferred to other fields of analysis? The
aim of this chapter has been to explore how the framework can be
used to examine a technology that is remembered in a fundamentally
altered political-cultural context. The chapter has employed a historical
ethnography approach, using primarily oral history sources, interviews
and questionnaires collected between 2006 and 2012. We have chosen a
comparative approach with examples from the UK and Sweden, revealing
both similarities and fundamental differences between the two countries.
But also—and perhaps more importantly—we have shown, through our
empirical examples from the UK and Sweden respectively, that people’s
memories tend to constantly diverge from the neat paths of the civil
defence imaginary. Essentially, there was no single way of understanding
civil defence at the time and certainly no single way of remembering it
decades later. Understandings were, and still are, shaped and reshaped by
social and cultural factors such as locations, temporalities and mediations.
But the evidence also highlights that the interlinking of the imaginary
and the material led to civil defence being at the same time curiously
unrooted in memory and (Cold War) wider society. The chapter serves,
then, as a cultural history of the circular feedback-loop implied in the
origins–embedding–extension–resistance processes. Our case studies high-
light some of the difficulties people had in fully grasping civil defence or
fully recapturing its meaning. When analysing the course of a sociotech-
nical imaginary through cultures and societies, more attention has to be
paid to the quotidian, messy and partial ways it was understood and
sometimes rejected in everyday life.
Our chapter also illustrates that the emotionology of civil defence could
not be fully grasped through traditional analyses of top-down ‘emotional
management’ but requires complementary ‘bottom-up’ approaches. This
cognitive gap between emotion and memory in civil defence history needs
further exploration, and we hope the comparison in this chapter of oral
histories in Sweden and the UK has served to open up such a discussion.
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It could be a function of the operation of memory mentioned above. It
could provide clues about the everyday manoeuvring required to adjust to
civil defence, to confront the anxiety seemingly inherent in the Cold War
nuclear confrontation and to reason out debates about nuclear security,
deterrence, protest and disarmament. The ‘emotional navigation’ charted
by individuals may have been as much about not engaging with nuclear
anxiety as anything else, but civil defence as a sociotechnical imaginary
certainly asked people to confront that choice even as it sought to provide
reassurance. The non-engagement, the refusal to answer questions about
civil defence, the complete lack of memories and the misunderstandings—
conscious or unconscious—are sometimes also paradoxical statements in
themselves. They could at the same time actively resist and confirm the
threat of nuclear war. In the words of Carl-Erik, born in a small Swedish
town in the early 1930s: ‘My daily life really didn’t change. We humans
do have a remarkable ability to blank out the unbearable’.24
The complexity and divergence of everyday life are as familiar to any
ethnographer as the multilayered processes of remembering are known to
the researcher of historical culture. As the vast and significant scholarship
on memory studies keeps reminding us: memories are not merely experi-
enced, but are constantly made and remade in the light of new presents.
What this chapter has brought to the table is a discussion of how we may
complement or refine the sociotechnical imaginary framework to incorpo-
rate at least some elements of the fuzziness of everyday life and how these
elements of everyday culture relate to processes of embedding, resistance
and extension of civil defence in Sweden, the UK and beyond.
Notes
1. LUF220 Kalla kriget, Folklivsarkivet (LUF), Lund. The question-
naire was initiated by Marie Cronqvist as a part of the research
project ‘The people’s home in the atomic age: Civil defence and
the Swedish narrative of community’, financed by the Swedish
National Research Council (VR) 2005–2009.
2. LUF 220: Astrid, b. 1937.
3. LUF 220: Gertrud, b. 1927.
4. Interview with Julian and Robert.
5. Interview with Julian and Robert.
6. LUF 220 Kalla kriget. Bengt, b. 1935.
7. Interview with Wally.
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8. Interview with Frank.
9. LUF 220 Kalla kriget. Karin, b. 1929.
10. LUF 220 Kalla kriget. Staffan, b. 1960.
11. LUF 220 Kalla kriget. Harald, b. 1921.
12. LUF 220 Kalla kriget. Lilian, b. 1932.
13. LUF 220 Kalla kriget. Thorsten, b. 1936.
14. Interview with Barbara, Doris, and Pamela.
15. LUF 220 Kalla kriget. For example Rune, b. 1933; Gertrud, b.
1927, Ingrid, b. 1934.
16. LUF 220 Kalla kriget. Margareta, b. 1950.
17. LUF 220 Kalla kriget. Ingrid, b. 1934.
18. LUF 220 Kalla kriget. Ida, b. 1974.
19. Interview with Julian and Robert.
20. Interview with Julian and Robert.
21. Interview with Barbara, Doris and Pamela.
22. Interview with Barbara, Doris and Pamela.
23. Interview with Barbara, Doris and Pamela.
24. LUF 220 Kalla kriget. Carl Erik, b. 1931.
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CHAPTER 10
Conclusion: Civil Defence Futures
(Re)imagined
Marie Cronqvist, Rosanna Farbøl, and Casper Sylvest
As a collective effort, Cold War Civil Defence in Western Europe has
sought to bring together new and established perspectives in civil defence
history within a theoretical framework sensitive to transnational dynamics:
from mighty international organisations to local groups in peripheral
areas, from top-down plans and ambitions of authorities to everyday
practices of individuals on the ground, from futuristic visions to fuzzy
memories and hard materialities, from embracement to resistance. As a
whole, the book highlights important and extensive European variations
in how societies and peoples grappled with the nuclear threat and how
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they were transformed in the process, but it also points to similarities,
as well as a myriad of transnational connections. Together, the chapters
enrich our understanding of civil defence in the nuclear age within and
across national boundaries. In this short conclusion, we offer a few reflec-
tions on three themes. First, we bring up the value and challenges of the
theoretical approach employed in this book. Second, we highlight the
most striking findings, commonalities and differences across the chapters.
As a third and final point, we stress the importance of civil defence history
at a time when policymakers are once again seeking to promote prepared-
ness and devoting energy and resources to its embedding in cultures,
institutions and citizenries.
Theoretical Reflections
One starting point for this book was to explore the merits and potential of
studying civil defence through the concept of sociotechnical imaginaries
(Jasanoff and Kim 2015; Jasanoff 2015a, b). This approach, presented
and discussed in the Introduction to the volume, has provided a common
vocabulary, which was central to the ambition of moving beyond a decid-
edly national tilt in civil defence history and making linkages visible and
comparisons possible. Indeed, the framework has sharpened our analytical
focus and facilitated comparisons, while allowing for diversity, dynamism
and creativity. Moreover, it has allowed us to highlight the central role
of technology in civil defence and to study the multiple forms of power
that were involved in civil defence practices, whether they involved the
rehearsal of strategies for survival during catastrophes, the disciplining
of citizens or the (re)shaping of societies and everyday life. While tech-
nology and technological development has been a subtext of several
existing studies of civil defence history, the benefits of working with a
common vocabulary that explicitly theorises the role of technology in
social life has allowed us to identify ways in which both nuclear and non-
nuclear technologies were integral to civil defence as vision and practice.
Finally, the concept of sociotechnical imaginaries has cast light on the
social embeddedness of civil defence by focusing attention on how this
concept prompted new forms of social interaction and reflected existing
social norms in an age when nuclear technologies were swathed in fear of
doom and hope of survival. The depth and breadth of the chapters testify
to these advantages.
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To be sure, the versatility of the concept of sociotechnical imagi-
naries—its capacity to be harnessed for a wide variety of research questions
and themes in the human sciences—goes a long way towards explaining
its uptake and the increasing popularity of the line of questioning the
wider approach entails. Yet, this is not the entire story. Another attraction
of this approach lies in its tendency to incorporate and connect to a wide
range of themes and lines of enquiry that are central to contemporary
research in the humanities and social sciences. They include, self-evidently,
a resurgence of interest pertaining to the role of science and technology in
human life but also a curiosity about the human faculty of imagination,
the role of futures in social and political life, a sensitivity to the multi-
faceted forms of power that are enacted in these contexts and a renewed
appreciation of the role of materiality in human interaction.
That said, it is a striking feature of the growing literature that it focuses
on brighter visions of technological possibilities—or, to be precise, visions
that, although they can be (and are) criticised, centre plainly on the bene-
fits rather than threats to human beings and the world they inhabit.
Examples of these imaginaries range from autonomous driving and energy
transition to digital transformation, genetically engineered crops and the
fourth industrial revolution.1 Many of these studies highlight the gener-
ative potential of technological future thinking whereby actors not only
formulate visions but also (seek to) ‘perform and produce’ them (Urry
2016: 9). Such studies also harness the critical potential of the concept
of sociotechnical imaginaries by highlighting the inconsistencies, gaps or
flight of fancy that they tend to entail, thus making clear that sociotech-
nical imaginaries are ‘contested, changeable, flexible and loose around the
edges’ (Sismondi 2020: 505).
Still, it is remarkable that few studies have so far employed the
concept for those imaginaries that are negative, protective or preserving
in nature—imaginaries that are overwhelmingly found in areas of health,
safety, security and risk. Civil defence is one such case, focused as it is on
a safeguarding vision of ensuring resilience, the continuation of social life
or bare survival in the face of total war. Overall, we think the chapters
in this book demonstrate that the concept of sociotechnical imaginaries
is useful for the study of an inherently ambiguous imaginary like civil
defence, caught as it was between dystopian and utopian projections.
Fulfilling the ambitions of this collective project and operationalising
the theoretical approach in diverse historical contexts and at various levels
of analysis has, at times, been complicated. We set out with an open
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mind to explore the potential of the concept of sociotechnical imagi-
naries in empirical, historical research, and at an early stage we identified
a series of challenges, some of which are dealt with briefly in the Intro-
duction to this volume. In addition, several chapters raise and engage
with potential shortcomings of the approach such as the tendency to
foreground top-down perspectives and the inclination to approach imagi-
naries within a linear, perhaps even teleological, perspective at the expense
of the complexity that historians traditionally emphasise. What emerges
from the attempt to use the approach in historical studies of civil defence
is the importance of perspective and context for assessing the ways in
which imaginaries functioned. This comes to the fore in the chapters that
focus on the public sphere or on how civil defence was practised on the
ground.
In exploring the concept of sociotechnical imaginaries empirically, the
chapters demonstrate that it can indeed be adjusted to inform a range of
analyses, just as it is compatible with a series of perspectives and priori-
ties that emerge from the humanistic interest in human beings as both
the producers and products of history. Indeed, the contributors to this
volume have developed important theoretical adjustments and refine-
ments, while also adding historical depth to the concept of sociotechnical
imaginaries. Jasanoff’s definition can be read as an instinctively positive
evaluation of the role of science and technology in that complex histor-
ical development we conveniently (but loosely) refer to as modernity. One
example of this is the emphasis on ‘desirable futures’ in the definition of
these imaginaries and their propensity to be ‘supportive of’ advances in
science and technology. On closer inspection, however, and as Bjørnsson
discusses in Chapter 2, the concept allows for a wider application and can
accommodate a greater degree of complexity than the definition may at
first glance suggest. In the context of civil defence, the desirable future
is seldom a bright future. The desirable is to find a way to collectively
handle the demanding threats to society.
Applying the concept to civil defence places special emphasis on the
series of ambivalences about science, technology and progress that often
accompanies visions of human futures and modernisation. In some cases,
these traits are not only found in forms of resistance but also exist at the
very heart of imaginaries. In that context, it is also worth stressing how
the notion of civil defence as (forming part of) a sociotechnical imag-
inary constitutes a balancing act by appealing at once to an amalgam
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of the ideals of a security paradigm (technologised efficiency, organisa-
tion, preparation) and a complex of existing norms and values (ranging
from social beliefs to humanitarian values). Crucially, these commit-
ments are juggled against a backdrop of uncertainty and controversy
created by unfathomable weapons technologies. Theoretically, this points
to the importance of legitimacy and credibility in the study of imagi-
naries revolving around controversial technologies that carry high risks.
These themes deserve more theoretical attention within the study of
sociotechnical imaginaries.
The intricacies of human–technology relations are revealed especially
in the context of the Cold War and in the shadow of nuclear annihila-
tion. Using a wide array of historical sources and analytical approaches,
the book advances a multifaceted understanding and application of the
concept of sociotechnical imaginaries that highlights social and historical
processes in all their ambiguity and ‘fuzziness’, as Cronqvist and Grant
(Chapter 9) term it. Sociotechnical imaginaries of civil defence were real
and affected European societies and the lives of people. They were much
more than plans, communication, initiatives and constructions rolled out
from the top of those societies or their central institutions. While a range
of chapters in the book highlight and study these ‘official’ imaginaries
and the myriad attempts at embedding them in norms, institutions and
ways of thinking, it is a distinct contribution of this volume to the theo-
retical discussion of this approach that it underscores how sociotechnical
imaginaries are also produced, transformed and inhabited by individuals,
organisations and practices in local, regional or professional contexts. We
see such processes at work in the social life of North-Western England of
the 1950s (Chapter 4), in the development of German disaster medicine
(Chapter 3), in the ruin towns of provincial Denmark (Chapter 7) and in
opposition to civil defence in the Netherlands and Switzerland (Chap-
ters 6 and 8). This everyday and bottom-up perspective is vital for
understanding how sociotechnical imaginaries function.
Common Themes and New Insights
The book has explored the nature and infrastructures of civil defence
imaginaries at the international, transnational, national, regional and local
levels. Across these boundaries, a common feature in several of the
studies collected in this volume is the Western European delay or diffi-
culty in adapting to the nuclear age. Well into the 1950s, the atomic
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bomb seemed more like an abstraction compared to the more imme-
diate experience of suffering in the recent war. Hence, early imaginaries
of civil defence looked to the European past to see the future. The only
wartime nuclear attacks the world had experienced, those on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki in August 1945, played a surprisingly marginal role. On the
European continent, in contrast to a good deal of American civil defence
thinking, which saw the beginnings of a transition towards atomic war
already in the late 1940s and early 1950s, it was the recent destruction of
German cities like Hamburg, Dresden and Cologne and the air raids on
allied cities like London that constituted the framework for understanding
total war and nuclear defence.
The importance of the Second World War in the early development
of European civil defence is highlighted in most of the chapters in this
book. Referring to what he calls ‘the underlying imagined disastrous’,
Jochen Molitor states in his contribution (Chapter 3) that this ‘was not
so much based on the theoretical premises of nuclear warfare, but rather
on first-hand experiences of the allied bombings of the recent past’.
Furthermore, as demonstrated by Cronqvist and Grant (Chapter 9), for
some civil defenders, memories of the Second World War trumped under-
standings of the Cold War—even when they were explicitly asked to
talk about the latter. References to Hiroshima were not absent, but they
often served the function of highlighting the astonishing and increasing
yield of atomic bombs and confirming a depressing trajectory of modern
warfare. The atomic bomb was overwhelmingly shoehorned into an
existing world view, despite the recognition, hesitantly at times, that the
new weapons technology presented a new, but difficult-to-grasp, invisible
danger: radioactivity.
It was only with the arrival of the H bomb during the mid-1950s
that a more systematic rethinking—especially in the public sphere—of
the nature of nuclear war and, consequently, sociotechnical imaginaries
of civil defence that were markedly nuclear in orientation really emerged
(see in particular Chapters 2 and 5). The centre of gravity now lay in an
unknown and unstable future. In the House of Commons in March 1955,
Winston Churchill famously argued that the British people had entered a
period in which safety would be ‘the sturdy child of terror and survival
the twin brother of annihilation’ (Bourke 2006: 261). What this precisely
meant for civil defence was not clear at the time, but its effects in Western
Europe came to display both similarities and differences.
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One common feature of civil defence thinking in the wake of the H
bomb was that atomic or nuclear war was, on the one hand, accorded
more explicit attention in civil defence thinking, communication and prac-
tice, while, on the other hand, often appearing as an un(der)specified
phenomenon. This was the case, for example, in Britain, Germany,
Denmark and Sweden, as illustrated by Molitor (Chapter 3), Hogg
(Chapter 4), Farbøl (Chapter 7), and Bennesved and Sylvest (Chapter 5).
Strikingly, these countries are marked by obvious and important differ-
ences: a nuclear-armed NATO member state (the UK), a NATO member
state hosting foreign nuclear weapons (West Germany) and two non-
nuclear states (Denmark and Sweden), one a NATO member and the
other following a policy of armed neutrality (while secretly pursuing a
nuclear weapons capability). Despite these differences, it was a marked
feature of the sociotechnical imaginaries of civil defence that were created
in these countries, above all by authorities, that there were few, if any,
references to the causes or specific nature of the kind of catastrophe that
could occur.
At the same time, however, mediations in many of the countries often
legitimised ideals of preparedness by referring to (or even exploiting)
an abstract sense of Angst and unease. Concrete civil defence prac-
tices and exercises also tended to operate with less catastrophic scenarios
than full-scale nuclear war. In her chapter on Danish civil defence ruin
towns, Farbøl points out that a key line of reasoning was that there
was no point in preparing for the impossible. Instead, resources were
geared towards manageable scenarios. These include conventional war
and limited nuclear attacks (see Chapters 4, 5 and 7), but also peace-
time nuclear accidents (Chapters 3 and 8), natural disasters and traffic
accidents (see, for instance, Chapters 3 and 6), which paved the way for
the kinds of all-hazards approach to emergency management prevalent
today. Whether this logic is inherent to imaginaries—that their propo-
nents create meaning by representing their shared visions as seamless and
coherent—is an open question.
This recurring calibration of sociotechnical imaginaries of civil defence
that sought to strike a balance between capabilities and ambitions and
attune new visions of preparedness to existing social norms, expectations
and practices is a striking, cross-cutting theme that emerges from this
volume. The complex of norms and practices that such imaginaries had
to accommodate included not only mundane habits of everyday life but
also (gradually shifting) gender roles, notions of good citizenship, and
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national narratives and identities related to security policy or the welfare
state.
In repeatedly performing this calibration, also in public, the risk of
overstretch was always present, however. Once cracks appeared in the
armour of civil defence, and they inevitably did, a host of other ques-
tions about its moral justification or allegations of its being out of touch
with reality gave rise to (self-)criticism and resistance. In the wider public
sphere, and especially among sceptics, detailed speculations about the
political dynamics behind a nuclear war and extrapolations of the conse-
quences of war for human life based on scientific opinion served to
destabilise official imaginaries. When civil defence demonstrated its effi-
ciency, it was liable to criticism that it was not concerned with the
most important threats, and once the limitations to its value in nuclear
war were recognised, it was vulnerable to charges of uselessness. Resis-
tance to a sociotechnical imaginary could take the form of friction or
outright opposition. In Chapter 6, van Lente details how a maternalist,
grassroots imaginary of the women’s civil defence organisation devel-
oped partly in opposition to the official, paternalist imaginary. At the
other end of the spectrum, Molitor (Chapter 3) and in particular Marti
(Chapter 8) demonstrate how civil defence was sometimes met with scep-
ticism and even outright resistance, because it was seen as futile or worse:
as contributing to the arms race and the likelihood of nuclear war.
The idea that civil defence itself constituted a militarisation of society
was a refrain of peace movements in Western Europe—especially during
the 1980s—and scholarly research, particularly in the USA, has detailed
how everyday life was affected by the logic of militarisation throughout
the Cold War (McEnaney 2000). Many mundane aspects of life—from
family relations to workplaces and infrastructures of living and mobility—
were transformed and assigned new, additional functions in light of the
ever-present risk of nuclear war. Dual-use shelters, for example, crept
into the foundations of private and public life. Yet, a larger question that
emerges from this book is whether the militarisation thesis puts the cart
in front of the horse. Several analyses in this book point in the oppo-
site direction, namely that the increasing public circulation of ideas about
survival and preparedness amounted instead to an ‘everydayification’ of
the military.
In the era of total war, the home front mattered more than ever, but
the war also took on a new quality as an ever-present, everyday risk and
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never more so than during a cold war. War no longer belonged exclu-
sively to the domain of armies and soldiers, bureaucratic planners and
civilians alike played a crucial role in the imaginary war. Though moti-
vated and legitimised by the unique, extraordinary and exceptional (and
imagined) disaster, civil defence was, in fact, a part of (real) everyday
existence for many citizens and a practical, daily and ordinary activity
for volunteers and professional civil defenders. It was (gendered) civic
engagement as well as a professional business, as Hogg (Chapter 4), van
Lente (Chapter 6) and Cronqvist and Grant (Chapter 9) make clear.
Furthermore, as the Cold War progressed, we see the contours of a new
sociotechnical imaginary emerge where nuclear war is replaced by an all-
hazards perspective. In this imaginary, a bracketing of the most apparent
low-risk/high-impact catastrophe gives way to a more limited concep-
tion of emergency preparedness focused on versatility and application
across a wide range of scenarios, as the chapters by Molitor (Chapter 3)
and Bennesved and Sylvest (Chapter 5) discuss. Though we still live in
the nuclear age, this remains the central focus of European preparedness
organisations.
Preparedness Redux
Among the questions that lie at the core of this book, one is of special
contemporary relevance. What knowledge can we attain from civil defence
history to the benefit of our contemporary European crisis-ridden soci-
eties as they prepare for future disruptions in the areas of health, military
conflict, climate change and digital infrastructure? The association of all
things atomic with the Cold War era may delude us to think nuclear
war is a bygone threat, but that is not the case. There is little doubt
that it should be counted among our present-day risks. Notwithstanding
renewed campaigns for nuclear disarmament and the adoption of and
entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,
the prospects of averting nuclear war through this route currently look
dim. Indeed, some nuclear-weapon states are expanding their arsenals,
while others have embarked on huge modernisation efforts that amount
to a ‘qualitative’ nuclear arms race. Against this background, it is hardly
surprising that in January of 2021 the Science and Security Board Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists kept the symbolic Doomsday Clock at 100
seconds to midnight—closer than it has ever been. The board noted in
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its statement that ‘an extremely dangerous global failure to address exis-
tential threats […] tightened its grip in the nuclear realm in the past year,
increasing the likelihood of catastrophe’.2
Still, the main reference point in the resurgence of preparedness as
both planning objective and cultural capital is not nuclear apocalypse but
a plethora of risks revolving around human interactions with technology
and nature. Disruptions likely to follow in the wake of accelerated climate
change, cyber warfare or increasingly perilous pandemics have prompted
contemporary scholarship and policymaking to focus on the concept of
resilience. In many respects, these threats differ from that of nuclear war,
and as the chapters in this volume amply demonstrate, there was much
more to civil defence and preparedness during the Cold War than nuclear
war (even if it loomed in the background most of the time). Today,
resilience is typically understood as an ability to recover a lost equilib-
rium (or attain a new one) following a large-scale disruption, shock or
catastrophe. As Sulfikar Amir has argued, current debates about resilience
are marked by a division between two approaches, one stressing the
social, cultural and political dimensions and preconditions of this ability,
and the second stressing the need for improving and fortifying its tech-
nical and material preconditions. Yet, Amir argues, ‘resilience is essentially
sociotechnical’, which means that is best viewed as ‘an embedded feature
that comes out of a hybrid construct where individuals and communities
are blended with the materiality of technology’ (Amir 2018: 4). Arguably,
this hybrid understanding informs several research and policy initiatives
in Europe. The new EU research and innovation framework Horizon
Europe, a e95.5 billion programme running from 2021 to 2027, is one
clear example of this trend.
What appears to be still out of sight, though, is that twentieth-century
civil defence provides the most complete historical case of such large-
scale attempts to make preparedness second nature and to make societies
resilient. As the chapters in this book demonstrate, civil defence was also
thoroughly sociotechnical. Given their inoculation to a mode of thinking
that emphasises the central role of context and circumstance in under-
standing human life, few historians believe that it is possible to transplant
historical lessons from one period to another. Neither do we. Our point
here is not that Cold War civil defence provides a template for contem-
porary systems of preparedness. The insights that history provides are of
a different order, but no less important. A core observation emerging
from this book is that preparedness measures are not independent of their
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political, social and cultural context. They affect, limit or promote partic-
ular forms of governance, democratic and civil engagement, social norms,
identities and visions of how we ought to co-exist as a society. Histor-
ical inquiry is as much a process of imagining or discovering the less
familiar and expanding our geographical, cultural and temporal reach as it
is anchored in the social and political present. If we let historical knowl-
edge of our sociotechnical past inform present-day concerns, including
discussions and debates on threats, fears, resilience and safety, we will be
in a better position to make sustainable, complex and mature decisions
for our desirable futures. We hope this book has contributed to just such
an expansion of horizons.
Notes
1. Among the plethora of recent studies that deploy the concept of
sociotechnical imaginaries, see, for example, Braun and Randell
(2020), Graf and Sonnenberger (2020), Gugganig (2021), Hassan
(2020), Scholin (2020), and Sovacool et al. (2020).
2. Science and Security Board, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
ed. John Mecklin, ‘This is your COVID wake-up call: It is 100
seconds to midnight – 2021 Doomsday Clock Statement’, available
at https://thebulletin.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/2021-
doomsday-clock-statement-1.pdf [accessed 29 March 2021].
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